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Various economic developments since 1972 have sharply limited
affordable construction and permanent financing for commercial and
other nonresidential properties, as well as for residential properties. As
a result, the construction industry has suffered its most severe crisis in
35 years' due both to intense competition for diminishing capital and
increased governmental restrictions on urban growth.2 In the commer-
cial sector, high interest rates have caused the failure of many construc-
tion projects and stopped countless others before they were started.
3
By the close of 1981, inflation, at an annual average rate of 13.04%,4
and unprecedented volatility in interest rates,5 had affected the housing
market so severely that only 4.2% of American families could afford a
$60,000, thirty-year fully amortizing6 loan at 16% interest.7 The higher
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nia and San Francisco Bars.
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1. See generally Kuklin, Real Estate Financing and The World We (Will) Live In, 13
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1116 (1978); Housing's Storm, Bus. WK., Sept. 7, 1981, at 60;
McMahan, The Future of the Real Estate Industry: Changing Supply Patterns, REAL EST.
REV., Spring 1977, at 68. One commentator noted: "In some areas, notably California, a
layering of zoning and environmental commissions has evolved which now places the cost of
the paperwork alone involved in obtaining the required development permits at $5,000 per
residential building lot." Strum, Today's Real Estate Financing Climate-Some of the Causes
and Some ofthe Problems, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 757, 760 (1978).
2. See Housing's Storm, supra note 1, at 63.
3. In the two-year period between 1978 and 1980, the decline in the number of build-
ing permits for apartment buildings was 20.57%; for office buildings, 14.40%; and for stores,
32.19%. See Construction & Building Products Division, Bureau of Industrial Economics,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Table C-2-Private Residential and Nonresidential Buildings Au-
thorized in 14,000 and 16,000 Permit-Issuing Places in the United States, CONSTRUCTION
REv. 30 (Nov.-Dec. 1982).
4. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE IN-
DEX FOR ALL URBAN CONSUMERS, U.S. CITY AVERAGE, ALL ITEMS (Jan. 1982) (average
annual increase from 1972 through 1981 based on percentage of 1972 index).
5. The prime interest rate charged by nationally chartered banks increased from an
average of 5.8% in 1972 to 20.5% in August 1981. The average interest rate charged by
federal savings and loans for first mortgages during the same period increased from 7.38% to
17.33%. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Aggregates and
Interest Rates; Prime Rate Charged by Banks, FED. RES. BULL. (June 1973-1982).
6. A fully amortizing loan is "one where there are partial payments of the principal,
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cost of financing, labor, and materials raised the median price of a new
home from $43,340 in 1976 to $78,220 in 1981.8
Institutional lenders, holding many low-yield, fixed-interest-rate
loans in their portfolios, underwent a similar economic squeeze.9 Dur-
ing the periods of high inflation in the 1970's, deposits eroded drasti-
cally as depositors turned to higher yield investments.' 0 To
compensate, lenders were forced to borrow in the short-term market at
substantially higher rates of interest.1' This development further in-
creased lending rates resulting in new borrowers subsidizing older
mortgagors who benefited from pre-inflation costs.' 2 By the close of
1975, long-term fully amortizing loans had become uneconomical, and
lenders began offering various alternatives instead, including five-to-
and accrued interest, at stated periods for a definite time, at the expiration of which the
entire indebtedness will be extinguished." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 108 (4th ed. 1957).
7. In a recent survey of 2,237 new home shoppers conducted by Housing Magazine,
the maximum acceptable interest rate on a home loan was 13%. CAL. REAL EST., Feb. 1982,
at 8.
The following table depicts the reduction of affordable housing resulting from increased
lending rates:
Affordability of Housing
Based on a 30-Year Term, $60,000 Mortgage
Annual
Income Number of Percent of
Interest Monthly Needed Families Who Families Who
Rate Payment to Afford Can Afford Can Afford
9 $483 $33,504 11,786,000 20.6%
10 527 35,626 10,328,000 18.4%
11 572 37,776 9,222,000 16.2%
12 617 39,936 7,896,000 13.6%
13 664 42,292 6,523,000 11.4%
14, 711 44,448 5,207,000 9.3%
15 738 46,704 3,833,000 6.7%
16 807 49,056 2,402,000 4.2%
Reichelt, SAMS: Recognizing Economic Reality, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1981, at 30, 37.
8. THE GUARANTOR, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 14. A recent survey performed by the Cali-
fornia Association of Realtors showed, as of November 1981, the median price of existing
single-family homes in California was $102,551. CAL. REAL EST., Feb. 1982, at 8.
9. See generally Cowan & Foley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance, 13
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1075 (1978); Iezman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments.- Their
Effect on Residential Financing, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Iezman,
Alternatives].
10. See Cowan & Foley, supra note 9, at 1077.
11. "[Tlhe cost of funds ... [is] the highest in more than 50 years. Boyle, Dra-
matic Changes Likely in Real Estate Financing, AM. BANKER, May 5, 1980, at 16.
12. See Iezman, Alternatives, supra note 9, at 4.
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ten-year, interest-only, balloon-payment loans. 13 Federal and state
governments, together with institutional lenders, promulgated a
number of innovative lending practices. The most significant develop-
ment was the emergence in 1977 of the so-called "creative financing"
device, or alternative mortgage instrument ("AMI").
14
13. See Barton & Morrison, Equity Particoation Agreements Between Institutional
Lenders andReal Estate Developers, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929, 932 (1981).
14. See generally FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, THE ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE
INSTRUMENTS RESEARCH STUDY (Kaplan ed. 1977). This study is published in three
volumes and is an excellent source of statistical information concerning AMIs.
There are various AMIs presently available to home purchasers under both federal and
California law. Although state law is generally more restrictive than federal law for compa-
rable loans, it should be noted that the Gan Act, see infra text accompanying notes 217-20,
creates a federal preemption whereby certain state lenders will be subject to only the more
favorable of either federal or state restrictions on a particular loan. Some of these loan
structures are:
A. Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM): CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1982).
The interest rate on a California VRM varies with a referenced index reflecting changes in
the market interest rate. Although future monthly payments are unknown at the time the
loan is originated, the VRM interest rate cannot increase more than 2.5 % over the life of the
loan, with no increase greater than % in any six-month period and no increase during the
first six months of the loan.
B. Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM): 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4b (1982); Cal. Admin.
Code tit. 10, R. 178.4(c) (1981). Under a GPM, the monthly payments start lower than
comparable fixed-rate mortgages but rise later. The graduation rate, the term of graduation,
and the interest rate are fixed for the life of the loan.
C. Reverse Annuity Mortgage (RAM): California savings and loan associations are
allowed to offer RAM loans pursuant to the regulations promulgated in CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 10, R. 178.4(d) (1981). Federally chartered savings and loan associations offer RAMs
under 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(c) (1982). In a rising-debt RAM the borrower receives monthly
disbursements from the lender, gradually increasing the balance of the loan to a predeter-
mined maximum. At the end of the term, the borrower can either sell the home or refinance
it. A fixed debt with life annuity RAM calls for interest-only payments with the loan used to
purchase a whole life annuity. From the annuity, the insurance company pays interest to the
lender and the balance of the funds to the borrower. The balance is due on the earlier of the
sale of the home or expiration of the term.
D. Pledged Account Loan (PAL): 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(a)(5) (1982). The PAL is a
form of graduated payment mortgage. Early reduced loan payments result from supple-
ments deducted from the homebuyer's initial down payment which is placed in an interest-
bearing savings account. Each month a certain portion of those funds are withdrawn to
supplement the monthly payment.
E. Renegotiable Rate Mortgage (RRM): CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1916.8, 1916.9 (West
Supp. 1982). The California RRM is a form of variable rate mortgage in which the interest
rate cannot increase or decrease more than 5% over the life of the loan, with increases occur-
ring no more than every three, four or five years. The maximum increase is lA% each year,
multiplied by the number of years in the loan term up to the maximum permitted. RRMs
can be long-term loans with periodic readjustments or short-term loans that can be automat-
ically renewed. California RRMs are usually short-term loans secured by 30-year deeds of
trust.
F. Adjustable Rate Loans (ARL): Id § 1916.7 (West Supp. 1982); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
4(a), (b) (1982). A California ARL must have a term of at least 29 years and must be amor-
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AMIs, however, only served to compound the woes of the indus-
try. Characterized by variable interest rates, short terms, and large bal-
loon payments, AMIs, while a hedge against inflation for the lender,
have only partially helped more families and businesses meet the
financial qualifications for a real property secured loan.15 Under the
provisions of a standard adjustable rate mortage, an annual income of
$30,800, 56% higher than the average American income, would be nec-
essary for an 80% loan for the purchase of a median-priced home.
16
Another financing technique appearing during the 1970's was the
shared equity loan, or equity participation arrangement ("EPA").
Used primarily in commercial real estate settings, 17 an EPA creates a
joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, joint venture, or partnership ar-
rangement between the "borrower" and the "lender." 18 The financing
for the project is often provided without a fixed interest charge or other
fixed return to the "lender," and the developer/owner is often permit-
ted to take advantage of all the project's tax benefits. The financing
party receives, in lieu of the traditional security device, an ownership
interest in the project and is repaid when the project yields a net posi-
tive cash flow or when the property is sold. EPAs, however, have char-
acteristics which some consider objectionable. In a commercial setting,
tized over a period of not less than 30 years. The interest rate of a California ARL may
increase no more than 7.5% annually and may be adjusted no more than two times per year.
The federal regulations allow variable or adjustable rates without the restrictions of either
the California ARL or VRM.
15. See Reichelt, supra note 7, at 33.
16. The above assumes a 16% per annum interest rate. See Iezman, Shared Apprecia-
tion Mortgage, L.A. LAW., May 1981, at 24 [hereinafter cited as Iezman, Mortgage]. Tradi-
tionally, homeowners devoted no more than 25% of their gross income to mortgage
payments, including interest and taxes. It is not unusual now for a homeowner to devote
40% of his or her gross income to mortgage payments. Klaman, The Short-Term Housing
Outlook. Slow, Sluggish Growth, AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 1980, at 32.
17. See generally Barton & Morrison, supra note 13; Roegge, Talbot & Zinman, Real
Estate Equity Investments and The Institutional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained,
39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (1971); Report of Subcommittee on Debtor-Creditor Problems of
Real Estate Financing Committee, Equity and Debt Particioation-Possible Conflict of Du-
ties, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 509 (1974); Comment, Equity Particpation In Texas: A
Lender's Dream Or a Usurious Nightmare?, 34 Sw. L.J. 877 (1980).
18. One problem encountered when using EPAs is the uncertainty as to whether the
transaction is a loan, a true equity participation (in which the financing party is a co-owner
for all purposes), or a hybrid. Numerous authors commenting on EPAs have confused loan
terminology and ownership terminology. E.g., Baker & Gianone, Equities: An Alternative to
the First Mortgage, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1979, at 37. Barton & Morrison, supra note
13, at 933; Gallagher, Computing the Lender's Yield on an Equity Participation Mortgage,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Feb. 1981, at 33, 37; Comment, supra note 17, at 879. One advantage
of a shared appreciation mortgage (SAM) is that this confusion is avoided. See infra text
accompanying notes 26-27, 281-88, 379-92.
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many developers resented the limitations placed on their traditional in-
dependence by the management role that most financing parties re-
quired as an integral part of their equity participation. 19 In the
residential market, the thought of owning a home as co-tenant with a
bank did not appeal to many American homeowners.
20
In 1980, institutional lenders, encouraged by proposed federal reg-
ulations,21 began promoting yet another lending device, the shared ap-
preciation mortgage ("SAM").22 A typical SAM is a loan secured by a
lien upon real property in which the currently payable interest rate is
fixed below the prevailing market rate for a standard fixed-rate mort-
gage. In exchange, the lender receives, as "contingent deferred" inter-
est, a predetermined share of the property's appreciation between the
time the loan is made and the time the property is sold or the loan
otherwise is paid. The appreciation portion of the interest is "contin-
gent" because it is payable only to the extent the property appreciates
in value. It is "deferred" because it is not payable until the maturity
date of the loan or the sale of the property.
23
SAMs offer a promising solution to many of the problems cur-
rently facing the real estate industry. Unlike traditional AMIs, SAMs
allow moderate income households to qualify for larger loans by reduc-
ing the fixed monthly mortgage payments.24 Developers or owners of
commercial property enjoy similar benefits. SAMs also protect the
19. See Barton & Morrison, supra note 13, at 933.
20. See The Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1981, at Real Estate, E55.
21. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") Resolution No. 80-610 (Sept. 30,
1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 66,801 (1980) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(b)); see also text
accompanying notes 217-29.
22. Wall St. I., Aug. 22, 1980, at 4, col. 2. Advance Mortgage Corporation, a subsidiary
of Oppenheim & Co., appears to have been the first major promoter of SAMs. More than
100 SAMs were planned to be marketed by Advance Mortgage by the end of 1980. Coast
Federal Savings & Loan Association in Sarasota, Florida, filled its $2.5 million allotment
with Advance Mortgage in three days. The remainder of Advance Mortgage Corp.'s first
SAMs originated in Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Tempe, Phoenix, and Denver. Mylod, Offi-
cial Describes Experience with SAMs, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 1981, at 12-13. Some in-
stitutional lenders were making SAMs or similar loans as early as 1969. See Reichelt, supra
note 7, at 33.
23. There are a number of ways SAMs can be structured. For instance, many SAMs
are 30-year loans with the lender receiving payment of principal and deferred contingent
interest upon the sale of the secured property or maturity of the note. Other SAMs are
short-term and subject to regular reappraisal and payment of contingent deferred interest.
SAMs can be either amortizing or nonamortizing. The various SAMs, as well as many other
AMIs, involve similar legal questions; the variations in form do not alter the legal
implications.
24. See Iezman, Mortgage, supra note 16, at 24. The following table compares the
payment and equity schedules of a fixed rate mortgage, VRM, GPM and SAM:
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lender from unanticipated inflation.25
One important advantage of SAMs is that they are not limited to
times of great inflationary expectations. Both the borrower and lender
may find SAMs desirable when the inflationary outlook is mixed. The
fluctuations in inflation during the past few years, for instance, have
caused both borrower and lender to question the absolute inflexibility
of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. If rates go up, one party loses; if
rates go down, the other loses. Allowing the lender to share in any
appreciation of the mortgaged property, when combined with a fixed-
rate interest element, provides much needed flexibility. Over the inter-
mediate and long terms, interest and inflation rates will increase and




Type of Average Interest Unrealized
Mortgage Rate Appreciation)
$100,000 house
$ 80,000 loan 1-3 yrs. 4-5 yrs. 6-10 yrs. 5th yr. 10th yr.
Fixed Rate $948 $948 $ 948 $82,306 $183,147
14% 14% 14%
VRM $979 $1,058 $1,044 $82,062 $182,442
14.5% 15.74% 15.5%
GPM $795 $951 $1,060 $73,034 $174,171
14% 14% 14%
SAM $673 $673 $673 $63,708 $134,083
9.5% 9.5% 9.5%
Hayes, Architects of Exotic Mortgages, FORTUNE, Dec. 29, 1980, at 66, 68; see also Commer-
cial Mortgage Lenders Taking Hard Stance, Demanding More of the Action, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 3, 1980, at 8.
25. See FHLBB Resolution No. 80-610, supra note 21, at 66,802; Shared Appreciation
Mortgage, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,802 (1980).
The following table shows the average rates of appreciation, by percentage in existing
home prices, nationwide:
Three-Year Moving Average Rates of Appreciation
from 1970 through 1980
Three-year United North
Period States Northeast Central South West
1970-1972 7% 8% 8% 9% 6%
1971-1973 8 9 8 9 8
1972-1974 9 10 8 10 10
1973-1975 10 10 8 10 12
1974-1976 10 8 9 8 14
1975-1977 10 7 10 7 18
1976-1978 11 7 12 9 19
1977-1979 14 9 13 12 19
1978-1980 12 10 12 13 16
Thygerson, Pricing the SAM, SAVINGS & LOAN NEws, Dec. 1980, at 29.
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against increases in interest rates, while allowing the borrower to pro-
vide that protection at the expense of a portion of the property's in-
flated value, all determined at the time of sale of the property.
Conversely, if inflation and interest rates go down, the borrower bene-
fits from the lower fixed-rate interest. Both borrowers and lenders may
wish to use SAMs to balance variations in the interest and inflation
rates occurring over the life of the loan.
SAMs, furthermore, do not create the uncertainty often associated
with EPAs as to whether the transaction is a loan or an equity partici-
pation. As does a SAM, an EPA allows the financing party to base part
or all of its return on the property's appreciation value. The EPA does
this by making the financing party a co-owner rather than a lender.
26
Although the EPA achieves the financing party's goal of basing return
upon appreciation, other unintended results sometimes follow because
entirely different rights, benefits, and burdens attach where two parties
are co-owners than attach where the relationship is that of lender and
borrower. The financing party in an EPA may not wish to be bound by
the rights, benefits, and burdens concomitant with co-ownership. In
contrast, a SAM clearly defines the intended relationship as that of bor-
rower and lender, thereby permitting the intended allocation of benefits
and burdens.27
The advantages of SAMs over other so-called creative financing
devices suggest that SAMs will play a major role in the real estate mar-
ket in this decade.28 Notwithstanding the apparent complexity of this
new lending instrument, the initial offerings of residential SAMs have
been exhausted within days.29 Moreover, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation has adopted guidelines designed to encourage
the purchase of SAMs on the secondary market.30 More importantly,
on August 23, 1982, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB")
promulgated final regulations permitting federal savings and loan as-
sociations to make SAMs.31 As secondary markets adjust to the some-
what unusual characteristics of SAMs, and as the contours of these
instruments become defined through legislative action, the demand for
26. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
27. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.160 (West Supp. 1982).
28. See Two Equity Mortgage Plans Seek to Hold Down Housing Costs, SAVINGS &
LOAN NEWS, Oct. 1980, at 19.
29. See supra note 22.
30. See FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Shared Equity Plans,
SELLER'S GUIDE TO CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES, at 122 (Change 21, Dec. 29, 1981).
31. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,612 (1982) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-545.8-8). See infra
text accompanying notes 217-29.
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SAMs will increase.32 The complexity of SAMs may result in their be-
coming a more popular tool in the commercial arena than in the
residential.
After describing California statutory and nonstatutory SAMs, this
Article will explore several legal and practical problems unique to this
financing device and other AMIs. The legal problems include usury
questions, the priority of liens against the property, and restraints on
alienation, including due-on-sale clauses. This Article also discusses
the potential for redlining, SAMs in relation to the Unruh Civil Rights
Act, and possible tax implications. Finally, legal problems arising from
SAMs as securities, partnership issues, and the potential for clogging
the equity of redemption will be examined. The practical problems in-
herent in SAMs addressed by this Article include accounting for im-
provements made to the property, title insurance, security instruments,
lender's problems and foreclosure. This Article concludes that both the
legal and practical problems facing SAMs may be resolved under cur-
rent precedents and that the numerous problems that some have felt
SAMs and other AMIs create should not deter lenders from making
such loans.
The Statutory and Nonstatutory Shared
Appreciation Mortgage
California Statutory Shared Appreciation Mortgages
The first comprehensive statute regulating SAMs was signed into
law by the Governor of California on October 1, 1981. 33 The Legisla-
ture adopted this statute in an effort to alleviate California's residential
32. Cf. Reichelt, supra note 7, at 40.
33. Act of October 2, 1981, ch. 1144, 1981 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 714 (Deering) (codi-
fied at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1917.110-1917.175 (West Supp. 1982)) (Assem. Bill No. 2168).
Simultaneously, the California Legislature also passed the Act of October 2, 198 1, ch. 1143,
1981 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 702 (Deering) (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1917.010-1917.075
(West Supp. 1982)) (Assem. Bill No. 2167), allowing a "comprehensive scheme" for provid-
ing SAMs by persons acting on behalf of pension funds subject to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Assembly Bill 2168 is more favorable to lenders.
Among the important differences between the measures are: the permissible amortization
rates, the initial permissible fixed interest rates, the refinancing which the lender must offer
at maturity, and the manner in which property is appraised. Both Acts were repealed and
replaced by the Act of July 9, 1982, Chapter 466. The July 9 act is identical to the repealed
acts; its sole purpose was to move the acts to the correct division of the Civil Code. The
ERISA SAM statute contains a "sunset" date of January 1, 1990, while the other SAM
statute contains a "sunset" date of January 1, 1987. The sunset dates, often inserted in legis-
lation creating new programs in order to encourage "aye" votes on the floor of the legisla-
ture, should not be construed as predicting a limited future for these "statutory" SAMs (as
defined infra in note 36).
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housing crisis by encouraging lenders to provide increased funding for
SAMs.34 Neither the federal government nor any other state legisla-
tures have adopted comprehensive laws regulating or encouraging
SAMs; 35 the California SAM statute will serve, therefore, as a model
for future legislative action addressed toward SAMs.
Several characteristics distinguish the California statutory SAM.
36
First, the interest rate provision of a SAM is bifurcated; it consists of a
fixed interest feature set below prevailing market rates 37 and a contin-
gent deferred interest feature38 established as a percentage of the net
appreciated value39 of the secured property as of the maturity date.
The buyer must pay the contingent deferred interest upon the earliest
of (1) the loan's maturity, (2) acceleration of the loan upon default, or
(3) the sale or transfer of the secured property.40 Second, in contrast to
EPAs, the SAM lender does not become a co-owner, joint venturer or
partner with the borrower. The parties are debtor and creditor, and a
deed of trust or mortgage held by the lender secures the SAM.
41
The third feature of the statutory SAM, one which safeguards the
lender's contingent interest, requires that a SAM be paid in full upon
the sale or transfer of the secured property.42 The California SAM stat-
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.1 10(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1982). See generally SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON BANKING AND COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF AB 2168 (COSTA) AS AMENDED IN THE
SENATE ON AUGUST 20, 1981, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (hearing Aug. 26, 1981).
35. Only New Mexico, among the states, has considered legislation similar to the Cali-
fornia SAM statute. The bill, N.M. S. 92, 35th Legis., 2d Sess. (1982), was defeated in the
1982 session of the New Mexico legislature. New FHLBB regulations, see infra text accom-
panying footnotes 217-229, impose a skeletal framework for SAMs at the federal level.
36. There are, essentially, two California SAM statutes. Civil Code §§ 1917.010-
1917.075 enable pension funds to make SAMs. Civil Code §§ 1917.110-1917.175, the pri-
mary focus of this Article insofar as statutory SAMs are concerned, permit all "lenders" to
make SAMs. SAMs created under §§ 1917.110-1917.175 are herein called "statutory
SAMs." Lenders in California may also create SAMs which do not fit the SAM statute's
definitions; such SAMs are herein defined as "nonstatutory SAMs." See infra note 67.
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.120 (West Supp. 1982). "Prevailing market rate" is defined
in § 1917.120(g) as the "weighted average yield accepted by the Federal National Mortgage
Association in its most recent free market system auction for four-month conventional mort-
gage commitments."
38. The contingent deferred interest portion serves a purpose similar to the "equity
kicker" feature in loans in which the borrower must pay both monthly fixed interest and
monthly contingent interest based on the operational net income of the borrower.
39. "Net appreciated value" is defined in § 1917.120(f) as "the fair market value less
the sum of the borrower's cost of the property and the value of capital improvements." The
provision also allows the borrower's selling costs as a deduction from fair market value in
determining "net appreciated value."
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.131(e) (West Supp. 1982).
41. Id. §§ 1917.131(c), 1917.160 (West Supp. 1982).
42. Id. § 1917.162 (West Supp. 1982). A "sale" does not include a transfer specified in
CAL. Crv. CODE § 2924.6 (transfers between spouses, transfers into an inter vivos trust, or
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ute defines a "sale" as any transfer of title to the real property securing
the loan, including refinancing, a trustee's sale, or a land sale contract
giving the purchaser the right to possess the property before actual
transfer of title.
43
The fixed interest rate of a 9tatutory SAM, and the extent of the
lender's participation in the net appreciated value of the secured prop-
erty, are determined by the ratio between the loan amount and the
property's original value, and by a formula based upon a percentage of
the prevaiiing market rate.44 A lender's share in the property's net ap-
preciated value cannot exceed 50%.
45
Unlike traditional mortgages, SAMs must contain a method for
transactions in which the secured property is made subject to a junior encumbrance or lien).
Id. § 1917.120(i) (West Supp. 1982). See infra text accompanying notes 181-202.
43. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1917.120(i) (West Supp. 1982). Further, the California SAM
statute provides: (a) the term of a statutory SAM must be at least seven but no more than 30
years; (b) the monthly installment payments must be such as would amortize the loan in not
less than 30 nor more than 40 years; (c) the loan may be secured only by real property
improved with one to four dwelling units, and (d) the loan must finance only owner-occu-
pied dwelling units. To ensure the affordability of SAMs, the statute sets a ceiling on the
amount lenders can charge borrowers as a loan fee. The limit is set at 2% of the principal
amount of the loan or $500, whichever is greater. In addition, the loan must be prepayable.
Id. §§ 1917.130-1917.132 (West Supp. 1982). The prepayment provisions largely duplicate
statutory provisions applicable to loans made by other than private lenders. Id. § 2954.9
(West Supp. 1982).
44. Civil Code § 1917.131(d) reads in part: "The percentage by which the fixed interest
rate is reduced below the applicable prevailing rate shall be at least one-half the lender's
percentage share of net appreciated value which is contingent deferred interest, except that if
the shared appreciation loan is for less than 80 percent of the borrower's purchase price of
the property, the percentage by which the fixed interest rate is reduced below the applicable
prevailing rate shall be at least two-thirds the lender's percentage share of net appreciated
value which is contingent deferred interest."
45. Id. § 1917.120(c) (West Supp. 1982); see also Thygerson, Pricing The SharedAppre-
ciation Loan Deserves Thought, SAVINGS & LOAN NEws, Nov. 1980, at 34. This Article
contends that a lender's competitive pricing of SAMs depends upon four key variables:
(1) The estimated rate of home appreciation;
(2) The lender's share of home appreciation-the "appreciation kicker";
(3) The downpayment; and
(4) The term of the loan.
The following illustration provides a clear example of a statutory SAM:
Assumptions:
Cost or value of property $80,000
Amount financed (800) 64,000
Prevailing market mortgage rate 15%
Deferred contingent interest (lender's share of net appreciated value of
property) 500
Fixed interest rate of SAM (reduction of one half of 50%, or 25%, below
prevailing market rate) 11.25%
Level monthly payments (amortized 30 years) $622
Appreciation of property (compounded per annum) 8%
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determining the property's fair market value when the loan matures.
The California SAM statute provides four procedures for calculating
fair market value: (1) a mutually agreed-upon value between borrower
and lender,4 (2) lender's stipulation of the minimum amount it consid-
ers to be the fair market value; if acceptable to the borrower, the stipu-
lated figure remains firm for a maximum of 150 days;47 (3) in the case
of a cash sale where the borrower has not requested a stipulated mini-
mum value, the gross sales price, if reflective of market value, deter-
mines the fair market value;48 and (4) barring any agreement to the
contrary, the fair market value must be determined by averaging two
appraisals.49 If the property is damaged beyond normal wear and tear
and is not fully repaired, the fair market value is the value of the prop-
erty assuming the repair has been made.50 The borrower, therefore,
Settlement Statement After Five Years:
Gross sale proceeds $117,546
Less Cost (assuming no capital improvements) (80,000)
Appreciation 37,546
Lender's share of appreciation 18,773
Borrower's share of appreciation 18,773
Under this scenario, the lender's internal rate of return over the term of the loan is
15.24%.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.142 (West Supp. 1982).
47. Id. § 1917.140 (West Supp. 1982).
48. Id. § 1917.141(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1982).
49. Id. § 1917.142 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "When Section 1917.141 requires the
application of this section, the fair market value shall be determined as the average of two
appraisals of the property performed as described in this section. If possible, the appraisals
shall be based on the sale prices of comparable properties in the market area sold within the
preceding three-month period. The appraisals shall be made upon request of the lender by
two independent residential appraisers, one to be selected by the. lender and one by the
borrower. Each appraiser shall be approved by the Federal National Mortgage Association.
The cost of the appraiser selected by the lender shall be borne by the lender, and the cost of
the appraiser selected.by the borrower shall be borne by the borrower, unless the average of
the two appraisals equals or is less than the gross sale price of the property, in which case the
lender shall also pay the fee of the borrower's appraiser up to two hundred dollars ($200). If
either of the appraisers determines that the gross sale price does not reasonably reflect the
fair market value of the property, or, in the case of a sale for which appraisal is required by
this section, then the fair market value of the property shall be determined as the average of
the two appraisals. If the borrower fails to select a qualified appraiser within 15 days after
the lender has notified the borrower in writing of the lender's request for an appraisal of the
property, the reasons therefor, and the borrower's option to select an independent appraiser
within 15 days after the lender's request is submitted to the borrower, the lender may desig-
nate the second appraiser, provided the lender's request informs the borrower of this time
limitation, and that the lender will select an appraiser on behalf of the borrower in the event
the borrower fails to designate an appraiser, with consequent cost to the borrower. If pursu-
ant to this section the lender designates the second appraiser, the cost of both appraisals
shall be borne equally by the borrower and lender."
50. Id. "if in any case the property has been damaged (other than normal wear and
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cannot decrease the contingent deferred interest through its own waste.
The California SAM statute also addresses the problem of distrib-
uting the value of improvements made to the secured property during
the term of the loan. Permanent improvements would be discouraged
unless at least a portion of the improvement costs could be added to the
original cost, or deducted from the sales price, before assessing the
amount of contingent deferred interest payable to the lender. The Cali-
fornia statute provides that, should the borrower make capital im-
provements in any twelve-month period that cost more than $2,500,
any resulting increase in the value of the property of $2,500 or more
can be added to the borrower's cost of the property in determining the
net appreciated value. 51 However, if the borrower performs 50% or
more of the value of the labor or other work on the improvement, only
the value of the improvement, and not its cost, must exceed $2,500.52
The statute also contains provisions concerning the reporting of im-
provements and the method of reconciliation in the event of a dispute
over the value.
53
Another feature of the California statutory SAM protects the bor-
rower from a forced sale in the case of a short-term loan. If a SAM
with a term of less than ten years matures, the lender must offer or
arrange refinancing of the remaining obligation.54 When feasible, the
tear) and the damage has not been fully repaired, the determination of fair market value
shall be based on the condition of the property not including the damage."
51. Id. § 1917.150 (West Supp. 1982).
52. Id. § 1917.150(d).
53. Id. § 1917.150(a), (b). Subsection (b) provides: "If, within 30 days of receipt of the
notice, the lender questions the claimed increase in value of the property by reason of the
improvements, the lender and the borrower may, by mutual agreement, establish the value
of the capital improvements or the lender may require appraisal of the property. An ap-
praisal shall be made to determine the increase in value of the property, if any, by reason of
the improvements, by two appraisers selected in the same manner specified in section
1917.142. If appraisals are performed, the increase in value resulting from the improve-
ments for the purposes of this section, shall be one-half of the sum of the two appraisals.
The cost of the appraiser selected by the borrower shall be borne by the borrower, and the
cost of the appraiser selected by the lender shall be borne by the lender."
54. See id. § 1917.133(a) (West Supp. 1982): "The refinancing may be provided di-
rectly by the lender or another mortgage lender, or the lender may arrange at the time of
making the shared appreciation loan for the refinancing to be provided by a federally or
state chartered bank or savings and loan association doing business in this state or by a
qualified mortgage banker....
"If the original lender is a bank or savings and loan association doing business in this
state or a qualified mortgage banker, it may provide the refinancing commitment to the
borrower required by this section and assignees or successors in interest of the original
lender shall not be guarantors of the refinancing obligation, provided the shared apprecia-
tion loan contains this limitation, which is fully and fairly disclosed to the borrower, and the
original lender's refinancing commitment is fully enforceable by the borrower."
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refinanced loan term must result in a repayment schedule based on a
maturity date not less than thirty years from the date of the SAM's
origination.5 5 At the time of refinancing, the proceeds from the new
loan would be used to satisfy the contingent deferred interest obliga-
tion, and the borrower would then occupy the same position as any
other borrower under a deed of trust.
5 6
The California legislature designed the SAM statute to facilitate
the making of residential SAMs,57 thereby "promot[ing] alternative
means of supplying affordable housing. ' 58 To encourage SAMs, the
statute offers several purported 9 benefits to SAM lenders who make
loans conforming to it. First, the statute provides that SAMs with fixed
interest rates below applicable California usury limits will not become
usurious by reason of the contingent deferred interest element.60 Sec-
ond, the statute gives the lien of a SAM priority, even as to the contin-
gent deferred interest, over any other lien or encumbrance recorded
after the shared appreciation instrument.61 Third, the California SAM
55. Id. § 1917.133(b).
56. See id. § 1917.133(e).
57. Civil Code § 1917.163 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "This chapter facilitates the
making of shared appreciation financing in this state which conforms to the provisions of
this chapter." The statute, however, does not prohibit SAMs which do not conform to the
statutory guidelines. Id.
58. Id. § 1917.110 (West Supp. 1982): "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that:
"(a) It is necessary and essential that the state provide and promote alternative means
of supplying affordable housing to the citizens of the state.
"(b) Because of current economic conditions, including the unprecedented fluctuation
in interest rates, alternative mortgage instruments must be developed to supplement the
standard long-term, fixed-rate mortgage.
"(c) State facilitation of the shared appreciation loan will serve the need to develop
alternative means of financing housing, particularly new homes, and will help to create vi-
tally needed jobs in the construction industry."
While technically the California SAM statute applies only to SAMs meeting the definitional
requirements of that statute, it is important to recognize that the California Legislature has
found and declared that alternative mortgage instruments (including, e.g., both statutory
and nonstatutory SAMs) "must be developed." Id § 1917.110(b).
59. These benefits are described as "purported" because most or all of them would
accrue to California SAMs that do not conform to the statutory definition, i.e., to nonstatu-
tory SAMs. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.167 (West Supp. 1982): "A shared appreciation loan which
at origination bears a fixed interest rate complying with the usury provisions of Article XV
of the California Constitution shall not be deemed to become usurious by reason of the
payment of contingent deferred interest pursuant to this Chapter."
61. See id. § 1917.166 (West Supp. 1982): "The lien of a shared appreciation loan,
including the principal amount and all interest, whether accrued or to be accrued, and all
amounts of contingent deferred interest, shall attach from the time of the recordation of the
deed of trust securing the loan, and the lien, including the lien of the interest accrued or to
be accrued and of the contingent deferred interest, shall have priority over any other lien or
encumbrance affecting the property secured by the shared appreciation instrument, recorded
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statute offers a legislative exemption from the possible effect of Wel-
lenkamp v. Bank of America62 and its progeny.63 Fourth, the statute
frees SAM interest rates from provisions of the Civil Code and the Fi-
nancial Code regulating variable rate mortgages (VRMs) and renego-
tiable rate mortgages (RRMs).64 Fifth, disclosures made pursuant to
the SAM statute are the only state law disclosures required of SAM
lenders.65 Finally, the act purports to exempt at least some SAMs from
the securities qualification requirements of the California Corporations
Code.
66
Nonstatutory Shared Appreciation Mortgages
The California legislature intended the SAM statute to facilitate
after the time of recordation of the shared appreciation instrument. However, nothing in
this section or Section 1917.165 shall preclude a junior lien or encumbrance subordinate to
the obligation of the shared appreciation loan. In no case may a junior lien achieve priority
over the lien securing the obligation of the shared appreciation loan, provided that nothing
in this section shall be construed to supersede Section 3134 of the Civil Code."
62. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
63. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1917.162 (West Supp. 1982): "(a) Notwithstanding Section 711,
a provision in a shared appreciation loan made pursuant to this chapter permitting the
lender to accelerate the maturity date of the principal and accrued interest on the loan upon
sale of the property shall be valid and enforceable against the borrower, except as may be
precluded by Section 2924.6.
"(b) The Legislature finds and declares that potential exposure to liability for enforce-
ment of a 'due-on-sale' clause consistent with Section 711, as interpreted by the courts,
makes use of such a provision impractical. Moreover, the additional risks to the lender
inherent in shared appreciation financing are greater with longer loan terms (which are more
desirable from the standpoint of housing affordability), but this risk is reduced with an en-
forceable 'due-on-sale' clause. Therefore, in order to facilitate shared appreciation financ-
ing, it is necessary to establish the exception specified in subdivision (a)."
64. See id. § 1917.164 (West Supp. 1982): "A shared appreciation loan shall not be
subject to any provision of this code or the Financial Code which limits the interest rate or
change of interest rate of variable interest rate or renegotiable interest instruments, or which
requires particular language or provisions in security instruments securing variable or rene-
gotiable rate obligations or in evidences of those debts.
This section is declaratory of existing law."
65. Id. § 1917.170(a) (West Supp. 1982): "(a) The disclosures made pursuant to this
chapter, as required, shall be the only disclosures required to be made pursuant to state law
for shared appreciation loans, notwithstanding any contrary provision applicable to loans
not made under this chapter, except those, if any, that may be required by reason of the
application of Division 1 (commencing with Section 25000) of the Corporations Code [relat-
ing to securities qualification requirements], or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11000)
of Part 2 of Division 4 of the Business and Professions Code [Subdivided Lands Act] .. "
This section does not exempt SAM lenders from the disclosure requirements of the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act.
66. See id. § 1917.168 (West Supp. 1982): "The qualification requirements of Sections
25110, 25120, and 25130 of the Corporations Code do not apply to a shared appreciation




and encourage residential SAMs. Nothing in the statute prohibits the
making of a SAM that does not conform to it.67 Additionally, upon
close scrutiny, it appears that most, if not all, of the benefits purport-
edly bestowed on SAMs conforming to the statute are illusory in the
sense that these benefits already exist for all SAMs.
68
The first, second, and third benefits are discussed in detail in the
next section of this Article examining legal questions.69 The fourth
benefit, exempting SAMs from laws regulating VRMs and RRMs,
merely restates existing law; the benefit is therefore available to non-
statutory SAMs as well.70 The fifth benefit, exempting SAMs from any
other disclosure requirements of California law, apparently refers to
the disclosure requirements imposed on VRMs and RRMs.7' How-
ever, the California SAM statute expressly states that, as a matter
which is "declaratory of existing law,"72 SAMs are not subject to stat-
utes regulating VRMs and RRMs; i.e., SAMs are deemed not to be
either VRMs or RRMs. Therefore, VRM and RRM disclosure re-
quirements are not applicable to SAMs, whether or not they conform to
the SAM statute. The last purported benefit tautologically states that
statutory SAMs need not be qualified under the California Corporate
Securities Law of 1968 "to the extent the exemption [of section
25100(p) of that law] is applicable.173 Obviously, to the extent the ex-
emption from qualification of the Corporate Securities Law is applica-
ble to statutory SAMs, it is applicable to nonstatutory SAMs. The
SAM statute's provision is meaningless because it purports neither to
enlarge the exemption nor to state whether the exemption is or is not
available for nonstatutory SAMs. 74
A lender participating in a SAM, therefore, should consider one
that does not fit the definitional requirements of a statutory SAM if a
67. See id. § 1917.163 (West Supp. 1982): "The terms and conditions of any shared
appreciation loan made pursuant to this chapter shall be consistent with this chapter. This
chapter does not, however, apply to or limit shared appreciation financing of real property
of a type specified in Section 1917.130 that is made pursuant to other provisions of law, or
which is not otherwise unlawful. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to in any way
affect shared appreciation financing of commercial property or residential property not
meeting the criteria specified in Section 1917.130."
68. See infra text accompanying notes 69-74.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 77-161, 181-202.
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.164 (West Supp. 1982), quoted supra note 64.
71. CAL. Bus. & TRANSP. AGENCY, DEP'T OF HousING & COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT, ENROLLED BILL REPORT (AB 2168), 1981-82 Reg. Sess., at 2 (1981).
72. CAL. CV. CODE § 1917.164 (West Supp. 1982), quotedsupra note 64.
73. Id § 1917.168 (West Supp. 1982), quoted supra note 66.
74. For a discussion of whether SAMs are subject to securities laws, see infra text ac-
companying notes 319-78.
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nonstatutory SAM appears better suited to the needs of both borrower
and lender.75 A lender on nonresidential property is eligible only for
nonstatutory SAMs. The various definitional requirements for a statu-
tory SAM appear to be more the result of a legislature bound by tradi-
tional views of the appropriate terms for residential financing than of
logical thinking.
76
Statutory and nonstatutory SAMs offer solutions to many of the
difficult lending problems facing lenders and borrowers. The relative
complexity of this new lending instrument and its divergence from
traditional lending forms, however, raise a number of legal questions.
The California SAM statute resolves some of these issues for statutory
SAMs, but leaves a number of questions unanswered as to both statu-
tory and nonstatutory SAMs. Because SAMs are a versatile lending
tool, the numerous legal questions relating to SAMs, whether statutory




One of the major benefits purportedly offered by the California
SAM statute is protection from the usury laws. From biblical times,
laws have prohibited usurious lending.77 Although some states have no
75. Although many variations of nonstatutory SAMs are possible, some variations ben-
efitting the borrower, but not the lender, include eliminating the requirement that the loan
amortize by providing for interest-only payments; eliminating any fixed term by providing
that the loan would become due only upon some indefinite event such as the sale of the
house, or, in the case of an employer/employee loan, upon termination of employment;
placing a limit on the maximum amount of contingent deferred interest by providing that
the fixed and the contingent interest portions, together, cannot exceed a fixed percentage per
annum; providing that the fixed interest portion shall commence at a certain low rate and
escalate each year, until reaching a limit; and extending the concept from residential to
commercial property. Cf CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1917.120(j), 1917.130, 1917.131(a), (b) &
1917.13 1(d) (West Supp. 1982) (referring to California nonstatutory SAM provisions bene-
fitting borrwers). Nonstatutory SAM provisions benefitting the lender, but not the borrower,
include increasing the percentage of contingent deferred interest, eliminating the refinancing
obligation, and permitting a shorter term. Cf. Id §§ 1917.131(d), 1917.133, and 1917.131(a)
(West Supp. 1982) (referring to California nonstatutory SAM provisions benefitting lend-
ers). Anyone may be a lender or a borrower under a nonstatutory SAM.
76. For instance, the loan term of a statutory SAM may not exceed 30 years. Id
§ 1917.131(a). It is impossible to imagine any borrower-protection or other public policy
reason why statutory SAMs should be limited in such a fashion.
77. 25 Leviticus 35-38; accord, 22 Exodus 25; cf. 23 Deuteronomy 20 (King James)
("Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend
upon usury."); Comment, supra note 17, at 877 n.5.
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usury laws,78 and others have such broad exemptions that few lenders
would be concerned with potential usury problems, 79 numerous states
still regulate the rate of interest that may be charged on at least some
residential and commercial real property loans.80 Consequently, com-
mentators have questioned whether SAMs might violate the usury
laws.81 The amount of the contingent deferred interest paid under a
SAM is based solely upon the appreciated value of the secured prop-
erty. Normally, a SAM lender places no limit on the amount of contin-
gent deferred interest that a borrower must pay. The absence of a limit
enables the lender to maximize return and compensate for the possibil-
ity of slow appreciation of other SAMs it may hold. As a result, the
amount of contingent deferred interest, when added to the fixed inter-
est, may exceed any applicable usury limitations if the secured property
significantly appreciates in value during the term of the loan.
Due to the great variation in usury laws among jurisdictions the
SAM usury problem must be addressed on a state-by-state basis. There
are, however, some general considerations applicable to all SAM
lenders.
General Considerations
If the lender or the SAM is not clearly exempt from an applicable
usury law,82 there are two general ways the usury issue may be re-
solved. Under the first method, the parties may stipulate in the SAM
promissory note and deed of trust that the law of a more favorable
jurisdiction will control. In most jurisdictions, however, the enforce-
ability of this type of contractual provision will depend on factors rele-
vant to a "governmental interests" analysis, which involves a
determination of whether the selected jurisdiction has a legitimate in-
terest in the application of its own law.8 3 First, the choice of law provi-
78. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 336:1 (1966 & Supp. 1981).
79. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 687.03(1) (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4 (Smith-Hurd
1966); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1978).
80. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 11; FLA. STAT. ch. 687
(1966 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-501 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1981-1982).
81. See Iezman, The SharedAppreciation Mortgage and the Shared Equity Progran A
Comprehensive Examination of Equity Participation, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 510, 522
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Iezman, Equity]; Kmiec, Shared Appreciation Mortgages: A Step
Toward Making Housing a Bad Investment, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 302 (1982); Comment, supra
note 17.
82. E.g., see infra note 94.
83. See Preble & Herskowitz, Recent Changes in California and Federal Usury Laws:
New Opportunities for Real Estate and Commercial Loans?, 13 Loy. L.A.L. R~v. 1, 43-66
(1979); Werner, Usury and The Variable-Rate Mortgage, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 155, 156-57
(1976). The California requirements have been developed in the following opinions: Sarlot-
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sion must not be a device designed solely to evade the usury laws.84
Second, both parties must enter into the choice of law provision in
good faith.8 5 Finally, the chosen state must bear some relationship to
the transaction.8
6
A second method of resolving the usury issue is to insert into the
SAM promissory note a savings clause providing that the borrower's
obligation to pay contingent deferred interest is limited to an amount
87
that, together with the fixed interest, will not exceed applicable usury
limits. Two problems are, however, inherent in this method. It may
not achieve the return on investment sought by many SAM lenders.
8
Further, courts have been willing to find loans usurious notwithstand-
ing the insertion of a savings clause in the note. 9
Contingency Rule
The contingent deferred interest portion of a California statutory
SAM cannot render an otherwise nonusurious loan usurious.90 Non-
conforming SAM lenders and nonstatutory SAMs, however, do not
benefit from this statutory exemption.
A 1979 state constitutional amendment 9' changed the interest limi-
tations of the California usury law; the maximum interest rate for loans
Kantarian v. First Pa. Mortgage Trust, 599 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1979); Garner v. duPont
Glore Forgan, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 3d 280, 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1976); Rochester Capital Leas-
ing Corp. v. K & L Litho Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 697, 91 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1970); Ury v.
Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
84. Werner, supra note 83, at 156-57; see also Fidelity Sav. Assoc. v. Shea, 6 Idaho 405,
55 P. 1022 (1899).
85. Fidelity Sav. Assoc. v. Shea, 6 Idaho 405, 55 P. 1022 (1899).
86. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1981); see also Hershman, Usury and the Tight Money Market-Revisited, 24 Bus. LAW.
1121, 1135-37 (1969).
87. In calculating the maximum rate of return, there appear to be no California cases
deciding whether lenders may take into account the fact that interest payments are not re-
ceived currently but on a deferred basis. Cf. Heald v. Friis-Hansen, 52 Cal. 2d 834, 345 P.2d
457 (1959) (allowing compounding on an annual basis after default). In view of the time-
value of money in today's economy, it seems clear that this is a relevant factor.
88. One reason lenders will make SAMs is to increase the number of borrowers quali-
fying for loans. Another is to achieve a potential yield on their loans higher than prevailing
rates. In order to do this, the actual return on some SAM loans may need to exceed appar-
ent usury limits to offset the lack of appreciation on properties subject to the lender's other
SAM loans.
89. E.g., Oklahoma Preferred Fin. & Loan Corp. v. Morrow, 497 P.2d 221 (Okla.
1972); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
90. See supra text accompanying note 60.
91. Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 52 (1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 49) ("Proposition
2"), CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
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or forbearances for the purchase, construction or improvement of real
property in California is now subject to a specified formula.92 The law
imposes severe sanctions for exceeding the applicable interest rate.
93
The California usury limits do not apply to all lenders and all
loans.94 Indeed, the statutory exemptions currently available to lenders
are so extensive that many nonstatutory SAMs will not be subject to
any usury limits.95 There will be, however, some SAM lenders that will
not be exempt from California usury limits by virtue of the California
SAM statute or other statutory or constitutional provisions.
96
For SAM lenders not exempt by statute from the usury limits, a
92. Proposition 2 established the maximum interest rate for loans for the purchase of
real property as equal to "the higher of (a) 10 percent per annum or (b) 5 percent per
annum plus the rate prevailing on the 25th day of the month preceding the earlier of(i) date
of execution of the contract to make the loan or forbearance, or (ii) the date of making the
loan or forbearance established by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on advances
to member banks under Sections 13 and 13a of the Federal Reserve Act." The maximum is
10% for any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action which are used
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. However, any loan or forbearance,
the proceeds of which are used primarily for the purchase, construction or improvement of
real property, is deemed not used primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Id.
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-3(a), (b) (West Supp. 1979).
94. Many usury exemptions are available to SAM lenders. First, as discussed above,
SAMs conforming to the California SAM statute are exempt from the California usury
limit. Id § 1917.162 (West Supp. 1982). Second, many institutional lenders are exempt
from the California usury limit, including banks, credit unions, industrial loan companies,
pawn brokers, and savings and loan associations. CAL. CONsT. art. XV, § 1 (West Supp.
1982). California statutory law exempts out-of-state banks and national banks. CAL. FIN.
CODE § 1716 (West Supp. 1982). As a result, there is no applicable usury limit for most
institutional loans, whether made upon residential or commercial property. The foregoing
exemptions do not protect noninstitutional lenders making nonstatutory SAMs. Many of
these lenders, however, may be protected by the 1979 amendment which added an exemp-
tion for "any loans made or arranged by any person licensed as a real estate broker by the
State of California and secured in whole or in part by liens on real property." CAL. CONST.
art. XV, § 1 (West Supp. 1982).
The ambiguous term "arranged" has been subject to much scholarly scrutiny since
1979. See, e.g, Preble & Herskowitz, supra note 83, at 22-29. The courts have distinguished
"finders" from "brokers" suggesting that Proposition 2 does not permit exemptions for loans
arranged by finders. See, e.g., Tyrone v. Kelley, 9 Cal. 3d 1, 507 P.2d 65, 106 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1973); Zappas v. King Williams Press, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 768, 89 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1970).
95. See supra note 94. In 1980, Congress adopted the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). This Act
preempts state usury limits for certain types of loans made by specified lenders. For in-
stance, the Act preempts state usury ceilings on first mortgage loans secured by residential
property if the loans are made by designated lenders. Various other exemptions in the Act
affect a wider range of SAMs.
96. The above described exemptions, while broad, do not apply in all circumstances.
Thus, for instance, a sale by an owner wishing to carry-back a SAM, a loan by a nonexempt
institutional lender which is arranged by a finder (not a broker), or a loan by a nonexempt
institution to an employee, is not exempt in California.
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common law exemption known as the contingency rule should be ap-
plicable. The case of Thomassen v. Carr9 7 sets forth the California ver-
sion of the contingency rule. In this case, the court stated:
It is also a general principle that when payment of full legal interest
is subject to a contingency so that the lender's profit is wholly or
partially put in hazard the interest so contingently payable need not
be limited to the legal rate, providing the parties are contracting in
good faith and without the intent to avoid the statute against usury.98
Under the common law version of the contingency rule, a lender is
exempt from usury laws only if the risk of not receiving the contingent
interest payment is not "remote." 99 The California courts have fol-
lowed this common law precedent, requiring that the contingency or
risk to which the interest or portion thereof is subject be "over and
above the risk which exists for all loans (whether the risk be great or
small), that the borrower will be unable to pay."'0 The contingency
must be such that there is a bona fide economic risk to the lender that
the contingent interest will not become payable.101
Application of the contingency rule also necessitates determining
whether the fixed interest portion of the loan assures the lender of a
return close or equal to the usury limit. It is reasonable to assume that,
where a lender charges both a fixed interest rate that is near to the
usury limit and a contingent interest element, the policy justification
for the contingency rule may not be present.102 Often, however, SAMs
will have either a fixed interest rate set materially below the prevailing
usury limit or a fixed interest rate close to the usury limit which was set
at a time when future appreciation appeared limited.
The most important consideration in applying the contingency
rule to SAMs is whether the contingency constitutes a material bona
fide risk. The first important source of law for consideration of this
matter, relied on by several California courts, 0 3 is the Restatement of
Contracts. Section 527 of the Restatement states that, except in cases of
sham, a promise to pay a rate of interest exceeding the usury rate is not
usurious if: (1) the promise is conditional; and (2) the rate to be paid
97. 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967).
98. Id. at 346, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (quoting Lamb v. Herndon, 97 Cal. App. 193, 201,
275 P. 503, 507 (1929)).
99. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 527, comment a (1932), quoted infra note 105.
100. 250 Cal. App. 2d at 347, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
101. Teichner v. Klassman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 514, 521-22, 49 Cal. Rptr. 742, 748 (1966).
102. See id. at 521, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
103. E.g., id.; Wooton v. Coerber, 213 Cal. App. 2d 142, 148, 156, 28 Cal. Rptr. 635,
638, 643 (1963).
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upon failure of the condition is "materially" less than the usury rate.' °4
A comment to section 527 explains that a loan is presumably usurious
if the possibility of occurrence of the contingency is "remote." Addi-
tionally, the interest rate diminution in the event of such failure must
not be "slight."' 0
5
Four California cases deal with the contingency rule. Jameson v.
Warren,10 6 one of the oldest relevant cases, involved stock delivered to
a lender as security for a note that provided for interest at eight percent
per annum. In addition to receiving interest on the note, the lender was
to retain the dividends from the stock. When the dividends paid were
added to the interest received, the lender's total compensation exceeded
the usury limit in effect at the time. Although the court acknowledged
the existence of the contingency rule, it denied its applicability because
the facts did not present the requisite risk. The court noted that the
term of the loan was thirty days and the amount of dividends to be
retained by the lender was "more than double the amount of the
loan."107 Further, the expected dividends not only were large, but were
apparently rather certain inasmuch as they were not annual dividends
but dividends upon dissolution of the corporation, the corporation then
being in liquidation. 0 8
104. "A promise, made as the consideration for a loan or for extending the maturity of a
pecuniary debt, to give the creditor a greater profit than the highest permissible rate of inter-
est upon the occurrence of a condition, is not usurious if the repayment promised on failure
of the condition to occur is materially less than the amount of the loan or debt with the
highest permissible interest, unless a transaction is given this form as a colorable device to
obtain a greater profit than is permissible. In that case it is usurious." RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 527 (1932).
105. "A creditor who takes the chance of losing all or part of the sum to which he would
be entitled if he bargained for the return of his money with the highest permissible rate of
interest is allowed to contract for greater profit. On the other hand it is not permissible to
use this form of contract as a device for obtaining usurious profit. If the probability of the
occurrence of the contingency on which diminished payment is promised is remote, or if the
diminution should the contingency occur is slight as compared with the possible profit to be
obtained if the contingency does not occur, the transaction is presumably usurious." Id.,
comment a. Comment a to section 527 of the Restatement of Contracts is cited and quoted
favorably in the recent California cases cited supra note 103. Directly relevant is illustration
number three of section 527: "A borrows from B $5000, payable in three years. It is pro-
vided in the bargain that instead of interest A shall pay B one tenth of the profits of A's
business. Although it is anticipated that this will exceed the amount of interest at the highest
permissible rate, the bargain is not usurious in view of the contingency that the anticipation
may not be realized." .d., illustration 3.
106. 91 Cal. App. 590, 267 P. 372 (1928).
107. Id. at 595. The unofficial reporter reads, "more than equal the amount of the
loan." 267 P. at 374.
108. "In the present case, however, while the evidence respecting the condition of the
corporation is not before us, it sufficiently appears from the record that large dividends upon
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In Schif v. Pruitt,10 9 the plaintiff planned to construct numerous
homes on a tract of land he already owned. The defendant made
plaintiff a construction loan of $20,000. The note stated that the only
interest to be paid by plaintiff on the loan was five dollars. The note
also provided, however, that in consideration for making the loan, de-
fendant would have the right to purchase, at a price calculated by a
predetermined formula set forth in the note, contracts of sale or
purchase money deeds of trust received by plaintiff upon the sale of the
first thirty houses erected. Evaluating the risk involved in this loan, the
court noted that there was no guarantee that the amounts paid under
the fixed formula would be any less than the value of the notes and
contracts received. Accordingly, a loss rather than profit might have
resulted. 110 On the basis of this factual situation, the court held that the
usury limitations did not apply by virtue of the "clear" applicability of
the contingency rule."11
The lender in Teichner v. Klassman112 made a loan calling for in-
terest in excess of the established usury rate. The loan proceeds were
used to purchase a gambling club. Under the note, plaintiffs obliga-
tion to make payments ceased if the gambling club was permanently
closed due to any change in the city, county, or state laws regarding
gambling institutions. The court held that this promissory note did not
satisfy the contingency rule for two reasons: first, the transaction was
conceived and formulated with the express purpose and intent to evade
the usury laws,113 and second, the risk was not substantial enough to
justify application of the contingency rule."14
Thomassen v. Carr1 15 is most directly on point. In Thomassen, the
plaintiff borrowed $18,500 from defendant. The note representing the
loan provided that the loan's term was eighteen months and that the
loan was interest-free. In lieu of interest, the note provided that the
the stock pledged were anticipated, and that under the terms of the agreement the lender -
who was to be repaid the principal of his loan with interest in any event - was entitled to
retain from such dividends more than double the amount of the loan, if the latter should not
be repaid in fifteen days. We think it is sufficiently shown by the terms of the contract that it
was the intention of the parties to violate the usury law; and that the effect of their agree-
ment, in view of what fairly appears to have been the condition of the corporation within
their knowledge, was to exact for the use of the amount of the loan sums in excess of the
lawful rate of interest." Id. at 595-96, 267 P. at 374.
109. 144 Cal. App. 2d 493, 301 P.2d 446 (1956).
110. Id. at 498, 301 P.2d at 449.
111. Id. at 499, 301 P.2d at 450.
112. 240 Cal. App. 2d 514, 49 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1966).
113. Id. at 522, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
114. id. at 522-23, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
115. 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967).
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lender would receive 30% of the borrower's net profit, if any, on the
sale of the secured property. The court held that this note did not vio-
late the California usury laws because "lo]n the face of the transaction
in this case, it appears, as the trial court found, that the special hazard
exists,"116 because the risk that there would be no profits was a risk
"over and above the risk which exists for all loans.., that the bor-
rower will be unable to pay."
117
In discussing the substantiality of the risk, the Thomassen court
addressed plaintiff's argument that the contingency that the interest
payment would be lost was so remote that the transaction was usurious
as a matter of law. In rejecting this contention, the court placed much
reliance on the testimony of an appraiser, and noted that "there is a
gamble to such a transaction as this; that construction of an office
building in San Jose was a somewhat speculative investment; that his
appraisal was made after he had information as to the actual rental and
that this was a factor in the appraisal."' 18 The court also cited the ap-
praiser's conclusion that the value of the property was dependent upon
"the highly fortuitous element of the time and terms at which rental
could be accomplished."119
These cases illustrate risks that may, or may not, justify applica-
tion of the contingency rule. In the two cases most analogous to SAMs,
the contingency rule was applied. Although these cases demonstrate
that the application of the contingency rule is, predominantly, a factual
question, the Thomassen and Schff holdings demonstrate a likelihood
that the contingency rule will apply to SAMs unless the fixed interest
rate is too close to the usury limit or unless some peculiar circum-
stances are present.
The Jameson and Teichner courts held that the risk in each case
was insufficient to justify application of the contingency rule.
120
Neither case, however, is factually analogous to a SAM. Moreover, the
116. Id. at 347, 58 CaL Rptr. at 301.
117. Id. The special hazard existed because, "although by the terms of the promissory
note the makers bind themselves unconditionally to repay the principal and interest at the
end of 18 months, they are not obliged to pay interest for the first 18 months, but only to pay
a share of the profit if there be any, and a share of rental if there be rental. The lenders'
'profit' was not only subject, as in loans generally, to the risk of inability of the debtors to
pay, but to extinction by eventualities in this single transaction even though the debtors were
at all times solvent." Id. at 347, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
118. Id. at 348, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
119. Id.
120. 91 Cal. App. at 595-96, 267 P. at 374; 240 Cal. App. 2d at 522-23, 49 Cal. Rptr. at
749.
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risks in both cases of not receiving interest in an amount less than the
usury limits were substantially less than in a SAM.
For instance, in Jameson there existed an extremely slight risk that
the lender would not receive interest payments in excess of the usury
limits.1 21 First, the fixed interest rate was close to the usury limits, and
second, the contingency was unlikely to occur. The facts in Jameson,
particularly the thirty-day term of the loan, support the court's appar-
ent conclusion that the dividend scheme was fabricated in the hope of
avoiding the usury law, with neither party having any real belief that
the "contingency" was actually contingent.
In contrast, the likelihood of property values appreciating under a
SAM is independent of any forces such as regular corporate practice,
shareholder expectations, or board policy. Rather, property value ap-
preciation is wholly dependent upon economic conditions. Further, the
corporate dividend policy in Jameson was, in view of the then pending
corporate liquidation, relatively certain. Conversely, even in the most
inflationary times there is a substantial possibility of downturns, tem-
porary or long-term, local or broad-scale, in property values.
The risk that the lender in Teichner would receive interest pay-
ments in an amount exceeding the usury limits was also much greater
than with a SAM. There, the lender was entitled to usurious interest
unless existing circumstances (i.e., the right to conduct a gambling busi-
ness) changed. 1 22 As in Jameson, the Teichner court found no evidence
that the risks of the purported contingency were real. In addition, the
court concluded that the terms of the loan were formulated in an effort
to evade the usury laws.
In both Schiff and Thomassen, the risks to the lenders were analo-
gous to the risks a SAM lender incurs in charging contingent deferred
interest. In both cases, the lenders' yield on the transaction depended
upon the appreciation of the value of real property. Moreover, both
lenders had no particular reason to believe that the property values
would necessarily appreciate. On this basis, the courts held that the
financing arrangements were subject to a bona fide economic risk justi-
fying application of the contingency rule.'
23
The SAM financing device is, however, somewhat distinguishable
from these two cases. In both Thomassen and Schif, the lenders risked
losing all return of interest on their loans if the real property did not
121. 91 Cal. App. at 595-96, 267 P. at 374.
122. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 517, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 746.




appreciate in value. 124 Because a SAM lender also charges a fixed in-
terest rate, it does not risk a complete loss of interest payments. Never-
theless, the return of contingent deferred interest represents a
significant portion of the lender's expected yield. Further, the Restate-
ment of Contracts expressly contemplates that a contingency may re-
late to only a portion of the interest.' 25 Finally, Thomassen expressly
stated in dicta that the contingency rule could apply where only a por-
tion of the interest obligation was at risk.
126
Usury Conclusion
The Thomassen and Schif courts contemplated that the economic
risk extend to the "contingent" interest up to the usury limit, as well as
to that which might be above the usury limit. 127 The lender must bear
a bona fide economic risk as to a portion of contingent interest which, if
lost, would place the amount of interest received materially below the
amount of interest which it might have charged on a flat-rate, non-
contingent loan at the usury limit. Moreover, both courts carefully
considered whether the anticipated appreciation of the properties did
constitute a risk.
Statistics and assumptions about real estate values in the general
area, or for the particular property, are very relevant in determining
whether a particular loan presents a bona fide contingency; such con-
siderations, however, may not be conclusive. The lender should also
decide for each SAM whether the fixed rate is materially below the
usury limit, and whether the contingent interest on the particular loan
presents an actual contingency.
These issues involve complex factual judgments subject to judicial
scrutiny in the event of litigation. It appears, however, that the contin-
gency of appreciation in value of any particular parcel of real estate
sufficiently justifies application of the contingency rule to any SAM not
involving an extraordinary factual situation.
Lien Priorities
SAMs, as well as other AMIs, raise a question concerning lien pri-
124. 144 Cal. App. 2d at 498, 301 P.2d at 449; 250 Cal. App. 2d at 348-49, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 302.
125. RESTATEmNT OF CoN'rAcrs § 527 comment a (1932), quoted supra note 105.
126. 250 Cal. App. 2d at 346, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 301. See supra text accompanying note 98.
127. 144 Cal. App. 2d at 499, 301 P.2d at 450; 250 Cal. App. 2d at 349, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
302.
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orities.' 28 Simply put, does a lien attaching to the property after recor-
dation of a SAM have priority over the SAM lien to the extent of the
latter's contingent deferred interest? The issue is critical because the
contingent deferred interest element represents a substantial portion of
a SAM lender's potential return.
To illustrate, assume a lender loans $100,000 for the purchase of a
$150,000 house and secures the loan by a SAM in which the lender
obtains a 50% interest in the appreciated value of the property. Fur-
ther, assume that shortly thereafter the owner obtains a $30,000 loan
secured by a standard form second deed of trust. If the owner defaults
on the fixed interest obligation of the SAM loan after the property has
appreciated in value to $200,000, the junior lienholder may assert that
its lien is subordinate only to the unpaid principal balance of the SAM,
and is not subordinate to the SAM lender's interest in the $50,000 ap-
preciated value because the appreciation occurred after the second lien
attached.1 2 9 Among other things, that would require the senior lender
to pay off the junior lender before the senior lender could credit bid the
amount of its contingent deferred interest at its foreclosure sale.
The California SAM statute specifically addresses this question,
providing that the SAM lien has priority from the time of recording for
principal and accrued and unaccrued interest, including contingent de-
ferred interest.' 30 However, nonstatutory SAMs are not protected by
this provision. Instead, lenders making nonstatutory SAMs must rely
on other principles of law to determine the priority of their liens.
There is no analytical basis for suspecting that a lien securing fu-
ture accruing contingent interest should not be prior to subsequent
liens. No authority has been found suggesting that the lien of an ordi-
nary deed of trust does not secure fixed interest accruing in the future
with the same priority as the principal obligation, despite the fact that
standard forms of deed of trust and mortgage disclose neither the rate
of interest nor whether the interest accrues or is payable currently.' 3 1
Nothing inherent in a SAM should cause it to be treated differently.
128. Two commentators have specifically addressed this question in connection with
AMIs. See Barnett, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: How to Maintain SecuredLender Sta-
tar, 96 BANKING L.J. 6, 45 (1979); Guttmann, Types ofAdistable Rate Mortgages and Their
Lien Priority, 55 FLA. B.J. 552 (1981).
129. For purposes of the discussion the illustration assumes that the second lien was
placed on the property prior to the time the amount of appreciation is determined, see infra
text accompanying notes 472-75, and prior to the time any of the appreciation in fact oc-
curred, a "worst case" scenario insofar as the first lender's priority is concerned.
130. See supra note 61.
131. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2948 (West 1974).
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For lien priority purposes, contingent deferred interest under a
SAM is indistinguishable from interest under a traditional loan. That
the interest accrues in the future-after both the SAM and the junior
lien are recorded--does not distinguish a SAM from a typical deed of
trust. Further, compounding of the deferred interest does not distin-
guish a SAM from a standard loan providing for compounding of in-
terest; the contingent interest differs only in amount, not in legal
principle. Similarly, deferral of payment is of no consequence. A stan-
dard lender, who for whatever reason delays foreclosure for two years
while monthly installments become delinquent, does not thereby lose
its priority as to the accrued but unpaid interest, even though the defer-
ral may have resulted from the lender's voluntary course of action.
The same is true in the case of a loan which provides that all interest
and principal will be paid at the end of, e.g., five years. Similarly, the
contingent nature of the interest is irrelevant. It is contingent only in
the sense that the dollar amount is unascertainable when the loan is
made; no one has seriously suggested that a standard loan carrying in-
terest at the prime rate, which varies periodically, has any lien priority
problems.
In short, the lien priority question raised by some commentators 32
for AMIs and SAMs seems merely the product of overactive imagina-
tion. The only analogous cases found in which priority has been ques-
tioned involve situations where the borrower and the lender voluntarily
altered the secured obligation after the junior lien was made.13 3 Obvi-
ously, once a junior loan is made, a SAM holder cannot be allowed
thereafter to erode voluntarily the junior creditor's lien. However, no
lien priority problem exists where the SAM borrower's obligations,
though both unaccrued and unascertainable, are nevertheless fixed as
of the date the junior loan is made.
Priority of Alternative Mortgage Instruments
The standard adjustable rate mortgage and variable rate mort-
gage 34 instruments provide that the borrower may defer interest pay-
ments resulting from increases in the interest rate until maturity. If the
borrower elects to defer such payments, the balance that the borrower
must pay upon maturity may substantially exceed the original principal
132. E.g., Murray, Title Insurance and the Equity Kicker, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1981, at 21,
24.
133. E.g., Keese v. Beardsley, 190 Cal. 465, 213 P. 500 (1923).
134. See supra note 14.
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amount. 135 This situation is commonly referred to as "negative amorti-
zation." Thus, if the AMI lien did not secure future accruing interest as
of the date of recordation of the AMI, a junior lienor would achieve
priority over a portion of the debtor's ultimate obligation under the
AMI.
No California cases discuss the priority of an AMI lien. 136 The
commentators on this point generally agree, however, that, at least if
sufficient notice of the variable interest element of the loan is given, the
priority of the entire obligation will be assured. 1
37
The potential negative amortization in some AMIs is similar to the
contingent deferred interest in SAMs; similar reasoning, therefore,
should apply. Adequate disclosure should be sufficient to put junior
lienors on notice, thereby assuring the priority of the variable interest
mortgage. If disclosure is sufficient, a junior lienor may be able to
make a rough estimate of the potential growth in the senior lien. In
any event, the junior lienor, when making its loan, will be on notice
that its security position may be eroded by growth of the senior lien. A
junior lienor with actual notice of a SAM lender's interest in the appre-
ciation of the secured property will be able to consider this element in
calculating the value of the property to be secured by the junior lien. ' 38
135. Presently, many title insurers will not insure the priority of a negative amortization
loan. Efforts have been made, however, to develop a special endorsement for negative
amortization loans, which now may be available from some title companies.
136. There are several recent articles discussing this problem. See Barnett, supra note
128; Iezman, Equity, supra note 81, at 521; Murray, supra note 132.
137. Generally, the commentators have concluded that the lien of an adjustable rate
mortgage or variable interest rate loan will have priority over subsequent liens only if the
notice to third parties is sufficient to put them on inquiry. One commentator stated: "An
increase in interest on a loan might present a problem as to where it should be placed in the
order of lien priorities. Most indications are that the lien priorities should not change if full
disclosure occurs. This is logical because, if subsequent creditors are aware of the clause,
they have no basis to contest an increase in interest on an existing loan as changing any
priority." Comment, The Variable Interest Rate Clause and lts Use in Caif/ornia Real Estate
Transactions, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 468, 485 (1972) (foonote omitted). A recent article stated:
"The minimum efforts which may protect the priority of an adjustable rate mortgage, in-
cluding the interest as adjusted, would then appear to include the recording of the mortgage
stating the principal debt secured and that the debt bears interest which is adjusted periodi-
cally according to the terms of the note." Guttmann, supra note 128, at 555. This commen-
tator adds, however, that it may be prudent to include a more thorough disclosure in which,
"It]he principal is identified, [as are the] adjustment period, initial rate of interest and the
index which controls the movement." Id. at 556.
138. For a discussion of the degree or extent of notice, if any, which must be provided
see infra text accompanying notes 149-61.
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Treatment as Interest
In analyzing the lien priority of a SAM, contingent deferred inter-
est may be analogized either to a borrower's obligation to repay fixed
interest on a loan or to a borrower's obligation to repay a mandatory
future advance.139 Under either classification, the lien of this portion
of the SAM will have priority over subsequent liens.
In a standard loan transaction the borrower is obligated to repay
both the principal portion of the debt and all accrued interest. Nor-
mally, when the mortgage securing such a debt is recorded, no interest
has yet accrued. Neither courts nor commentators have doubted, how-
ever, that the priority of the lien securing all subsequently accruing in-
terest dates back to the time the mortgage was recorded.
This tacit understanding flows from three sources. First, it is a
general principle of real property law that liens securing promissory
notes attach to both the principal and interest portions of the debt.
Courts have permitted lenders to begin foreclosure proceedings when a
borrower has failed to make required interest payments.140 Second,
California Code of Civil Procedure section 728 permits beneficiaries
under deeds of trust to begin foreclosure proceedings as to a portion of
the secured property if interest payments are delinquent.' 41 Neither of
these situations has raised any question concerning the priority of the
lien attaching to interest. Third, California Civil Code section 2844
provides that a lien may be created which takes effect immediately and
which secures obligations not yet in existence.142 As a result, such a
lien "is not dependent for its existence upon subsequent acts requisite
to its enforcement. When these acts are performed, they, by relation,
139. A mandatory future advance is a fixed obligation imposed on a lender pursuant to
the terms of a loan agreement or promissory note to make an additional advance to the
borrower at some time in the future, usually after the borrower has satisfied certain specific
conditions precedent.
140. "In a word, the interest is part of the substance of the mortgage-debt. It belongs not
to it by tacking - it is not an incident of the debt, butpro tanto, it is the debt itself." West
Branch Bank v. Chester, I1 Pa. 282, 290, 51 Am. Dec. 547 (1849) (quoting and affirming the
lower court opinion) (emphasis in original); see also Yoakam v. White, 97 Cal. 286,32 P. 238
(1893). But see Van Loo v. Van Aken, 104 Cal. 269, 37 P. 925 (1894).
141. "If the debt for which the mortgage, lien, or incumbrance is held is not all due, so
soon as sufficient of the property has been sold to pay the amount due, with costs, the sale
must cease; and afterwards, as often as more becomes dueforprincpal or interest, the Court
may, on motion, order more to be sold. . . ." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 728 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1982) (emphasis added); see Chinn v. Penn, 179 Cal. 153, 175 P. 687 (1918); Byrne v.
Hoag, 116 Cal. 1, 47 P. 775 (1897); Yoakam v. White, 97 Cal. 286, 32 P. 238 (1893).
142. "A lien may be created by contract, to take immediate effect, as security for the
performance of obligations not then in existence." CAL. Civ. CODE § 2884 (West 1974).
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become part of the established lien and are secured thereby."
' 143
A borrower's obligation to pay interest in a traditional loan does
not differ from a SAM borrower's obligation to pay contingent deferred
interest. In both situations, when the lien is recorded, there is no ac-
crued interest and therefore no obligation to pay. 144 Moreover, in both
situations the loan can be structured so that no payment of interest is
required until the note matures. Finally, it has not been suggested that
a traditional loan with a variable interest rate raises priority problems.
For years the loan industry assumed correctly that loans carrying a
floating, unfixed (that is, unknown at loan inception) interest rate have
no priority problems. From a junior lienor's perspective, such a loan is
as uncertain in amount as a SAM. Particularly when most current
loans now carry anything but standard, fixed-rate interest, a SAM
should have no less priority. 145 The appreciated portion of a SAM debt
being nothing more than deferred interest, mere notice in the deed of
trust that it secures interest as well as principal should be sufficient to
assure the priority of a SAM lien.
Analogy to Future Advances
Should a court decline to treat contingent deferred interest as in-
terest, then certainly that court should treat the contingent payment as
it would a future advance. Accordingly, if the SAM documentation
satisfies the priority requirements of a future advance, the SAM lien for
the contingent deferred interest should have full priority.
The priority of a lien for a future advance depends upon two fac-
tors: (1) whether junior lienors are given adequate notice of the future
advance; and (2) whether the future advance is optional or obliga-
tory. 146 Absent notice to the junior lienors that a particular lien secures
both a present obligation and future advances, the lien for future ad-
vances will be junior to any intervening liens. 147 However, the notice
may be either in the form of a statement that future advances will be
143. City of Santa Monica v. Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. App. 710,712, 115 P. 945, 946
(1911). See also infra note 158 & accompanying text.
144. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2884 (West 1974), quoted supra note 142. -
145. One should not be overly concerned about junior lienors suddenly finding them-
selves junior to, for example, $50,000 of contingent deferred interest. It is standard practice
for a junior lienor, before its loan is made, to obtain a statutory statement of loan condition
which would disclose the SAM nature of the senior lien. See id § 2943 (West 1974).
146. Oaks v. Weingartner, 105 Cal. App. 2d 598, 234 P.2d 194 (1951); Lanz v. First
Mortgage Corp., 121 Cal. App. 587, 9 P.2d 316 (1932).
147. See Lumber & Builders Supply Co. v. Ritz, 134 Cal. App. 607, 25 P.2d 1002 (1933);
Machado v. Bank of Italy, 67 Cal. App. 769, 228 P. 369 (1924); Atkinson v. Foote, 44 Cal.
App. 149, 186 P. 831 (1919).
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secured, without any indication of the dollar amount, or by stating that
a particular dollar amount is secured, and thereafter making advances
up to that amount. The court in Tapia v. Demartini held that either
method "is sufficiently definite to put subsequent encumbrancers on in-
quiry, and they must ascertain the extent of the lien, or suffer the
consequences." 1
4 8
However, extensive disclosures are not necessary to ensure ade-
quate notice of future advances. 149 Although certain jurisdictions re-
quire lenders to specify the amount of future advances in the mortgage
instrument, 150 California has no such requirement.1 51 Indeed, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has stated that a mortgage for future advances
that gives notice to subsequent encumbrancers of its nature creates,
without more, and in particular without any indication of dollar
amount, a valid hen for all sums advanced. 152 InFrankH. Buck Co., v.
Buck,15 3 the court noted:
[I]n the absence of statutes providing otherwise a definite statement
of amount is unnecessary and ... all that can be required is that a
mortgage designed to secure such future liabilities should describe
the nature and amount of them with reasonable certainty, so that
they may be ascertained by the exercise of ordinary diligence on
proper inquiry.'
5 4
Thus, if a SAM deed of trust divulges that it secures a loan which in-
cludes a contingent deferred interest element, recitation of the terms of
the loan should be unnecessary.
Notwithstanding the adequacy of notice, the Hen priority of a fu-
ture advance will not necessarily relate back to the initial lien unless
the future advance is obligatory.1 55 If the future advance is optional, its
lien priority will be lost if the first lienor has actual notice of the subse-
quent lienor before making the future advance.156 Thus, because ac-
tual notice is a factual issue that might be contested, the contingent
148. 77 Cal. 383, 387, 19 P. 641, 643 (1888).
149. See Lumber & Builders Supply Co. v. Ritz, 134 Cal. App. 607,25 P.2d 1002 (1933).
150. Barnett, supra note 128, at 15 n.31.
151. See, e.g., Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641.
152. Id. at 387, 19 P. at 643; see also Oaks v. Weingartner, 105 Cal. App. 2d 598, 234
P.2d 194 (1951).
153. 162 Cal. 300, 122 P. 466 (1912).
154. Id. at 306, 122 P. at 468.
155. Lumber & Builders Supply Co. v. Ritz, 134 Cal. App. at 610, 25 P.2d at 1003.
156. See Althouse v. Provident Mut. Bldg.-Loan Assoc., 59 Cal. App. 31, 38-39, 209 P.
1018, 1022 (1922); see also Garcia v. Atmajian, 113 Cal. App. 3d 516, 520, 169 Cal. Rptr.
845, 847 (1980); Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal. App. 3d 461,472, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478,485-86 (1978);
Pike v. Tuttle, 18 Cal. App. 3d 746, 751, 96 Cal. Rptr. 403, 406 (1971).
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deferred interest must be obligatory in order to assure priority of the
entire SAM lien.
An obligatory future advance is one which, under the loan terms,
is mandatory for the lender to make. 57 The accrual of contingent de-
ferred interest is mandatory under the terms of a SAM loan, and is
dictated by factors outside the lender's control. It is therefore identical
to an obligatory future advance. Additionally, in the case of both con-
tingent deferred interest and future advances, the borrower's debt in-
creases pursuant to an objective standard. Finally, a potential junior
lienholder can ascertain the potential scope of a SAM lien as easily as
that of an obligatory future advance. As a result, the lien priority for
contingent deferred interest should be determined by the rules applica-
ble to obligatory advances.
The rationale for the obligatory future advance rule also supports
the analogy between SAMs and future advances. In commenting on
the priority of a future advance, a prominent scholar stated that be-
cause "the mortgage for future advances secures the promise to repay
them made at the time the transaction is entered into, it follows that
priority dates from the day that promise became binding."' 58
A junior lienor might contest the mandatory nature of contingent
deferred interest on the basis that the amount of contingent deferred
interest is purely speculative and therefore cannot be something giving
notice to a potential junior lienor. However, future advances in an
amount dependent on the changing value of the secured property
should achieve priority over a subsequent lien. A contract not specify-
ing the precise amount of a future advance may still be obligatory if the
parties understand that the lender is required to advance further sums
to the borrower.159
157. Atkinson v. Foote, 44 Cal. App. at 161, 186 P. at 836; see Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal.
App. 3d at 472, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 485 ("When the beneficiary-lender is not bound to make
the future advances, priority as to the securityfor the future advances is determined by the
circumstances existing at the time the particular advances were made.").
158. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 195 (2d ed. 1970). See also
Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 386-87, 19 P. 641, 643 (1888), in which the court stated:
"The mortgage, as against subsequent encumbrancers, becomes a lien for the whole sum
advanced from the time of its execution, and not for each separate amount advanced from
the time of such advancement, although the right to enforce the collection thereof can only
arise upon each advancement being made."
159. Preble v. Csunger, 66 Ill. 370 (1872). This is not the same question discussed supra
in the text accompanying notes 147-54, but arises from the fact that typically the maximum
amount of debt to be created under an obligatory future advance is ascertainable, whereas in
a SAM the maximum is not ascertainable.
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In Machado v. Bank of Italy,160 a $25,000 loan was made, secured
by property appraised at $72,000. At the time the loan was made, the
lender orally agreed to make future advances to the borrower in an
amount up to 60% of the appraised value of the secured property. Af-
ter a junior lien had attached to the secured property, the lender ad-
vanced an additional $25,500 to the borrower. The court rejected the
claim that, because the amount of the adi'ance was left open, the usual
priority rules as to obligatory advances should be altered.
161
The uncertain amount of a SAM lien for contingent deferred inter-
est should not render it junior to subsequent liens. Such has always
been the case with loans in which the interest rate floats with the
lender's prime rate. The same should be true for SAMs. If the re-
corded security interest adequately notifies junior lienors of the exist-
ence of the SAM, which necessarily carries with it the probability of
contingent deferred interest, the SAM should have priority. Further-
more, although the precise amount of contingent deferred interest
under a SAM may be uncertain, Buck, Mfachado, and Tapia demon-
strate that junior lienors will be deemed to have adequate notice that
certain sums will be payable to the senior lienor at a future date.
Under these cases no further specificity in the loan documents would
be required.
Restraints on Alienation
Both the common law162 and California statutory law163 prohibit
unreasonable restraints on the alienation of property. Courts have re-
lied on this doctrine to prohibit a wide variety of restraints on
alienation.16
Under the common law rule, restrictions which to a certain extent
may be analogous to SAMs have been held unenforceable. Section 413
of the Restatement of Property provides a concise summary of the com-
mon law rule: "[a] promissory restraint [stating] that the owner of the
estate shall pay a certain percentage of the sale price to some desig-
nated person, is valid if, and only if, the restraint is valid under the
rules stated in sections 406-411. '1165 These sections provide the general
rules as to when restraints on alienation are valid. Assuming the SAM
160. 67 Cal. App. 769, 228 P. 369 (1924).
161. Id. at 775, 228 P. at 372.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1954), provides in full that "[c]onditions restraining
alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void."
164. See infra examples set forth in text accompanying notes 170-74.
165. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(2)(b) (1944).
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is being placed on fee title, the only relevant section of those just men-
tioned is section 406, and the only relevant part of that section provides
that restraints on alienation are valid only if the "restraint is reasonable
under the circumstances."'
166
The Restatement lists several factors that indicate whether a re-
straint is reasonable or unreasonable. A restraint tends to be reason-
able if:
(1) the one imposing the restraint has some interest in land which
he is seeking to protect by the enforcement of the restraint;
(2) the enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a worthwhile
purpose.
A restraint is unreasonable if-
(1) the restraint is capricious;
(2) the restraint is imposed for spite or malice;
(3) the one imposing the restraint has no interest in land that is
benefited by the enforcement of the restraint;
(4) the restraint is unlimited in duration;
(5) the number of persons to whom alienation is prohibited is
large. 16
7
The Restatement authors provide the following example illustrat-
ing section 413: "A [conveys Blackacrel 'to B and his heirs, and B cov-
enants . . . that if he ever sells Blackacre . . . he will pay 25% of the
sale price to C.' . . . The promissory restraint is invalid."'
168
The revision committee states that
[wihen the owner of an estate is required to turn over a percentage of
the sale price to some designated person, he is free to sell but unable
to realize the full market price. The resulting hesitancy to sell brings
such a case within the rules previously stated in §§ 406-411.169
Although a SAM in some ways resembles the invalid restraint on
alienation described in section 413, a SAM is not an unreasonable re-
straint. The invalid restraint described in the Restatement involves re-
strictions in the deed conveying real property; the grantor retains no
legitimate interest in the property. The restriction merely permits the
grantor to obtain an economic advantage from a future sale of the
166. Id. § 406(c).
167. Id. comment i;see also Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588,
589 (Mo. App. 1958) in which the court considered three factors in determining the reasona-
bleness of a restraint on alienation: (1) the purposes for which the restraint is imposed,
(2) the duration of the restraint, and (3) the method of determining the price to be paid. A
SAM appears reasonable under these factors.
168. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413 comment a, illustration 3 (1944).
169. Id. comment g.
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property. Under common law criteria, such a restriction is both capri-
cious and unreasonable.
In contrast, a SAM is a security instrument, not a deed restriction.
Neither arbitrary nor malicious, it encumbers the property only to the
extent necessary to secure an obligation from the owner which enabled
it to obtain a loan at a lower, fixed rate of interest. Moreover, as op-
posed to the restraint described in the Restatement, a SAM lender has
an important continuing security interest in the property. Finally, un-
like the restraint described in the Restatement, a SAM is limited in
duration and has a substantial economic effect. For these reasons, a
SAM is not an unreasonable restraint on alienation under common law
principles.
Furthermore, no California cases have prohibited a restraint simi-
lar to a SAM. Recently, courts have applied California Civil Code sec-
tion 711170 to void due-on-sale clauses in deeds of trust or mortgages
when those clauses are enforced solely for the purpose of adjusting in-
terest rates.'71 The California courts have also invalidated a deed pro-
vision that property cannot be sold without the grantor's consent. 7 2 A
covenant in a deed that property can only be sold to the grantor is also
invalid under section 711.173 Most types of racial and religious restric-
tions applicable to potential purchasers are also invalid restraints under
section 711.174 Thus, section 711 has been applied to cases where the
restraint was both more restrictive and less related to legitimate busi-
ness or social purposes than SAMs. The language of section 711 and
recent case law confirm this conclusion.
Section 711 provides that restraints on alienation are void only
when "repugnant" to the property interest concurrently being created
or transferred. 7 5 In the illustration from the Restatement 176 in which
"A" grants to "B" on condition that "B" pay over to "C" a percentage
of the profits obtained upon resale of the property, that condition
would, in an ordinary context, involve an attempt to create a restraint
or interest wholly repugnant to the interest purportedly being con-
170. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1954).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 181-202.
172. E.g., Prey v. Stanley, 110 Cal. 423, 42 P. 908 (1895); Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363,
28 P. 118 (1883).
173. Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887).
174. See, e.g., Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 P. 596 (1919); Foster v.
Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P.2d 497 (1933); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42
Cal. App. 152, 183 P. 470 (1919).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1982).
176. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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veyed. Certainly in the typical situation, when "A" grants a fee title to
"B," "A" no longer has any continuing financial or other interest in the
property.1 77 In a SAM, however, the lender's taking of an interest in
the profits on resale is not repugnant to the security interest being cre-
ated. Rather, it is complementary to it in that it defines both the
amount of interest to be paid on the loan and the time of payment.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America 178 stated clearly that restraints on alienation are not automati-
cally void. Rather, one must weigh the degree of the restraint against
the justification for its imposition to determine whether the restraint is
reasonable. 179
In the case of a SAM, the degree of restraint is quite small. Unlike
the illustration in section 413 of the Restatement, where the owner is
unable to retain the full market price and therefore is hesitant to sell, '
80
a SAM borrower who is required to pay a portion of the profits to his
lender should not be hesitant to sell; the reduction in profit has been
offset by a lower fixed interest rate during the term of the loan. The
apparent restraint on alienation in the SAM financing device is not,
therefore, the unreasonable restraint prohibited by Wellenkamp and
section 711.
In conclusion, a SAM contains little if any of the restraint con-
tained in the Restatement illustration, but, again unlike the illustration,
substantial justification for the restraint exists in a SAM. Accordingly,
a SAM does not violate the rule against unreasonable restraints on
alienation.
Due-On-Sale Provisions
A related question is whether, as is typically the case for SAMs, a
provision is enforceable which requires the payment of all contingent
deferred interest and principal when the secured property is sold. The
177. Although undoubtedly correct at the time the Restatement of Property was written,
it is doubtful that the A-B-C illustration, quoted supra in the text accompanying note 168, is
an accurate exposition of the law today. For instance, assume an owner of undeveloped
property neither wishes, nor has the ability, to undertake the risks and obligations necessary
to rezone the property and to put a governmentally approved development plan on it. Nev-
ertheless, doing so would double the per-square-foot value of the property. Although an
effort to capture some of the potential increase in value might better be accomplished by a
differently structured transaction, it would certainly seem that a deed by such owner on
condition that his or her buyer turn over to the seller a percentage of the profits realized as a
result of efforts to rezone the property would be justifiable and not a violation of section 711.
178. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
179. Id. at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
180. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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California legislature exempted statutory SAMs from this potential
problem by a specific provision validating acceleration of the loan ma-
turity date when the property is sold. 181 A lender making a nonstatu-
tory SAM should also be able to enforce a due-on-sale provision.18 2
A plethora of recent California cases I8 3 and commentaries' 84 dis-
cusses the statutory prohibition of unreasonable restraints on alienation
and the applicability of this prohibition to the enforceability of due-on-
sale provisions. The seminal case in this area is Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America,'8 5 which concerned whether the automatic enforcement of a
trust deed's acceleration clause upon sale of the property is an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation. Wellenkamp mandates a balancing test
under which the justification for enforcement of a particular restraint
must be weighed against the actual practical effect upon alienation that
181. See supra note 63 for text of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.162.
182. The following discussion assumes the inapplicability to the particular loan of the
Gan Act's validation of due-on-sale clauses. See infra text accompanying notes 204-16.
183. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982); Dawn Inv.
Co. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982); Wellenkamp
v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864,489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); Garber
v. Fullerton Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 122 Cal. App. 3d 423, 176 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981); Wilhite v.
Callihan, 121 Cal. App. 3d 661, 175 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1981); Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981); Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n
v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981); Saucedo v. Mercury Say. & Loan
Ass'n, Ill Cal. App. 3d 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980); Guild Wineries & Distilleries v.
Land Dynamics, 103 Cal. App. 3d 966, 163 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1980); Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App.
3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978).
184. See Humphrey, Tucker v. Lassen The Demise of the Due-On-Sale Clause in Califor-
nia, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 665 (1976); Miller, Fixed Price Preemptive Rights in California: The
Quality of Mercer is Strained, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1980); Rubens, Right of First Re/fsal
and Waiver ofthe Right of Judicial Partition, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1963); Valensi, The Due-
On-Sale Clause-A Dissenting Opinion, 45 L.A.B. Bull. 121 (1970); Zeller, Enforceability of
the Due-On-Sale Clause After Tucker, 52 L.A.BJ. 630 (1977); Comment, Wellenkamp v.
Bank ofAmerica: Invalidation ofAutomaticall , Enforceable Due-On-Sale Clauses, 67 CALIF.
L. REv. 886 (1979); Note, The Demise of the Due-On-Sale Clause, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 573
(1976); Note, The Casefor Relieffrom Due-On-Sale Provisions: A Note to Hellbaum v. Lytton
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 32 HASTINGS L.L 431 (1979); Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmeri="
A Victoryfor the Consumer?, 31 HASTINGS L.. 275 (1979); Note, Beyond Tucker v. Lassen:
The Future of the Due-On-Sale Clause in California, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1975); Comment
Due-On-Sale Clauses and Restraints on Alienation: Does Wellenkamp Apply to Federal Insti-
tutions?, 11 PAC. L.J. 1085 (1980); Note, Reverse Annuity Mortgages and the Due-On-Sale
Clause, 32 STAN. L. REv. 143 (1979); Comment, Coast Bank v. Minderhout and the Reason-
able Restraint on Alienation: Creature of Commercial Amb:gui y, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 954
(1965); Comment, The Due-On-Sale Clause in Calfornia: A Casefor Automatic Enforcement
by the Private Lender, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 639 (1979).
185. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
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would result if the restraint were enforced.18 6 Under this balancing
test, the court invalidated due-on-sale clauses unless their enforcement
"is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment of [the lender's]
security or the risk of default."'
' 87
The Wellenkamp court reasoned that if lenders could accelerate
notes on the transfer of secured properties, the transfer of such property
might be prohibited entirely because the buyer would be unable to sub-
stitute a new loan and the seller would not receive sufficient funds to
discharge the existing loan. 88 The court rejected the claim that a
lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at current interest rates
outweighs such a restraint. Although the court recognized that lenders
face increasing costs due to escalating inflation, it held that due-on-sale
clauses are not designed to protect against this type of business risk;
lenders, rather than borrowers, should assume the burden of long-term
future economic projections.
89
A due-on-sale clause in a SAM must be analyzed using the Wel-
lenkamfp balancing test. If the degree of restraint in a SAM is less than
in a traditional mortgage, the balance changes. Similarly, any reason-
able justification for the acceleration, over and above any increases in
the risk of default or any impairment of the security, may be placed in
the balance.' 90
The ratio decidendi of Wellenkamp is that due-on-sale clauses sub-
stantially restrain alienation because they require purchasers to make
an immediate single payment of the remaining balance of a note rather
than assuming the less onerous obligation of paying this amount over
186. Id. at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
187. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (footnote omitted). The court also
explicitly overruled Cherry v. Homes Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr.
135 (1969), to the extent that Cherry permitted the lender to accelerate a debt in order to
acquire economic advantage, i.e., adjustment of the interest rate. There have been several
California cases decided since Wellenkamp which clarify, elaborate, expand and distinguish
its holding. See supra note 183. The only subsequent California Supreme Court case in this
area is Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332
(1982). This case is significant because it demonstrates the court's unwillingness artificially
to restrict the expressed rationale of Wellenkamp. In Dawn Investment, the court concluded
that, "the Wellenkamp rule applies to non-institutional lenders and to commercial prop-
erty." 30 Cal. 3d at 697, 639 P.2d at 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 332. The Dawn opinion merely
affirms the reasoning of Wellenkamp. As a result, the balancing test adopted in Wellenkamp
is still the applicable measuring rule for the determination of the enforceability of a due-on-
sale clause.
188. 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
189. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
190. Id. at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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an extended period.19' In a SAM, a less substantial restraint is imposed
because the buyer's options for payment of the current loan do not vary
significantly. The purchaser of property encumbered by a SAM must
either pay the contingent deferred interest in a single payment upon
maturity, if the SAM is assumed, or pay the contingent deferred inter-
est in a single payment upon purchase, if the SAM is not assumed.
Thus, unlike traditional mortgages, the purchaser will not have the op-
portunity simply to continue the installment payments of a previously
amortizing loan.
Also, the enforceability of a SAM due-on-sale clause is clearly
more justifiable than a due-on-sale provision in a traditional mortgage.
In order to protect the security interest, acceleration of the principal
portion of a SAM upon sale of the property is more important to SAM
lenders than it would be to lenders making traditional loans. Wel-
lenkamp establishes that the lender's security interest is not impaired
by the failure to accelerate because the purchaser's equity interest in
the property assures continued protection from default. The court
stated that "the buyer in an outright sale. . . may make a large [cash]
down payment on the property, thereby creating an equity interest in
the property in him which is sufficient to provide an adequate incentive
not to commit waste or permit the property to depreciate."' 192 Wel-
lenkamp states that traditional lenders need protection only against
waste and depreciation. A SAM lender must, in addition, protect the
potential appreciation of the value of the security.
Several other reasons support the conclusion that a due-on-sale
provision in a SAM should be automatically enforceable. First, Wel-
lenkamp states that in fixed interest rate mortgage situations, a lender's
primary purpose for acceleration is the protection of the average inter-
est rate of its loan portfolio. The court concluded, however, that the
due-on-sale clause was not designed or intended for this purpose and
that its automatic exercise in the absence of a threat to the lender's
security is invalid.193 In the case of SAM lenders, the motivation for
191. Id. at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
192. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
193. "Although we recognize that lenders face increasing costs of doing business and
must pay increasing amounts to depositors for the use of their funds in making long-term
real estate loans as a result of inflation and a competitive money market, we believe that
exercise of the due-on clause to protect against this kind of business risk would not further
the purpose for which the due-on clause was legitimately designed, namely to protect against
impairment to the lender's security that is shown to result from a transfer of title. Economic
risks such as those caused by an inflationary economy are among the general risks inherent
in every lending transaction. They are neither unforeseeable nor unforeseen." Id. at 952,
582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (footnote omitted). See also Tucker v. Lassen Say. &
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acceleration upon a sale is not to maintain a loan portfolio at current
rates. SAM lenders make loans in order to receive a potentially high
yield from the contingent deferred interest portion of the loan. Upon
sale of the property, the lender no longer has an interest in continuing
to carry the loan; the sole purpose for making the loan has been satis-
fied. Indeed, it may be assumed that many SAM lenders will make
loans only on property they believe is undervalued. 94 Thus, upon sale
of the property at fair market value and payment of the contingent
deferred interest, the lender's entire reason and purpose for making the
SAM is extinguished at that point, and the most appropriate time for
calling the loan due has arrived.
Examination of the contrasting reasons that SAM and traditional
lenders have for making loans highlights this point. Traditional thirty-
year, fixed-interest loans are long-term investments providing the
lender with a steady and predictable income. In a sense, the borrower
treats such a loan as a fixed feature of the property. 95 Thus, at the
initiation of the loan, the parties do not contemplate that the loan will
be accelerated for any reason other than default or, as a result of sale,
the threat of default. SAM lenders, however, desire a high yield from
the contingent deferred interest payable when the property is sold. The
lender and the borrower, for economic purposes, 196 are essentially co-
owners. In this relationship, termination of the contractual arrange-
ment is expected, by both borrower and lender, upon sale of the com-
mon asset. Thus, the reason SAM lenders accelerate loans upon sale is
not that the loan has ceased to yield at current interest rates. Rather,
SAM lenders must accelerate upon sale because the purpose of the
transaction has been fully satisfied. In short, to deny SAM lenders the
right to accelerate upon sale is to deny the essential feature of a SAM
loan, the right to share appreciation. If owners can gain the profits of
appreciation upon sale but lenders cannot, then, in view of the contin-
Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974), holding that a lender's
interest in maintaining its portfolio at current interest rates does not justify the restraint
imposed by the exercise of a "due-on" clause upon the execution of an installment land
contract by the borrower.
194. Whether a SAM is made when property is initially financed or as a refinancing
device, SAM lenders obviously will intend to lend only on properties that are undervalued,
or which have substantial potential for appreciation, in order to maximize potential future
appreciation.
195. For instance, it is standard practice for appraisers to consider the nature of a prop-
erty's liens in assessing its value; a long-term, low interest rate loan may significantly in-
crease the value of a parcel.
196. But only for economic purposes. The lender is not legally a co-owner. See infra
text accompanying notes 274-318, 379-92.
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gent deferred interest aspect, there would be no true shared
appreciation.
A second reason for allowing acceleration upon a sale relates only
to SAMs in which the principal is not amortized over the term of the
loan. If an unamortized SAM with a twenty-year term is not acceler-
ated upon a sale, the lender's risk of default increases. For example,
assume that a lender makes a $100,000, twenty-year SAM, and the
property is sold after fifteen years. If the SAM is not payable in full at
the time of sale, the purchaser assumes an obligation which includes a
substantial burden to make full payment of the principal and contin-
gent deferred interest in five years, while the original borrower walks
away from the sale transaction with the property's total appreciation
pocketed in cash.
The final and most compelling reason for enforcement of SAM
due-on-sale provisions is found in the California SAM statute. The
legislative findings in Civil Code section 1917.162(b) justify the en-
forcement of a due-on-sale clause by a nonstatutory SAM lender. The
legislature found and declared that although longer term financing was
desirable in order to reduce housing costs, the "additional risks" inher-
ent in SAMs are greater with longer term loans, but the risk is reduced
with an enforceable due-on-sale clause.1 97 In short, section 1917.162(b)
constitutes a legislative declaration that due-on-sale clauses are justifia-
bly included in SAMs because such clauses provide SAM lenders nec-
essary and appropriate protection from the "additional risks" inherent
in SAMs as compared with traditional financing. Therefore, the legis-
lature found it necessary in section 1917.162(a) to validate due-on-sale
clauses in statutory SAMs' 98 Although the courts are not obligated to
implement this declaration of legislative intent with respect to nonstat-
utory SAMs, there are two reasons why the courts will give weight to it.
First, section 1917.162(b) appears to have been intentionally
drafted as a statement of legislative policy applicable to all SAMs, not
merely to statutory SAMs. Throughout the remainder of the statute,
including section 1917.162(a), statutory SAMs are referred to as
197. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.162(b) (West Supp. 1982).
198. "The legislature finds and declares that potential exposure to liability for enforce-
ment of a due-on sale clause consistent with Section 711, as interpreted by the courts, makes
use of such a provision impractical. Moreover, the additional risks to the lender inherent in
shared appreciation financing are greater with longer loan terms (which are more desirable
from the standpoint of housing affordability), but this risk is reduced with an enforceable
'due-on sale' clause. Therefore, in order to facilitate shared appreciationfinancing, it is nec-
essary to establish the exceptions specified in subdivision (a).' Id. (emphasis added).
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"shared appreciation loans,"'199 a defined term meaning loans con-
forming to the provisions of the code.200 In setting forth the reason that
Wellenkamp should be inapplicable to SAMs, however, the legislature
did not utilize the defined term; rather, it referred to "shared apprecia-
tion financing. '201 It appears that the legislature intended the findings
in section 1917.162(b), in conjunction with section 1917.110,202 to be
treated as a legislative declaration of public policy favoring enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses in all SAMs.
Second, under the balancing test of Wellenkamp, adequate justifi-
cation for automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses exists. Enact-
ment of section 1917.162(b) shows that the legislature found such
enforcement would reduce what would otherwise be greater risks in-
herent in all SAMs, both statutory and nonstatutory, and further, that
the degree of reduction is, at least in longer term loans, enough to make
a difference in whether the lender is willing to make a SAM. Courts
should conclude that due-on-sale clauses in SAMs are sufficiently dis-
tinguishable from due-on-sale clauses in traditional mortgages to jus-
tify a lender's automatic acceleration of the principal and contingent
deferred interest upon sale of the secured property.
The Garn Act
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (the
"Gan Act") 20 3 is an attempt to revitalize the housing industry by both
strengthening the financial stability of home mortgage institutions and
insuring the availability of home mortgage loans. The Gan Act con-
tains many technical provisions regarding the operation of banks, sav-
ings and loans, thrifts and credit unions. Two sections of the Garn Act
will also affect SAMs. Section 341 of the Garn Act provides in many
instances for the specific preemption of state laws and regulations that
prohibit the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses with respect to real
property loans. Title VIII of the Gan Act creates a federal preemption
of state laws relating to certain alternative mortgage transactions, in-
cluding SAMs.
199. E.g., id. §§ 1917.131-1917.133, 1917.160 (West Supp. 1982).
200. "'Shared appreciation loan' means any loan made pursuant to this chapter upon
the security of owner-occupied real property of a type specified in Section 1917.130, and in
connection with which the lender has a right to receive a share of the appreciation in the
value of the security property. 'Shared appreciation loan' includes a deed of trust and any
evidence of debt issued in connection with the loan." Id. § 1917.1200) (West Supp. 1982).
201. See supra note 198.
202. See supra text accompanying note 58.




With one exception, section 341 validates the enforceability of
due-on-sale clauses in real property loan documents regardless of when
made or transferred. 204 Particularly significant is the validation of due-
on-sale clauses in loans made by private parties, as well as by state and
federal institutions and governmental agencies. 20 5 Additionally, the
Gain Act affects loans on commercial, as well as residential,
properties.2o6
Subsection (d) of section 341 lists specific transfers, such as junior
encumbrances, intrafamily transfers, and others, where a lender is pro-
hibited from exercising a due-on-sale clause.20 7 This list may be sup-
plemented in regulations prescribed by the FHLBB. This subsection
purports to apply to all loans, thereby also preempting state law.
The Gain Act does not remove all uncertainties in the due-on-sale
area. For instance, in California it is not perfectly clear which date is
the commencement date of the period for defining "excepted con-
tracts," i.e., contracts not presently affected by the Gain Act.208 Al-
though generally the Wellenkamp decision (August 25, 1978) is
considered the death knell of due-on-sale clauses in California,209 ar-
guably the date of enactment of section 711 of the Civil Code, which
forbids unreasonable restraints against alienation (1872),210 or the date
of an earlier Supreme Court decision, such as La Sala v. American Sav-
204. The sole exception is "excepted contracts"--real property loan contracts involving
lenders other than federal savings and loan associations or federal savings banks where the
loans were made or assumed, or where the property was transferred "subject to" the lien,
during the period between (a) the date the state adopted a statute prohibiting the exercise of
a due-on-sale clause or the date on which the highest court of the state (or, if the highest
court has not acted, the next highest court if the decision applies statewide) rendered a deci-
sion prohibiting such exercise, and (b) October 15, 1982.
As to an "excepted contract," the Gan Act overrides contrary state law only upon a
transfer of the property occurring on or after three years following the date of enactment of
the Gain Act (October 15, 1982) unless prior to the third anniversary either the applicable
state legislature enacts legislation, or the Comptroller of the Currency (as to national banks)
or the National Credit Union Administration Board (as to federal credit unions) prescribes
regulations that otherwise regulate such a loan. Id. § 341(c)(1). Lenders under excepted
contracts may nonetheless accelerate the loans if any successor or transferee of the borrower
does not meet customary credit standards applied to loans secured by similar property.
Otherwise lenders may not enforce due-on-sale clauses in excepted contracts on the basis of
transfers occurring prior to enactment of the Gan Act. id. § 341(c)(2).
205. Id. § 341(a)(2).
206. Id. § 341(a)(3).
207. Id. § 341(d).
208. See supra note 204.
209. See supra note 185 & accompanying text.
210. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1980).
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ings & Loan Association (October 21, 1971)211 or Tucker v. Lassen Sav-
ings & Loan Association (October 10, 1974),212 could be the date from
which the critical period should be measured. Two cases, in dicta, con-
firm that the date of Wellenkamp is the relevant date.213 A third case
appears so to hold.
214
The effect of section 341 on SAMs is obvious. Although statutory
SAMs are statutorily exempt from state laws restricting the enforceabil-
ity of due-on-sale clauses,215 nonstatutory SAM lenders were not statu-
torily exempt from such restrictions before enactment of the Garn Act.
The Garn Act provides all nonstatutory SAM lenders the same ability
to enforce due-on-sale clauses that statutory SAMs lenders are given by




The purpose of title VIII of the Gan Act217 is to eliminate the
discriminatory impact of FHLBB regulations by authorizing any
"housing creditor" to make, purchase and enforce an "alternative
mortgage transaction" in accordance with FHLBB regulations,
notwithstanding any state constitution, law, or regulation prohibiting
or limiting such transactions.21 8 The result of title VIII is that housing
creditors may now make loans that comply with the less restrictive of
either FHLBB regulations or applicable state law.
An "alternative mortgage transaction" is defined broadly in title
VIII to include any loan or credit sale secured by residential real prop-
erty, other than a fixed-rate, fixed-term loan, subject to FHLBB regula-
tory definition.2 19 A "housing creditor," among other things, is "any
person who regularly takes loans, credit sales or advances secured by
211. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
212. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
213. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3031 n.24 (1982);
Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 328, 605 P.2d 10, 12, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 (1980).
214. Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 135 Cal. App. 3d 514, 518-19, 185 Cal. Rptr. 401,
404 (1982).
215. The legislative history is in accord. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
n. 1, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3054, 3076. See supra text accompany-
ing note 42.
216. As discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 181-202, due-on-sale clauses in
SAMs should be enforceable even absent the federal preemption.
217. Pub. L. No. 97-320 §§ 801-07, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545-48 (1982).
218. Id. §§ 802-804.
219. Id. § 803(1).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
SHARED APPRECIATION MORTGAGES
interests in [residential real propertyl. '220
Title VIII expressly permits states to avoid the application of its
provisions.22' Section 805 provides that if a state, within three years of
the effective date of the Gan Act, adopts a law or passes a referendum
avoiding application of title VIII, then the title VIII preemption shall
apply only to alternative mortgage transactions entered into prior to the
effective date of such law or referendum and subsequent to the effective
date of title VIII.222
One ambiguity of title VIII is whether it is retroactive. Since sec-
tion 804(a) of the Act permits housing creditors to "make, purchase and
enforce alternative mortgage transactions," 223 it could be argued that a
housing creditor may now enforce a loan made before the effective date
of the Gan Act that did not comply with state law existing at the time
the loan was made but did conform to FHLBB regulations existing at
the time the loan was made. Since the Gan Act does not expressly
apply retroactively, and since retroactive application might raise consti-
tutional objections, it is probable that title VIII will not be construed to
be retroactive.
In order to understand the effect of title VIII on SAMs, it is neces-
sary to analyze the FHLBB regulation of SAMs. On September 30,
1980, the FHLBB issued proposed regulations for SAMs. 224 The
FHLBB received 350 comments.225 After reviewing the comments,
however, the FHLBB determined that further staff work was needed on
several issues raised by the comments. Therefore, no final action on
the proposal was taken at that time.
On May 7, 1982, the FHLBB issued new proposed regulations.226
In the preface to the new proposed regulations, the FHLBB stated that
the major problem raised by the initially proposed regulations resulted
from the excess of constraints contained therein. In response to this
problem, the 1982 proposed regulations were much less restrictive.
The 1982 proposed regulations became final rules on August 11,
1982.227 The final regulations amend section 545.6-2 of the Code of
Federal Regulations to provide that a federal association may make,
sell, purchase, participate or otherwise deal in loans that provide that a
220. Id. § 803(2)(C).
221. Id. § 805.
222. Id.
223. Id. § 804(a) (emphasis added).
224. See supra note 21.
225. 47 Fed. Reg. 19,711, 19,713 (1982).
226. Id. at 19,711.
227. Id. at 36,612 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2).
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portion of the consideration to be received by an association in return
for making a loan may be interest in the form of a percentage of the
amount by which the current market value of the secured property,
during the loan term or at maturity, exceeds the original appraised
value.228 The final FHLBB SAM regulations do not limit the term,
amount, percentage or other substantive provisions of SAMs. How-
ever, the regulations do not expressly exempt SAM lenders from usury
laws, priority questions or other legal questions discussed in this
Article.
Title VIII in conjunction with the current FHLBB regulations
does not directly benefit the California SAM lender because California
law does not expressly restrict a lender's ability to make nonstatutory
SAMs. 229 Title VIII, however, may offer future SAM lenders some
comfort. California SAM lenders are only limited in their ability to
make SAMs by the considerations discussed in this Article. Although
SAM lenders should not fear these considerations, it would simplify
matters if California or federal law addressed these issues. Thus, if
future FHLBB regulations specifically permit lenders to make SAMs
notwithstanding the considerations just described, the Garn Act would
preempt any arguably contrary state law. Unless FHLBB regulations
change, however, title VIII will have little effect on California SAM
lenders.
Redlining
Lenders making traditional real property loans routinely examine
only two factors in assessing the security: the appraised value of the
property and the loan-to-value ratio.2 30 Because the contingent de-
ferred interest element of a SAM represents a substantial portion of the
lender's anticipated return, a SAM lender considers a third factor
before making a loan: the likelihood that the property will appreciate
in value. Factors such as neighborhood trends, the age of the secured
property, and the general condition of the surrounding property affect
the rate of appreciation of a particular parcel.23' SAM lenders relying
on these and similar factors in evaluating a proposed loan must avoid
violating state and federal antiredlining statutes.
228. Id. at 36,618 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6 & 545.6-2(a)(2)(iv)).
229. See supra note 67.
230. Cf Gallagher, Computing the Lender's Yield on an Equity Participation Mortgage,
MORTGAGE BANKING, Feb. 1981, at 33.
231. See Angell & Wardrep, Evaluating the Shared Appreciation Mortgage, MORTGAGE
BANKING, Apr. 1981, at 39; Iezman, Equity, supra note 81, at 517.
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Redlining is a policy either to exclude certain geographical areas
from consideration for home mortgages or to vary the terms and condi-
tions of loans within certain geographical areas.2 32 At least one Cali-
fornia statute prohibits any consideration of neighborhood trends.
233
Thus, a SAM lender may be forced to choose between violating state or
federal antiredlining laws or foregoing appropriate economic analysis
of the contemplated loan.
A finance industry task force identified redlining as an issue re-
quiring "further analysis" before a SAM program is adopted.
234 Al-
though the California legislature considered this issue when developing
the California SAM statute,235 the statute itself does not address the
redlining issue. Consequently, this Article next examines the antired-
lining statutes to determine whether they are applicable to the proce-
dures a lender would use to evaluate making statutory and
232. Special Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Violations
Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. Rnv. 1045 (1975).
233. CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35854 (West Supp. 1982).
234. "Our major concern with the use of a shared appreciation mortgage is with respect
to the potential for discriminatory lending. We are not satisfied with the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board's comment that 'accordingly, while an association may, as a matter of
sound business practice, seek to concentrate SAMs in areas or types of housing that it be-
lieves will appreciate rapidly, it may not limit the availability of these instruments to certain
neighborhoods. To the extent a policy is discriminatory in fact, an association must be pre-
pared to demonstrate that its policy achieves a genuine business need which cannot be
achieved by means which are either not discriminatory in effect or less discriminatory in
effect.'
It is our view that certain neighborhoods in which property values are not appreciating
rapidly will be, for business purposes, excluded from shared appreciation mortgage lending.
In order to avoid a practice with a discriminatory effect, some method must be devised for
insuring a fair mix of mortgage instruments in all communities. We believe that further
analysis of this particular problem is required prior to the adoption of the shared apprecia-
tion mortgage instrument." Alternative Mortgage Instrument Task Force of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (Dec. 29, 1981) (as quoted in DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
STATE & CONSUMER SERVICES AGENCY, ENROLLED BILL REPORT (A.B. 2168), 1981-82
Reg. Sess. 4(1981). Others have noted this problem. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 81, at 318-
24; Letter from California Association of Realtors to Office of the Secretary, FHLBB, at 5
(Nov. 25, 1980).
235. Commenting upon the initial draft of the California SAM statute, a legislative ana-
lyst for the California Department of Consumer Affairs noted the redlining question and
came to the unsupported and facially erroneous conclusion that SAMs would be discrimina-
tory because they would aidonly the. "more affluent" home purchaser. "While very little
analysis of the potential for unlawful discrimination has been performed, it seems likely that
SAMs will be used primarily by builders in the sale of new and expensive subdivision
homes, not by lenders financing the construction of low income housing or the resale of
already existing homes. To the extent that is true, the SAM will be discriminatory in the
sense that it will be used mainly to finance homeownership [sic] by the more affluent home
purchasers. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, STATE & CONSUMER SERVICES AGENCY EN-
ROLLED BILL REPORT (A.B. 2168), 1981-82 Reg. Sess. 4 (1981).
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nonstatutory SAM loans.236
The only federal statutes or regulations establishing an express an-
tiredlining prohibition are the new rules promulgated by the FHLBB,
which apply only to member institutions of the Federal Home Loan
Bank.237 These regulations prohibit discrimination in lending based on
the age or location of a home238 and are rather ambiguous. 239 Inas-
much as these regulations240 are no more restrictive than the California
236. The antiredlining statutes will not, of course, be applicable to commercial SAMs.
237. 12 C.F.R. §§ 528.1-528.8, 531.8 (1982). On the federal level, two sources of housing
regulation, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), while not
specifically prohibiting redlining, do prohibit various forms of racial discrimination. The
Fair Housing Act establishes comprehensive rules prohibiting all forms of housing discrimi-
nation. One provision states: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any. . . enterprise whose business
consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate loans, to deny a loan
. . or to discriminate in the fixing of the amount, interest rate, duration, or other terms
• . . because of. . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C. § 3605
(1976). The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, applicable to all "creditors," prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, and age in the
extension of credit. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1976).
As SAM lenders have no legitimate reasons for discriminatorily denying SAMs, these
two statutes should not affect SAM lending practices. However, under the racial impact test
devised by the federal courts, lenders may be held liable under either of these Acts for
lending practices having a disproportionate effect on minorities. The racial-impact test was
first adopted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Civil Rights Act of 1964).
The test was later applied to housing in Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), and in United
States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). Thus, SAM lenders must care-
fully avoid any improperly disproportionate effects in offering SAMs. SAM lenders may
avoid the otherwise possible application of the racial impact test by invoking the business
necessity doctrine. In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that the racial impact doctrine was
inapplicable if the challenged practice was justified by a business necessity. Under this doc-
trine, a practice absolutely vital to the proper functioning of a business enterprise may be
permitted even if it produces a discriminatory effect. To qualify under the business necessity
exception: (1) the business purpose must be an important business purpose sufficiently com-
pelling to override its discriminatory effect; (2) the challenged practice must effectively carry
out the business purpose it allegedly serves; and (3) there must be no alternative policies or
practices available which would accomplish the business purpose advanced as well or better
but with a less discriminatory impact. For a discussion of the business necessity doctrine,
see, e.g., Note, The Red-Lining Battle Continues.- Discriminatory Effect vs. Business Necessity
Under the Fair HousingAct, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.J. 357 (1979). Generally, the commenta-
tors have suggested that the doctrine be limited, a suggestion the courts have followed. The
three-prong test noted above is substantially identical to that contained in the California
Administrative Code, discussed infra in text accompanying note 247. Most of the same con-
siderations would apply.
238. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8 (1982).
239. For a discussion of these regulations, see Kmiec, supra note 81, at 320-22.
240. Whereas the FHLBB regulations apply only to member institutions of the Federal
Home Loan Bank, the California antiredlining provisions apply to any "financial institu-
tion," as defined by statute. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35805(c) (West Supp. 1982).
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antiredlining provisions, this discussion will focus on the latter.
The legislature intended241 that California antiredlining prohibi-
tions242 "prevent discrimination in the provision of financial assistance
for financing or refinancing the purchase, construction, rehabilitation,
or improvement of housing accommodations because of conditions,
characteristics, or trends in the neighborhood or geographic area sur-
rounding the security property."24 3 Accordingly, the antiredlining stat-
ute prohibits discrimination based upon consideration of "conditions,
characteristics, or trends in the neighborhood or geographic area sur-
rounding the housing accommodation, unless the financial institution
can demonstrate that such consideration in the particular case is re-
quired to avoid an unsafe and unsound business practice."
244
The return on the SAM lender's investment depends on the appre-
ciation in value of the secured property. As no generally accepted test
exists for determining whether certain property will appreciate in
value, it is difficult to predict what factors a SAM lender will consider
before making such a loan. However, the nature of the factors consid-
ered determines whether a SAM lender is required to justify considera-
tion of the factor as necessary "to avoid an unsafe and unsound
business practice."
The age of a home, for instance, may be one factor used to deter-
mine its potential rate of appreciation.245 Mere consideration of the
age of a particular house no more violates the redlining prohibition
than does consideration of the value of a house. If a SAM lender, how-
ever, is tempted to consider the conditions, characteristics, or trends in
the neighborhood or geographic area surrounding the housing accom-
modation, then it might arguably run afoul of the antiredlining rules.
246
For example, potential appreciation may, in many lenders' opin-
ions, be affected by the neighborhood's affluence, whether neighbor-
hood values are static or climbing, and other similar factors. If a SAM
241. The legislative findings regarding California's antiredlining statutes illuminate the
legislative intent: 'With respect to certain geographic areas, financial institutions have
sometimes denied financial assistance or approved assistance on terms less favorable than
are usually offered in other geographic areas, regardless of the creditworthiness of the appli-
cant or the condition of the real-property security offered . Id. § 35801(e) (West Supp.
1982) (emphasis added).
242. Id. §§ 35801-35833 (West Supp. 1982). The regulations enacted pursuant to these
statutes are set forth in title 21 of the California Administrative Code §§ 7100-7117.
243. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 35802(a) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
244. 1d § 35810 (emphasis added).
245. Depending upon other facts, it may be expected to appreciate or to depreciate. See
Kmiec, supra note 81, at 318-19 & n.64.
246. d.
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lender takes into account these neighborhood considerations, it may be
presumed to have violated the antiredlining prohibitions unless it can
demonstrate that such considerations are necessary to avoid an "unsafe
and unsound business practice."
No case law discusses the parameters of the phrase "unsafe and
unsound business practice." The statute itself neither defines nor ex-
plains this term. The California Administrative Code provides some
useful analysis of the problem in section 7105.1, suggesting three ques-
tions to be considered in deciding whether it would be an "unsafe and
unsound business practice" for the lender not to consider neighborhood
trends: (1) whether a legitimate business purpose is served by consider-
ing neighborhood trends, characteristics and conditions; (2) whether
such considerations effectively achieve this purpose; and (3) whether
any non-discriminatory practices would accomplish this purpose
equally well.
247
The first question, whether consideration of neighborhood charac-
teristics serves a legitimate business purpose, can be answered affirma-
tively by the SAM lender. Lenders will make SAMs primarily to
expand the pool of potential borrowers and to create the possibility of
earning a higher return.248 The return must be sufficiently high to al-
low lenders to meet their costs and to encourage lenders to remain in
the residential loan markets.2 49 Consideration of neighborhood trends,
assuming valid prognostication of future appreciation, will protect the
lender's investment. Thus, the legitimate business purpose to be served
by consideration of neighborhood trends is allowing, facilitating and
encouraging a lender to make SAM loans on a basis that enlarges the
lender's pool of borrowers without reducing the lender's ultimate over-
all return below a minimum acceptable level.
247. "[I]f it is clear that a practice has a discriminatory effect against a protected group,
the burden shifts to the financial institution to demonstrate that the practice is required to
achieve a legitimate business purpose. Under this concept, each policy or practice is evalu-
ated by first asking whether or not the policy or practice is discriminatory in effect. If the
answer to this is 'yes,' then the financial institution will be considered to be in violation of
the regulations unless it can demonstrate that the practice is required to achieve a legitimate
business purpose." Additionally, "the business purpose must be an important business pur-
pose sufficiently compelling to override any discriminatory impact, the challenged practice
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced-or accomplish it equally well-with a lesser discriminatory im-
pact." 21 CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, R. 7105.1 (1979) (emphasis added).
248. See supra.text accompanying notes 24-25.
249. Cf. CAL. Bus. & TRANSP. AGENCY, STATE BANKING DEP'T, ENROLLED BILL RE-
PORT (A.B. 2168), 1981-82 Reg. Sess. (1981); CAL. Bus. & TRANSP. AGENCY, DEP'T OF CON-
SUMER AFFAIRS, ENROLLED BILL REPORT (A.B. 2168), 1981-82 Reg. Sess. at 1 (1981).
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The second question, whether consideration of neighborhood
trends, characteristics and conditions effectively achieves the legitimate
business purpose, is presently unanswerable due to the absence of
available empirical evidence. The practice might be acceptable in one
location and not in another, depending upon the history,
demographics, and other factors unique to the locale. Each lender will
need to analyze whether the practices and criteria it wishes to use are
effective in carrying out the legitimate business purposes described in
the foregoing paragraph. Nevertheless, one would expect an empirical
study to show actual returns on ten-year SAMs to be greater in areas
where home price trends are up at the time the loan is made, or are
expected to go up, than in areas where price trends are not increasing
or are not expected to increase. Thus limiting SAM loans to certain
areas, though perhaps constituting redlining, may nevertheless effec-
tively carry out the legitimate business purpose.
In analyzing this question, it must be emphasized that a SAM
lender has legitimate concerns beyond those of traditional lenders. A
lender making a standard loan of 80% of the property value has little
legitimate concern whether the value remains static or even declines
somewhat. A SAM lender depends on a continued minimum apprecia-
tion in order to render the investment a profitable one.
The final question of the three, whether any nondiscriminatory
practices would accomplish the legitimate business purpose equally
well, is also ultimately factual. If, for instance, it can be assumed in
answer to the second question above that consideration of neighbor-
hood value trends are effective in achieving a legitimate business pur-
pose, then a cause and effect relationship can also be assumed. To that
extent, "no acceptable alternative policy or practices" would accom-
plish the business purpose in the same or better way. Further, no other
alternative mortgage program established in the last fifty years has low-
ered the interest rates paid by borrowers.250 Thus, there appear to be
no nondiscriminatory alternatives.
From a broader perspective, application of the antiredlining provi-
sions in a manner that would prevent SAM lenders from making neces-
sary or appropriate investment decisions would inhibit the California
legislature's ability to encourage shared appreciation financing.
251 In-
terpreting antiredlining statutes in ways that forestall or discourage
250. Indeed, most AMIs are designed to permit a lender to raise the interest rate accord-
ing to an independent standard.
251. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.110 (West Supp. 1982).
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lenders from making SAMs would effectively eliminate one of the few
loan programs designed to aid lower-income borrowers.
Other portions of the California antiredlining provisions support
this conclusion by suggesting that the economic factors SAM lenders
must consider are both permissible and appropriate.252 The regulations
permit lenders to apply certain inherently subjective criteria in deter-
mining whether a loan will be granted, including consideration of the
possibility that market value may decline as a result of the local geo-
graphic factors.253 If a lender can document that the property's fair
market value is likely to decrease during the early years of the mort-
gage term, he may deny the loan or adjust the loan-to-value ratio, in-
creasing the down payment required of the borrower.254 The lender
may also require a shorter term to maturity, thereby increasing the bor-
rower's monthly payment.255 By analogy, SAM lenders should be able
to consider the prospect for appreciation of the property, notwithstand-
ing California antiredlining legislation.
256
Unruh Civil Rights Act
The California Unruh Civil Rights Act 257 prohibits business estab-
lishments from discriminating against or refusing to trade with any per-
252. The regulations appear to adopt a less rigid view of the statute than the statutory
language might otherwise suggest.
253. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, R. 7106(b)(1) (1979).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. To implement these policies, the Administrative Code provides: "If a financial in-
stitution can document that one or more factors relating to the geographic area closely sur-
rounding the security property are likely to cause the fair market value of the security
property to decrease during the early years (three to five years) of the mortgage term, even
assuming the availability of nondiscriminatory financing in a geographic area, then the
financial institution, in determining whether and under what terms and conditions to grant
financial assistance, may make adjustments or additional requirements in the loan terms.
Provided, however, that no adjustment or additional requirement made pursuant to this
subsection shall exceed the minimum reasonably estimated to be required for the security
property to continue to be an adequate security for the loan." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, R.
7106(b)(1) (1979).
Further, the regulations provide: "Decisions on reasonable loan security shall be based
solely upon the value of the individual structure offered as security unless the financial insti-
tution can identify and document specific neighborhood or geographic conditions that affect
its present or short-range future value (e.g., three to five years). Such conditions may in-
clude current market trends based upon actual transactions involving comparable property
and trends indicating increasing numbers of abandoned, vandalized, or foreclosed proper-
ties in the immediate vicinity of the security property." Id., R. 7106(e) (1979).
257. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-53 (West 1954 & Supp. 1982) ("Unruh Civil Rights Act").
Though by statutory definition the term Unruh Civil Rights Act is comprised of only Civil
Code § 51, herein we have used the more common broad definition.
[Vol. 34
SHARED APPRECIATION MORTGAGES
son because of such person's race, creed, religion, color, national origin,
or sex.258 In deciding In re Cox, 259 the California Supreme Court de-
termined that the particular bases of discrimination identified in the
Unruh Civil Rights Act were- "illustrative, rather than restrictive.
' '260
Thus, if a business establishment discriminated against or refused to
deal with any arbitrarily defined group, it might violate the Unruh
Civil Rights Act.
Recently, the broad sweep of the Unruh Civil Rights Act was con-
firmed in Marina Point, Ltd v. Wolfson. 261 The California Supreme
Court held that a landlord's refusal to rent to a group consisting of
families with children was an exclusionary policy violating the rights of
members of that group.262 The landlord argued, however, that its ex-
clusionary policy was "reasonable," not "arbitrary. '263 The lower
court made a factual finding that children as a group are noisier and
more mischievous than adults.264 Therefore, the landlord argued, he
could seek to achieve the legitimate goal of a quiet residential atmos-
phere by excluding all children.
265
The supreme court, however, held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act
establishes for each individual a right of access to business establish-
ments.266 Thus, a business establishment may exclude persons only on
an individual, not a group, basis, and then only because of legitimately
unacceptable characteristics that a particular individual possesses. A
business establishment may not reject an individual merely because he
or she is a member of a group, even though there is empirical proof
that the percentage of individuals in that group having such legiti-
mately unacceptable characteristics is substantially greater than in the
population as a whole.267 Arguably, therefore, making SAMs available
only to certain classes of people, such as those with homes within a
particular value range or geographic area, violates the Unruh Civil
Rights Act. A lender basing its investment decisions solely upon an
individual evaluation of each loan applicant, however, would not vio-
258. Id. § 51.5 (West 1954 & Supp. 1982).
259. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
260. Id. at 212, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
261. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d at 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
262. Id. at 744-45, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
263. Id. at 725, 640 P.2d at 117, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
264. Id. at 729, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
265. Id. at 736, 640 P.2d at 124, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
266. Id. at 740, 640 P.2d at 126, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
267. Id. at 738-39, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
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late the Unruh Civil Rights Act because no group discrimination
occurs.
Ample justification also exists for rejecting the application of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act to lenders making SAMs available only to cer-
tain types or groups of properties. First, Marina Point indicates that a
reasonable discriminatory policy may be upheld if the policy "serves
any similarly compelling societal interest. '268 The court gave as an ex-
ample the right of landlords to bar, as a group, families with children
from apartment housing designed specifically for the aged. The court
based its conclusion on legislative history indicating that the California
legislature had implicitly indicated that housing for the elderly was a
desirable public policy.2 69 With respect to SAMs, the California legis-
lature has made an express legislative determination that SAMs must
become an integral element of the financing industry in California.
270
Thus, to the extent a lender must establish otherwise discriminatory
procedures and practices in order to set up and operate a feasible SAM
lending program, the lender would not be in violation of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. Such a lending program would be a "specialized in-
stitution designed to meet a social need,"27' in that it "alleviates" rather
than "exacerbates . . .the state's specialized housing needs.
'272
Second, to the extent that a SAM lender does discriminate, the
Unruh Civil Rights Act is not violated because the discriminatory
choices are based on the characteristics of property, not people. The
Unruh Act prohibits businesses from refusing to deal with persons on
the basis of personal characteristics imputed to an individual because
he or she is a member of a group. If, however, the likelihood of appre-
ciation is greatest for $100,000 to $200,000 homes in a particular geo-
graphic area, then a lender's refusal to give a SAM loan on property
outside that range would not discriminate against the individual. In-
stead, the basis for the discrimination would be the nature of the prop-
erty. 2 7 3 Thus, a SAM lender's decision to lend only on certain types of
property based on that property's potential for appreciation is not a
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
268. Id. at 743, 640 P.2d at 128, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
269. Id. at 742, 640 P.2d at 127-28, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10.
270. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.110 (West Supp. 1982).
271. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d at 743, 640 P.2d at 128, 180 Cal. Rptr. at
510.
272. Id.
273. To argue otherwise is to argue that banks willing to make $100,000 secured loans
on properties worth $150,000 or more must also be willing to grant such loans on properties
worth less than $100,000.
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Further, there is a critical difference between discriminatory policy
based on human groups and that based on property groups. It is evi-
dent that a particular person does not necessarily possess the same per-
sonal characteristics as others in his or her group. Conversely, it is also
evident that depressed general values of properties in a specific area
have a measurable effect on the value of a particular property within
that area. The cause and effect relationship exists because property is,
by and large, fungible, whereas people are not.
Finally, even if the cause-and-effect relationship described above
did not exist, the Unruh Civil Rights Act would not be violated merely
because a lender imputed to a particular piece of property a legiti-
mately unacceptable characteristic generally true of most properties in
the same class or grouping. The Act, as construed in Marina Point,
forbids ascribing to a particular individual the personal characteristics
generally true of other persons in his or her group. The Act was not
intended to forbid ascribing to a particular piece of property the char-
acteristics generally true of other pieces of property in the same class or
grouping. Therefore, the social policy and rationale of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act are not applicable.
Tax Implications
Some of the more difficult legal issues raised by SAMs are the tax
consequences for both lenders and borrowers.274 Unfortunately, there
has been little critical commentary on the subject.2 75
The SAM financing device poses tax questions in five principal
areas: First, can a lender report receipt of contingent deferred interest
as a capital gain, rather than ordinary income, and must a borrower
report it as a capital expenditure, rather than as an interest deduc-
tion?2 76 Second, is contingent deferred interest deductible for the bor-
rower and includible for the lender only in the year in which it is paid,
or in each year as it accrues? 277 Third, if contingent deferred interest is
not deductible until the note matures, and if it is to be treated as a
274. The contingent deferred interest feature of SAMs is the complicating element in the
tax context. The Internal Revenue Code employs terminology appropriate to more tradi-
tional loan situations, e.g., I.R.C. § 163 (1976). The contingent deferred interest feature of
SAMs corresponds neither to the terminology used in the Code nor to commonly used ac-
counting terminology.
275. But see Kmiec, supra note 81; Levine, Tax Implications of Shared Appreciation
Mortgages, 59 TAxEs 487 (1981); Mooradian & Rosenblatt, Characterization of Contingent
Payments on Shared Appreciation Mortgages, 57 J. TAX'N 20 (1982).
276. See I.R.C. §§ 163, 1221, 1245 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
277. See id §§ 446, 451, 461 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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payment of interest, must a SAM borrower take its entire interest de-
duction for contingent deferred interest in the single taxable year in
which the note matures? 278 Fourth, what is the impact of the interest
limitation rules of section 163(d) of the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.")? 2 7 9 Fifth, how will the imputed interest rules of I.R.C. sec-
tion 483 be applied if the fixed-rate portion of the interest obligation is
less than the minimum rate set by that section?
280
Characterization of the Income or Deduction Resulting from Receipt or
Payment of the Contingent Deferred Interest
The tax treatment of contingent deferred interest payments is of
concern to both parties to a SAM. Probably because there has been
confusion of SAMs with EPAs, some commentators have questioned
whether lenders can treat the receipt of contingent deferred interest as a
capital gain, rather than as interest, which is ordinary income,281 and
whether the borrower must treat the payment of deferred interest as a
capital payment, rather than as a current expense in the form of inter-
est. 282 In most situations, the parties will want characterizations that
conflict. Lenders usually prefer capital gain treatment while borrowers
usually benefit most by deducting the payments against ordinary in-
come. If the payment is termed capital in nature, however, the bor-
rower might benefit because the portion of profits paid to the lender
would not be considered gain to the borrower. Also, although interest
deductions are often more valuable to the borrower, the borrower
might not have enough income to take full advantage of the deduction
in the year of payment.
The FHLBB when considering proposed regulations concluded
that appreciation received by a savings and loan association from a
SAM would be ordinary income, not capital gain. 283 Additionally, the
278. See id § 441 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
279. See id § 163(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
280. See id. § 483 (1976).
281. See supra note 275.
282. Id.
283. "The Board believes that the structure of the SAM will cause it to have tax conse-
quences which differ significantly from those of other residential mortgage instruments. For
example, the payment of contingent interest by a borrower on maturity or payment in full of
the loan or sale or transfer of the property could result in an income tax deduction for the
borrower in excess of his/her taxable income for the year. Any such excess deduction could
be neither carried forward nor added to basis. In addition, contingent interest received from
a borrower by a lender or secondary market purchaser of the SAM would be taxable income
in the year it is received. Moreover, as contrasted to certain widely used non-residential
mortgage arrangements involving equity participation by the lender, the portion of the ap-
preciation received by an association on a SAM would constitute ordinary income, rather
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California legislature structured the SAM as a loan and treated the par-
ties as lender and borrower.284 The IRS has not yet made a formal
ruling.2
85
The conclusions of the FHLBB and the California legislature ap-
pear clearly correct for SAMs, and follow the assumption that an ordi-
nary debtor-creditor relationship exists between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee in a SAM. The contingent deferred interest provision in a
SAM exists solely for the purpose of defining the amount and time of
payment of a portion of the interest; its inclusion in the loan document
does not change the interest obligation into something else. The parties
to a SAM are nothing other than parties to a debtor-creditor relation-
ship.286 The lender has no equity ownership in the property. In view
of the nature of the relationship, the characterization of contingent de-
ferred interest as "interest" for purposes of section 163(a) of the I.R.C.
is a result that follows by definition. It is also in accord with case law
and Revenue Rulings.
287
than capital gain." 45 Fed. Reg. 66,801, 66,804 (1980). The quotation concerns only resi-
dential loans. Compare infra text accompanying note 291.
284. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.160 (West Supp. 1982).
285. The Internal Revenue Service acknowledges that it has received many questions
concerning whether contingent deferred interest should be treated as ordinary income or
capital gain. Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1980, at F9, col. 1. See generally supra note 274.
286. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 379-92.
287. In Dorzback v. Collison, 195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952), a debtor/creditor relationship
was amended to provide that, in lieu of interest at the rate of 5% per annum, the creditor
would receive 25% of the net profits of the debtor's business. Id. at 70. The court quoted the
United States Supreme Court in defining interest as being "the amount which one has con-
tracted to pay for the use of borrowed money." Id. at 72 (quoting Old Colony R.R. v.
Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932)). The court also noted that payments made in lieu
of interest were in fact to be treated as interest, and that it was not a requirement that
interest be computed at a stated or fixed rate, but only that it be an ascertainable amount.
Id. at 72 (quoting Kena, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 217, 219-20 (1941)). In Kena, the
borrower and lender entered an agreement in which the borrower received a sum of money
as a "loan"; the borrower agreed to repay the principal and to pay a further sum "in lieu of
interest" equal to 80% of the net profits of the borrower's business. 44 B.T.A. 217-18. The
lender had no power or authority over the operation of the business. Id. at 219. The court
held that the agreement was one creating a relationship of creditor and debtor, and that the
amount paid for the use of the borrowed money was interest. "It is not essential that interest
be computed at a stated rate, but only that a sum definitely ascertainable shall be paid for
the use of borrowed money... ," .d. at 221.
In Rev. Rul. 76-413, 1976-2 C.B. 213, two parties entered a land development loan
agreement and the borrower executed a note that provided for a fixed rate of interest plus
additional contingent interest equal to the greater of 1:75% of the gross receipts or $300 per
acre from the sale of portions of the property. The ruling was that the contingent interest
payments constituted "interest" and "interest on obligations secured by mortgages of real
property" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 856(c). Id. at 214. In Rev. Rul. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B.
19, the amount of interest payable pursuant to a tuition deferment plan was based in part
upon the amount of the former student's income at the time. Citing Kena, the ruling was
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The parties to a transaction, upon weighing the respective benefits
and detriments of each approach, may prefer to be co-owners, as in an
EPA, or may prefer to be borrower and lender, as in a SAM.
288 It is
critical, however, that the parties not attempt an amalgam of these two
that such payments were fully deductible even though the amount of interest was not com-
puted at a rigid stated rate.
Under different and peculiar facts, a different result was reached in Farley Realty Corp.
v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960). In that case, one party had lent money in
return for fixed interest plus 50% of the appreciation of the value of the property. The facts
in that case make it clearly distinguishable from the situation in a SAM. In that case the
"lender" appeared to have a direct equitable interest in the fee title to the property. For
instance,
1) the "lender" could initiate proceedings which would result in the sale of the property
to a third party. Id. at 703.
2) the agreement contained a buy/sell agreement in which either party could propose to
buy out the other party, and the other party was required either to buy out the offeror or to
sell to the offeror. Id.
3) the principal and fixed interest was payable at fixed times over a 10-year period, with
a fixed maturity date at the end of the period. However, the "lender's" interest in the appre-
ciation continued thereafter even though the principal had been repaid, and could be termi-
nated only by a sale of the property pursuant to the provisions described immediately above
in subparagraphs 1 and 2. Id. at 705. The situation was effectively similar to a partnership
at will.
Because the facts of Farley are so different from those in a SAM, the case should not
cause any apprehension for a SAM lender. Unfortunately, the case also contains language
indicating that payments which are contingent, or unfixed, cannot be considered interest.
Id. at 704-06. If this language is taken at face value, the case is clearly wrongly decided.
Instead, the case should be narrowly construed, and limited to its own admittedly "compli-
cated" facts. Id. at 702.
Three other authorities fall into the same category as Farley in that, although these
authorities are clearly distinguishable from SAMs on their facts, they contain statements to
the effect that the inclsion of contingent interest prevents a transaction from being a loan.
Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Gurtman v. Com-
missioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (1975); Private Ruling 8140017 (June 30, 1981, available on
LEXIS, Fedtax library, PR file). Among others, the following facts, which would not be
present in a SAM, existed in one or more of the three authorities just cited, or in Farley:
1) the structuring of the transaction as a loan was for the apparent purpose of tax avoidance,
2) the structuring of the transaction as a loan occurred in situations where typically a loan
structure would not have been used, 3) the purported lender had some effective control over
the property or business exceeding that which a lender ordinarily would have and exceeding
that which would be justifiable for purposes of protecting the security), 4) there was no
written evidence of the debt obligation, 5) the payment of all interest was subject to a profit
contingency, 6) there was no fixed time schedule for repayment of interest or principal,
7) there was no security for the debt, 8) the profits in question were to be generated by a
business enterprise of some sort, 9) there was a provision by which the purported lender was
obligated to subordinate to some or all of the borrower's future creditors, 10) there was a
high ratio of debt to equity, 11) there was no provision for acceleration of principal in the
case of default, 12) all of the purported lender's anticipated returns were speculative in
nature.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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incompatible structures. If the SAM structure is used, the payment
should be treated as an interest payment by both borrower and lender.
Year of Inclusion or Deduction of Contingent Deferred Interest
If contingent deferred interest is deemed received and paid in the
year the cash is actually paid to the lender, both lender and borrower
may receive unfavorable tax treatment. The borrower may not be able
to take full advantage of the interest tax deductions if the amount of
contingent interest paid comprises a large percentage of the taxpayer's
income.289 The lender, on the other hand, may be pushed into a higher
tax bracket by receipt of this large amount of ordinary income.
The FHLBB, when commenting on its proposed-SAM regulations,
elaborated on this question. It noted that the deduction for contingent
deferred interest would probably have to be taken all in one year, pos-
sibly in an amount larger than the taxpayer's income.290 Furthermore,
unless the interest expense relates to property used in a trade or busi-
ness allowing it to be carried forward as a net operating loss, 29 1 the
deduction could neither be carried forward nor added to basis.2 92 A
similar result would occur for the lender.2 93 Other analyses of the
problem, unfortunately, lead to the same result.
294
The year contingent deferred interest is includible or deductible
does not depend upon whether the taxpayer reports on an accrual or
cash basis. A cash-basis taxpayer can deduct interest payments only
when actually paid.295 Similarly, a lender reporting on the cash basis
289. I.R.C. § 163 (1976). Even if contingent deferred interest payments are fully deduct-
ible in the year paid (i.e., not in excess of taxable income after other deductions are taken),
there are two reasons why the deduction will be worth less to the borrower than it would
have been had the deduction been spread out over the term of the loan. First, the tax sav-
ings benefit of the deduction will have been deferred to a later taxable year. Second, a large
deduction in one year will push the borrower into a lower tax bracket and, therefore, a
portion of the deduction will be less advantageous to the borrower because it will offset
income which is being taxed at a lower rate.
290. See supra note 283.
291. LR.C. § 172 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
292. The net operating loss provision is limited to trade or business deductions. Id. The
item cannot be carried forward as a long-term capital loss because it is a deduction item, not
a capital loss. See supra text accompanying notes 281-88. Similarly, the payment cannot be
added to basis. Id.; LR.C. § 1016(a)(1) (1976).
293. The lender cannot report the interest as income until received. See infra text ac-
companying notes 296-98. Of course, once received, it must all be reported as income and
not deferred.
294. Angell & Wardrep, supra note 231, at 39; Kmiec, supra note 81, at 316; Levine,
supra note 75.
295. LR.C. § 7701(a)(25) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1982); see Helvering v.
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will not report accrued interest income until received. 296 The fact that
the interest obligation is contingent and deferred does not affect its
treatment for cash-basis taxpayers. Once payment occurs, both the
contingent and deferred aspects disappear.
297
Similar results occur with respect to accrual taxpayers. Techni-
cally, payment of income accrues when the contingency is removed, not
when payment is made. In a SAM, however, removal of the contin-
gency (i.e., determination of profits) usually occurs simultaneously with
actual payment. Until then, the existence of the contingency prevents
accrual for both borrower and lender because neither the fact of liabil-
ity nor the amount of payment are known.298
The year of tax treatment of the contingent deferred interest por-
tion of SAMs is further illuminated by analogy to the Service's tax
treatment of graduated payment mortgages. Revenue Ruling 77-135299
states that under the cash method of accounting, interest due under a
graduated payment mortgage plan is includible in the mortgagee's in-
come for the taxable year in which it is actually or constructively re-
ceived, and is deductible by the mortgagor in the year paid. The
addition of unpaid interest to the note, a requirement in the early years
of a graduated payment mortgage, does not constitute a payment or
receipt of interest in that year.300
Under the accrual method of accounting, interest from a gradu-
ated payment mortgage plan is includible in the mortgagee's gross in-
come in the taxable year in which the mortgagee acquires a fixed right
to receive the interest; it is deductible by the mortgagor in the taxable
Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 953, 969 (1964); Christensen v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 563, 577-78 (1963).
296. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957).
297. Of course, taxpayers cannot deduct prepaid interest. I.R.C. § 461(g) (1976). How-
ever, the term "prepaid interest" applies only to interest which "is properly allocable to any
period. . . which is after the close of the taxable year in which paid." Id. Thus if a SAM
borrower, on the fifth anniversary of its loan, voluntarily prepays five years of accumulated
contingent deferred interest, the borrower may deduct it all in that year. In short, the prohi-
bition on deduction of prepaid interest relates only to interest paid with respect to a future
period, not interest which has accrued but is not yet due. The foregoing assumes that, if a
prepayment occurs, the borrower is not entitled to a refund if the property later depreciates.
298. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1964); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2
C.B. 163, 164; Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58; see also Jones Lumber Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 404 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968); Burlington-Rock Island R.R. Co. v. United States, 321
F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1963); Pierce Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1952);
George L. Castner Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1061 (1958); Holtzman v. Commissioner,
35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1088 (1976).




year in which the liability is determined. Because the graduated pay-
ment mortgage plan described in Revenue Ruling 77-135 accrues inter-
est at a fixed rate per annum on the unpaid mortgage balance, the
mortgagee acquires a fixed right to receive a specific amount of interest
and includes the amount accrued in gross income in the taxable year
accrued, even though the interest might not be received in that year.
The mortgagor, similarly, may deduct a corresponding amount even
though the interest may not be paid until a later year.301 If the logic of
Revenue Ruling 77-135 is applied to SAMs, however, the contingent
deferred interest element could not be taken into account prior to ma-
turity because the liability and amount are not yet fixed.
30 2
Finally, section 483 of the Internal Revenue Code, as it applies to
SAMs, also implies that contingent deferred interest is reportable only
when paid. Section 483 may affect certain loans that carry a fixed in-
terest rate of less than nine percent.30 3 Regulations under this section
provide detailed rules for treatment of these loans if a portion of the
interest is contingent. 304 Interest is deemed contingent if the liability
for, or the amount or due date of, such interest cannot be determined at
the time of the sale or exchange. 305 If a loan that is subject to section
483 also provides for contingent interest, the contingent interest is ig-
nored for purposes of determining whether interest must be imputed;
3 6
the necessary implication is that contingent interest is to be reported
not currently, but when actually paid.
Spreading the Interest Deduction Over Multile Years
The unfavorable tax results to both borrower and lender from re-
porting income in the year the contingent interest is actually paid raise
301. Id.; see also Davis, The Tax Aspects of Graduated Payment Mortgages, 9 MoRT-
GAGE BANKER, 40, 42 (Feb. 1979).
302. Kmiec, supra note 81, also concluded that accrual lenders cannot avoid the harsh
consequences of receipt of contingent deferred interest in a single year. Kmiec stated:
"Four methods of income recognition seem possible under the accrual method: (1) upon
payment, (2) annually based upon the difference between the market interest rate and the
SAM's below-market rate, (3) annually based upon a housing inflation index, or (4) annu-
ally based upon actual appraisal. Only the first method seems realistic, and the FHLBB has
so indicated in its proposed regulations. While the three other methods are valid in theory,
all involve the creation of tax liability prior to the receipt of income. Given the precarious
financial condition of mortgage lenders in today's high interest market, few lenders would
support accounting practices which, at best, improve current paper earnings." Id. at 317.
303. See infra text accompanying notes 314-18.
304. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(e)(2), (3) (1966), as amendedby T.D. 7781, 1981-2 C.B. 118,




a third question: Can the borrower spread the interest deduction over
more than one year so as to maximize the benefits? 30 7 One possible
solution is to structure the SAM note to permit the borrower to make
periodic prepayments of contingent deferred interest. If a borrower
desires to make payments of contingent deferred interest at particular
times, such payments would be permitted by appraisal procedures writ-
ten into the note. Alternatively, periodic payments of deferred interest
could be required in a SAM note.30 8 Unfortunately, many borrowers
are unable financially to exercise this option because they would be
able to make contingent deferred interest payments only upon realizing
the increased value of the property.
If the parties report their income taxes on a cash, rather than on an
accrual, basis, a second approach is to permit the borrower to pay the
contingent deferred interest over multiple years following the sale of
the property or maturity of the note. The debt to the lender would be
evidenced by a promissory note, possibly secured by a certificate of
deposit, letter of credit, or similar item purchased by the borrower with
the portion of the sale proceeds that would otherwise be payable to the
lender as deferred interest upon sale of the property.
Tax court decisions support this approach. In Franklin v. Commis-
sioner,30 9 the Tax Court denied deductions to a taxpayer for interest
payments purportedly made by the issuance of promissory notes, be-
cause the taxpayer did not part with cash or its equivalent at that time.
Franklin is consistent with prior decisions disallowing deductions
claimed with respect to issuance of promissory notes.310 These deci-
sions indicate that interest payments made by a cash-basis taxpayer by
the issuance of promissory notes are deductible only in the year the
actual cash payment on the note is made. The fact that the note is
secured by a letter of credit should not, if the letter of credit is in
307. If the borrower is "cashing out" so that all profits of sale will be taxed in the year of
sale, then the borrower may or may not wish to utilize all of the interest deduction in that
year, depending on the amount of taxable gain and the amount of contingent deferred inter-
est. If a borrower is executing a § 1031 tax-free exchange, or is selling a residence intending
to repurchase a residence under the tax deferral procedures of § 1034 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, then the borrower may wish to spread out the interest deduction over a period of
several years.
308. See supra note 297.
309. 77 T.C. 173 (1981).
310. See, e.g., Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d
848 (1st Cir. 1932); Heyman v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 482, 485 (1978); San Diego Trust &
Sav. Bank v. United States, 71-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9518 (1971); England v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C. 617 (1960); Rev. Rul. 70-647, 1970-2 C.B. 38; Thomason v. Commissioner, 33
B.T.A. 576 (1935).
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standby form, change the result.3 11
Interest Limitation Rules
I.R.C. section 163(d)312 creates a fourth tax issue for certain SAM
borrowers by limiting the amount of interest otherwise deductible
under the Code. Section 163(d), however, applies only to investment
interest of noncorporate taxpayers.313 Thus, borrowers obtaining
SAMs to purchase principal residences are exempt from this limitation.
Similarly, commercial corporate borrowers are unaffected. Only non-
corporate SAM borrowers purchasing investment property are subject
to this limitation. Those borrowers so affected may avoid the problem
by spreading the deduction over multiple years, as discussed above.
Imputed Interest Rules
The final tax issue arising from SAMs stems from the imputed in-
terest rules of I.R.C. section 483. Under section 483, SAMs with fixed
interest rates of nine percent or less shall be imputed as bearing interest
at ten percent.314 As a result, SAM lenders may be obligated to report
additional ordinary income in the amount of unstated interest calcu-
lated under section 483 before the contingent deferred interest is actu-
ally received.315
Three qualifications temper the effects of this section. First, sec-
tion 483 applies only to contracts for the sale or exchange of prop-
erty.31 6 Thus, only SAMs entered into between a buyer and a seller of
real property are subject to the imputed interest rule. Second, the regu-
lations provide for the recalculation of the imputed interest upon actual
payment of contingent interest.317 As a result, when the contingent de-
ferred interest is received, a lender is able to exclude from ordinary
income the full amount of interest imputed and included in income in
311. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(3)(iii) (1981) (temporary).
312. I.R.C. § 163(d) (1976).
313. Id. § 163(d)(1). Investment interest is that "paid or accrued on indebtedness in-
curred or continued to purchase or carry property held for investment." Id. § 163(d)(3)(D).
314. Id § 483 (1976).
315. Although payment of contingent deferred interest upon sale of the property or ma-
turity of the SAM will usually render the effective interest rate higher than nine percent, "no
part of such contingent interest shall be taken into account for purposes of section 483 until
it is actually paid." Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(e)(2) (1966).
316. I.R.C. § 483(a) (1976).
317. The regulations set forth at Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(e)(2) provide that subparagraph
(f) of § 1.483-1 of the regulations shall be used to compute payments of unstated interest in
situations similar to SAMs. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(f)(4)(ii) sets forth the appropriate
calculation.
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prior taxable years. Likewise, if the borrower has previously deducted
payments of unpaid interest, an equal amount of the payment of con-
tingent deferred interest must be excluded from the interest deduction.
Finally, if lenders and borrowers wish to avoid the application of sec-
tion 483 entirely, they may establish a fixed interest rate higher than
nine percent, or make the SAM payable in interest-only payments.
318
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that SAMs can produce ad-
verse tax results for both borrowers and lenders. Structuring of the
loan with these issues in mind will, however, avoid most tax problems
for both parties.
Securities Law
SAM lenders and borrowers must consider whether a SAM is a
"security" for purposes of both federal and applicable state securities
laws.31 9 If a SAM were deemed a security for federal securities law
purposes there would be some unusual and dramatic consequences.
Federal securities laws, for example, prohibit the offer or sale of a "se-
curity" without registration, unless the security is exempt or is sold in
an exempt transaction.320 If a SAM is a "security" under federal law,
the SAM borrower is required to register the SAM unless there is an
applicable exemption.
A second important consequence of deeming a SAM a security is
the applicability of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 ("1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934
Act").32' If applicable to SAMs, the lender can rely on the broad anti-
fraud remedies of those statutes even if the SAM is exempt from the
registration requirements.32
2
Determining whether a particular transaction or scheme is a secur-
ity for federal securities laws purposes is a complex issue. Section 2(1)
318. If the monthly payments are interest only, there will be no principal payments
which may be treated as imputed interest payments. I.R.C. § 483(a) (1976).
319. Although this discussion focuses exclusively on the federal securities law question,
it is generally applicable to the treatment SAMs will receive under California state securities
law. For the most part, if an arrangement is a security for federal purposes, it is also a
security under California law. California Corporations Code § 25019 defines "security" in
almost the same terms as § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
Moreover, certain of the California registration exemptions which would generally be used
for SAMs relating to nonpublic sales are essentially identical to federal exemptions. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f) (West 1977). See also People v. Park, 87 Cal. App. 3d 550, 563,
151 Cal. Rptr. 146, 152 (1978).
320. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-77e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
321. Id §§ 77 q and 78j (1976).
322. Sohns v. Dahi, 392 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Va. 1975).
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of the 1933 Act defines "security" as including not only traditional
types of securities, such as stocks and bonds, but also any "note," "in-
vestment contract," or "profit-sharing agreement. ' 323 The same terms
are used in the 1934 Act.324 Arguably, a SAM may be deemed a secur-
ity under any one of these terms. This section of the Article will discuss
each of these separately.
Notes
Because SAMs are clearly notes, they appear at first glance to be
securities under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. Indeed, any bank loan
evidenced by a note would be a security under a literal reading of the
definition, which defines security to include any note.325 The Second
Circuit has tended to a literal reading of the two acts such that most
notes would be deemed to be securities.326 This approach has been re-
jected by other circuits.3 27 The Second Circuit's literal approach has
caused its decision to be reversed by the United States Supreme Court
in a case addressing the question whether shares in a cooperative apart-
ment corporation are securities. 328 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
has persisted with the literal approach.329 That court has indicated that
"the note secured by a mortgage on a home" is not a note within the
meaning of the federal securities laws.330 However, assuming the court
had in mind the then-typical thirty-year fixed rate mortgage, it is not
clear that a SAM would be so treated by that court. All that can be
said is that the Second Circuit's analysis would deem a SAM not to be
a security only if SAMs "bear a strong family resemblance" to the
home financing devices in use when the court made that statement in
1976, i.e., if the "context" of the transaction is the same.331 Though a
SAM differs from a more traditional note in that it bases a part of the
interest return on a contingency, the SAM is nevertheless being issued
in the same "context" and thus presumably a residential SAM would
323. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
324. Id § 78c(a)(10)(1976).
325. There are some express exemptions for certain notes with terms of nine months or
less. Id §§ 77c(a)(3), 78c(a)(10) (1976).
326. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'1 Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
327. E.g., Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
328. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
329. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (sale of 100% of stock of company
held to constitute sale of security even though buyer would control company and thus would
not rely on management by a third party).
330. 544 F.2d at 1138.
331. Id.
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bear such resemblance. Absent extraordinary facts, a commercial
SAM should also.
A number of other courts have seized upon the prefatory words of
section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 332 "unless the context otherwise requires,"
as the basis for differentiating between commercial notes, which are not
securities, and investment notes, which are.333 The United States
Supreme Court has approved the practice of looking to the economic
realities of the individual transaction.334 More recently, in a decision
perhaps boding ill for the Second Circuit's literal approach, the United
States Supreme Court approved looking to the prefatory words quoted
above so as to limit the applicability of the acts to "instruments ordina-
rily and commonly considered to be securities in the commercial
world."
335
There are two tests applied by the courts (other than the Second
Circuit, which follows the literal approach) to distinguish commercial
notes from investment notes. The Third, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Cir-
cuits rely on the commercial-investment dichotomy theory336 and the
Ninth Circuit uses the risk-capital test.337 Generally, under these tests
only those notes in the nature of an investment are treated as securities;
a note involved in a commercial transaction would not be a security.
The distinction between investment notes and commercial notes under
either test is vague, for "[i]n one sense every lender of money is an
investor since he places his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in
the form of interest. ' 338 The two tests appear, however, to yield similar
results.
332. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976). Identical words appear in the 1934 Act. Id § 78c(a)
(1976).
333. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583
F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
334. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849-51 (1975). "With the ex-
ception of the Second Circuit, every Court of Appeals recently to consider the issue has
rejected the literal approach . I..." ld  at 849 n. 14.
335. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit
not a security).
336. See, e.g., Emisco Indus. v. Pro's, Inc., 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976); Zabriskie v.
Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir.
1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
337. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1978); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Great Western
Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally Lipman, Notes as
Securities, 14 REv. SEC. REG. 933 (1981).
338. C.N.S. Enters. v. G. & G. Enters., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
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The "investment-commercial" test is based on the view that securi-
ties laws are not designed to regulate commercial transactions. The
courts applying this test focus on several characteristics of the transac-
tion in determining whether its primary character is investment or com-
mercial. For example, the Third Circuit has held that promissory notes
given by a licensee in payment for the purchase of franchise sale center
licensing agreements are not securities within the meaning of the fed-
eral laws because the notes were personal, were not publicly offered,
were not procured for speculation or investment and did not solicit
venture capital.
339
The Fifth Circuit has also ruled that a one-year promissory note
issued for a bank loan was not a security when the proceeds were used
to pay the general corporate obligations of a closely-held corpora-
tion.34° Analyzing the prior federal decisions, the court stated:
The cases excluding certain notes from the coverage of the [1934] Act
generally involved underlying transactions between payor and payee
which were not of an investment nature....
On the other hand, where notes have been deemed securities
within the meaning of the securities laws, either of two factors, not
present here, usually indicated the investment overtones of the un-
derlying transactions. [The notes were either] offered to some class
of investors, [or] were ... acquired ... for speculation or invest-
ment ... [or the borrower obtained] investment assets, directly or
indirectly, in exchange for its notes.
341
Since neither factor was present in that case, the court held that the
note was not a security
3 42
The Ninth Circuit's "risk capital" test, established in Great West-
339. Lino v. City Inv. Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973). A recent lower court
decision in the Third Circuit held that a promissory note given to evidence a simple com-
mercial loan, used to purchase a condominium, was not a security. Rispo v. Spring Lake
Mews, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See also infra text accompanying notes
360-61. Thus, the court concluded that, in the context of a commercial loan, the promissory
note could not be construed to be a security. The Seventh Circuit has taken a similar ap-
proach and held that where "promissory notes were of a 'commercial' rather than 'invest-
ment' character ... [they] were not 'securities' under the 1933 Act or 1934 Act." Lincoln
Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1979).
340. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975).
341. Id. at 493-94 (footnote omitted).
342. Id.; see also National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1978), where a $2.5 million note issued to a bank was not a security since no special
investment rights were given to the payee; the note was payable in fixed amounts at fixed
times, and the bank anticipated no gain beyond repayment of the note with interest. In
Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974), a promissory note of six-month
maturity issued for a bank loan needed to aid the borrowers in the development of their
livestock business was commercial paper and, therefore, not a security.
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ern Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz, 3 4 3 considers six factors in measuring the
risk involved to the lender in determining whether a note is a security.
These factors include the term of the note;344 the extent of collateraliza-
tion;345 the form of the obligation;346 the circumstances of issuance;
347
the relationship between amount borrowed and the size of the bor-
rower's business; 348 and the contemplated use of the proceeds.
349
The leading Ninth Circuit cases have balanced these factors to de-
termine whether certain notes are to be characterized as securities.
350
In the Great Western Bank & Trust case, the court held that an un-
secured promissory note delivered to a bank in consideration of the
extension of a $1.5 million line of credit did not constitute a security.
351
The instrument had a maturity of ten months, bore interest at a rate
slightly higher than the prime rate, limited the use of proceeds to work-
ing capital only, thereby excluding capital expenditures, obligated the
borrower to maintain a checking account balance of $300,000 with the
bank, allowed the bank to inspect the borrower's property and records,
and set forth numerous events of default entitling the lender to acceler-
ate the loan.352 The economic realities of the transaction indicated that
the risk created was commensurate with the risk normally associated
with lending money for a period of time.
353
343. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
344. Time is considered the most important factor because the longer one's funds are
used by another, the greater the risk of loss. "A demand or short-term note is almost ipso
facto not a security." Id. at 1257.
345. "The unsecured lender is generally more dependent upon the managerial skills of
the borrower than is a secured party who can look to the collateral in case of inability to
repay." d. at 1258 (footnote omitted).
346. This factor is utilized to help explain the fourth factor, the circumstances of issu-
ance. Id.
347. "Whether the obligations were issued to a single party or to a large class of inves-
tors sheds light on the nature of the financing." Id
348. "[T]he larger the relative amount, the greater the stake, and therefore the risk, of
the lender." Id.
349. "Proceeds constituting an essential ingredient of enterprise formation ... are gen-
erally securities [but] those used to maintain current financial position generally are not."
Id.
350. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v.
Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin.
Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
351. 532 F.2d at 1260.
352. Id at 1254-55.
353. Id. at 1259. See also United Cal. Bankv. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.
1977) (A "put letter" agreement in which a financial thrift company agreed to purchase for
six months all notes taken by a bank to secure debts under a line of credit extended to one of
its creditors did not constitute a security.) The concurring opinion in Great Western Bank &
Trust suggests that part of the reason for the decision is that courts are loathe to find bank
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In Amfac Mortgage Corp. ,34 the court found that a construction
loan was made in the course of an ordinary commercial financing
transaction and, therefore, was not a security.3 55 The court applied the
six factors of the risk-capital test and emphasized the short two-year
term of the note, the form of the documentation, the presence of exten-
sive collateralization, the specification of default events, and circum-
stances indicating that the investor was not risking its money on the
borrower's efforts.35
6
The Ninth Circuit cases indicate that there is little difference in
result between the commercial-investment dichotomy theory and the
risk-capital test. Under each test the primary concern is the degree of
risk to the lender or investor as reflected in the nature and structure of
the transaction. A lender expects a specific return on its investment
(the specific return may be fixed or may vary according to prime rate,
property appreciation, or other factors), whereas an investor assumes
that the investment is subject to some degree of risk. The tests are diffi-
cult to apply, however, because courts have used a wide range of char-
acteristics to determine whether the particular transaction is a security.
No federal cases to date have analyzed whether a note secured by
real property and containing a contingent interest element is a security
under either the risk-capital test or the commercial-investment dichot-
omy theory. Whether SAMs are securities must therefore be assessed
in light of the inconclusive case law that exists. The question is further
complicated by the varied terms and character of individual SAMs.
However, it can be predicted that under both the primary intent and
specific considerations of these two tests, most SAMs should not be
deemed securities.
Under both the risk-capital and commercial-investment dichot-
omy theories, the cases seem to be concerned with whether a note rep-
resents an investment of capital with the return based on the
managerial efforts of others and with the extent of risk or uncertainty.
In a SAM, the lender's profits result not from the efforts of others, but,
in most cases, from the property's appreciation due to independent
forces such as inflation and increase in population pressures. The im-
loans to be securities. 532 F.2d at 1260-62. This presumably results not from any exemption
from the securities laws that bank borrowers have, but from the nature of bank loans. Ac-
cordingly, the result should be the same for a commercial or real estate loan from any insti-
tutional lender, whether or not a bank, or even from a noninstitutional lender fulfilling an
essentially similar role on generally the same terms.
354. 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
355. Id. at 434.
356. Id. at 432-34.
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provement and regular upkeep of a home by a residential SAM bor-
rower, or the operation of business property by a commercial SAM
borrower, will have little, if any, direct effect on the lender's yield.
Also, the risk of return of principal and fixed interest is slight. The risk
with respect to the contingent deferred interest should not change this
result. Thus, SAMs are more similar in nature to commercial notes
than to notes representing an investment of risk capital.
Further, under five of the six factors357 used in the risk-capital test,
SAMs are not securities. First, under the extent-of-collateralization
test, SAMs are secured by real property. Under the third factor-the
terms and form of the obligation-the documentation evidencing a
SAM normally more closely resembles traditional commercial transac-
tions than securities. Under the fourth factor, the circumstances of is-
suance, SAMs involve only a single lender and a single borrower.
Under the fifth factor, the relationship between size of loan and size of
business will vary from one SAM to another. However, it appears that
this test is of limited importance where the basis for the loan is not
primarily the financial wealth of the borrower, but the value of the col-
lateral.358 Finally, SAMs will not be used for the formation of a busi-
ness enterprise and so do not meet the sixth test for securities, the
contemplated use of proceeds.
Two characteristics do support a finding that SAMs are securities.
First, the Ninth Circuit's risk-capital test considers the term of the note
as a factor in determining whether a note is a security, reasoning that
the longer one's funds are used by another, the greater the risk of
loss. 359 In some SAM situations, the term will be twenty to thirty years.
This factor is not enough to support the conclusion that a SAM is a
security, however, because traditional mortgage loans are normally
thirty-year term notes, and such notes are ipso facto not securities.
Another characteristic suggesting that SAMs may be securities is
the lack of a fixed interest rate. In Rispo v. Spring Lake Mews, Inc., the
court determined that the note was not a security relying on the fact
that the interest rate of the note was fixed. 360 There is no reason to
believe, however, that other common alternatives to fixed-rate mort-
gages, such as renegotiable rate, variable rate, and graduated payment
357. See supra notes 344-49 & accompanying text.
358. See C.N.S. Enters. v. G. & G. Enters., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1975).
359. Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir.
1978).
360. 485 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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rate mortgages, are securities. Similarly, a note with a rate fixed at, for
example, two points above the bank prime rate, as from time to time in
effect, would undoubtedly not be deemed a security solely because the
rate may fluctuate. Rispo should be read to mean that the lack of a
fixed rate is important only if the amount of the unfixed return will
eventually be determined by the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others.361 Because the appreciation of SAM-encumbered property
will typically not depend on the efforts of the owner, but rather on gen-
eral market conditions, and carries no greater risk of return of principal
than traditional mortgage loans, it appears that SAMs, absent unusual
facts, should not be found to be securities under either the commercial-
investment dichotomy theory or the risk-capital test.
Investment Contracts
The United States Supreme Court formulated the standard for de-
termining whether an investment arrangement constitutes an invest-
ment contract, and thus a security, in SEC v. W.J Howey Co.3 62 Under
the Howey test, a security exists whenever (1) an investment of money
is made, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profits
produced solely from the efforts of others. In Howey, investors' funds
were pooled and used to purchase undivided fractional interests in cit-
rus trees. The investors were offered management contracts for the
growing, harvesting, and sale of the fruit produced. The arrangement
was held to be an investment contract. 363
The Ninth Circuit defined a "common enterprise," the second ele-
ment of the Howey test, as one in which the "fortunes of the investor
are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of
those seeking the investment or of third parties."'364 This concept,
which has been referred to as "vertical commonality," dictates that the
common enterprise element is satisfied when the investor and the pro-
moter are involved in some common venture, even if other investors
are not involved in the venture.3 65 The profit feature of a SAM does
361. See supra note 339.
362. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
363. Id. at 301.
364. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
365. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459,461 (9th Cir. 1978). Vertical commonality has
not been adopted in other circuits where the test of horizontal commonality is applied (i.e.,
there must be more than one investor). SAMs with only a single lender would not meet this
test. Compare SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974), with Hirk v.
Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
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not depend upon the lender and the borrower engaging in a "common
venture" because the "fortunes" of the lender are not "interwoven with
and dependent upon the efforts and success" of the borrower.
3 66
The third element of the Howey test requires that the investor's
expected profits come solely from the efforts of others. The Ninth Cir-
cuit glossed this requirement in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
367
by holding that the critical inquiry is whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor "are the undeniably significant ones, those es-
sential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the en-
terprise. '368 An investment contract may therefore exist even though
there is some participation by the investor in the enterprise.
Numerous cases have discussed the contours of the third element
of the Howey test.369 The focus of these cases is similar to the analyses
in the note cases. 370 Therefore, because the lender's return in a SAM
usually does not depend upon the managerial efforts of either the bor-
rower or a third party, a SAM should not be deemed an investment
contract. 371
366. See supra text accompanying note 364.
367. 474 F.2d 476, 481-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
368. Id. at 482.
369. See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); McCown v. Heidler,
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); Nash & As-
socs. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973).
370. See cases cited supra notes 325-61.
371. As Professor Loss has stated: "For example, no 'investment contract' is involved
when a person invests in real estate, with the hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result of
a general increase in values concurrent with the development of the neighborhood, as long
as he does not do so as part of an enterprise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood
that the property will be developed or operated by others." I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 491-92 (2d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). The question whether SAMs are securities is
analagous to the question of whether the sale of commodity futures is the sale of a security.
The law is clear that the sale of commodities futures, without more, is not the sale of a
security. E. F. Hutton v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 418 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Although there
are two rationales for so concluding, both hinge on the failure of such transactions to meet
the three-prong Howey test. The first rationale is that the second-prong common enterprise
test cannot be met because of a lack of horizontal commonality, see supra note 365, or be-
cause the "fortunes" of the broker (whose income is based on commissions) and of the inves-
tor (whose income depends on the investment) are not "interwoven," see supra text
accompanying note 364. Compare Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th
Cir. 1977), with Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978). This rationale may not
be sufficient to exempt SAMs. The second rationale, however, is that in nondiscretionary
trading accounts for commodities futures the results of the investment do not depend on the
managerial efforts of the broker. As a result, the factual situation does not satisfy either the




There have been remarkably few cases discussing the meaning of
the phrase "certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement" as used in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act.372 Thus, it is not
easy to determine whether a particular scheme is a profit-sharing agree-
ment and thus a security.
The courts that have considered the meaning of the phrase "profit-
sharing agreement" have suggested that it is similar, if not identical, to
prong as refined by Glenn W. Turner (quoted supra text accompanying note 364, requiring
the fortunes of the investor to be "dependent" upon the efforts of others).
As stated in one case: "Moreover, the purchase of commodities futures involves no
reliance upon the efforts of promoters, managers, employees or any third party. The mere
presence of a speculative motive on the part of the purchaser or seller does not evidence the
existence of an 'investment contract' within the meaning of the securities acts. In a sense
anyone who buys or sells a horse or an automobile hopes to realize a profitable 'investment.'
But the expected return is not contingent upon the continuing efforts of another." Sinva,
Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
It is true that, unlike a commodities broker, a SAM borrower is the owner of the investment.
However, that does not mean that the SAM borrower has any significant control over the
amount of appreciation the property will have.
In one "no-action" letter, the SEC staff found that a shared equity program was not an
investment contract. The lender and borrower took title to residential property as tenants' in
common, agreeing to share the expenses of the purchase and the costs of property mainte-
nance, and to divide the equity at the time of sale according to the respective ownership
shares. The two parties made all decisions regarding how equity, mortgage payments, re-
pairs and improvements, maintenance expenses, taxes, depreciation and rent were to be di-
vided between them. The agreement also specifically provided that the two parties would
regularly consult each other regarding these matters, and mutual consent was required in
each instance. Moreover, the two parties were to determine together in advance when the
property was to be sold, although, by mutual consent, this date could later be advanced or
extended.
In this arrangement, it was clear that the expectation of profit derived from the common
enterprise. The author of the letter argued that "Ib]ecause in the shared equity arrangement
the investor has complete control over his investment and full right to participate directly in
the management of his property. . . a security [did] not exist." The SEC staff agreed.
A shared equity or equity participation arrangement is distinguishable from most
SAMs. As is clear from the description of the above arrangement, there was equal involve-
ment in the actual management of the property in that shared equity arrangement. It is true
that the lender in a SAM is not involved in the management of the property. However, this
should not make a SAM a security because the expectation of profits does not usually derive
from the management efforts of the owner or of third parties, and because the return of
principal and fixed interest is relatively risk-free. In certain cases, such as properties being
developed by the proceeds of a SAM loan, the management efforts may be sufficiently im-
portant as to cause a different outcome.
372. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). "The parameters
of the phrase 'commonly known as a security,' like those of the phrase 'interest in a profit
sharing arrangement' are largely unrefined in federal law." Id. at 477 n.6; see also Weaver
v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
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an investment contract. 373 Indeed, it has been indicated that a profit-
sharing agreement is merely a synonym for investment contract.374 For
instance, in the case Teamsters v. Daniel,375 the United States Supreme
Court stated that:
Respondent also argues that his interest constitutes a "certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement." The court
below did not consider this claim, as respondent had not seriously
pressed the argument and the disposition of the "investment con-
tract" issue made it unnecessary to decide the question. Similarly,
respondent here does not seriously contend that a "certificate of in-
terest. . in any profit-sharing agreement" has any broader mean-
ing under the Securities Acts than an "investment contract." In
Foreman, supra, we observed that the Howey test, which has been
used to determine the presence of an investment contract, "embodies
the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions
defining a security."
Although this quote is not definitive, it strongly suggests that a profit-
sharing agreement exists only if the particular scheme would qualify as
an investment contract. The court in Hirk v. Agri-Research Counsel,
Inc. also stated that there is no real difference between an investment
contract and a profit-sharing arrangement.376 Thus, the considerations
discussed in the investment contract section above will be equally ap-
plicable in determining whether a SAM is a profit-sharing agreement.
Further, an examination of the commentary related to profit-sharing
agreements illustrates that a SAM is not similar to the usual types of
arrangements classified as profit-sharing agreements.
Professor Loss is one of the few commentators to discuss the
phrase "profit-sharing agreement." He stated:
The classic example of a "certificate of interest or participation in [a]
profit-sharing agreement" is a contract whereby the buyer furnishes
the funds and the seller the skill for speculating in the stock or com-
modity markets under an arrangement to split any profits.
377
The arrangement that Professor Loss described bears little resemblance
to a SAM. In both Professor Loss' example and a SAM, funds are
373. Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Hirk v. Agri-Research Counsel, Inc., 561
F.2d 96, 102 (7th Cir. 1977). One opinion has stated that the various categories "are not
mutually exclusive and are meant to be 'catchalls.'" Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374,
381 (7th Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
374. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971) (referring to profit-sharing
agreements "or" investment contracts in a context implying that the two terms are
synonymous).
375. 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.11 (1979) (citation omitted).
376. 561 F.2d 96, 102 (7th Cir. 1977). "[C]ourts have made no real distinction between
investments contracts and profit-sharing plans."
377. 1 L. Loss, supra note 371, at 489.
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invested with the expectation of profit. In both cases, the profits made
by the seller (borrower) will be shared with the buyer (lender). There
are, however, significant differences between a SAM and the example
described by Professor Loss. First, in a SAM, the lender is assured of
return of principal plus a minimum return on its investment by virtue
of the fixed interest obligation; an investor in stocks is not guaranteed
to receive even a repayment of principal. Second, the SAM borrower is
not using the funds for an investment in a speculative venture. Fur-
ther, the investment in a SAM is not based on the "skill" of the bor-
rower. Thus, it would appear that a SAM would not be considered to
be a profit-sharing agreement.
The recent cases involving profit-sharing agreements are also dis-
tinguishable from SAMs.378 Thus, SAMs will only be construed as
profit-sharing agreements if they are also investment contracts.
Partnership vs. Debt
A partnership is presumed when parties enter into an agreement to
share profits.379 Unlike an equity participation arrangement, it is im-
portant that the parties to a SAM not be construed as partners. If the
parties to a SAM were found to be partners rather than lender and
borrower, several important features of the SAM would be altered,
378. For instance, in United States v. Davis, 40 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1941), the court
found that a certificate reciting that a person had become a member of a cooperative associ-
ation and was entitled to participate in the distribution of certain profits was a profit-sharing
agreement. In SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961), the defendants solicited
unsecured loans, the proceeds of which were to be used to develop uranium mining claims
through the use of a "Benson Upgrader," a machine which, by adding "certain component
parts" to low-grade unmarketable ore, transformed the ore into marketable quality. Id. at
715. The court had little trouble in finding that a collateral agreement by which the lenders
were also guaranteed a percentage of the profits from the proposed mining venture was a
profit-sharing agreement within the meaning of the 1933 Act.
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), involved a pyramid
scheme in which product distributors earned most of their income not from product sales
but from recruiting other distributors; a distributor joining the program paid a fee to the
promoter which in turn shared a portion of that income with the member who had recruited
the new distributor. The district court found that "[tihe significant efforts in this promotion
are the specialized, professional, highpowered tactics used at these meetings by [the pro-
moter], and the ordinary investors by themselves would be unsuccessful at persuading any-
one else of parting with $2,000 to $5,000.' ld. at 775. The district court concluded that the
scheme was both an investment contract and a profit-sharing agreement. On appeal, the
decision was affirmed solely on the basis of the investment contract analysis. 474 F.2d 476,
480 (1973).
In bothAddison and Glenn W. Turner there were express findings that the success of the
venture depended solely or primarily upon the efforts of the promoter and not the investor.
379. Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (1956); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 15007 (West 1977).
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making this financing arrangement less attractive. First, a junior lienor
might be able to claim priority over the SAM lien by asserting that the
SAM did not establish a valid mortgage because the relationship be-
tween the parties was not one of mortgagor/mortgagee. 380 Second, if
the lender were deemed to be the borrower's partner, rather than a
mortgagee, the borrower might be able to prohibit the lender from as-
serting its right of foreclosure. 381 Third, certain important tax features
of a SAM,382 such as the interest deduction, might not be available if
the payment of contingent deferred interest were a sharing of profits
rather than a payment of interest. Fourth, the lender might become
jointly liable for the debts and liabilities relating to the property.
The California Corporations Code defines a partnership as "an as-
sociation of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit."383 Section 15007 of the California Corporations Code pro-
vides that receipt of a share of the profits is prima facie evidence that
the recipient is a partner unless "such profits were received in payment:
(a) [als a debt by installments or otherwise. . . [or] (d) [a]s interest on a
loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the
business."
384
This provision prevents any inference that SAMs create partner-
ships. Although all SAM lenders receive profits from the property to
the extent that they receive a portion of the appreciation, the existence
of a partnership cannot be inferred because the profit relates to an in-
stallment debt or loan. The Corporations Code also provides that two
parties must be co-owners in order to be partners. 38 5 The parties to a
SAM are not co-owners; the lender does not hold fee title to, or control
over the management of, the property, but is merely a mortgagee.
386
Finally, the Corporations Code requirement 387 that partners carry on a
business is not satisfied, because there is no co-owned business.
380. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15040 (West 1977) ("creditors other than partners" rank
first in order of payment of partnership liabilities upon dissolution).
381. A creditor of a partnership, if also a partner, may experience several undesirable
results, the most serious of which is the inability to sue on its note. An Illinois Supreme
Court decision illustrates this dilemma: "While the note remained in the hands of Davison
[a partner], as assignee, he could not have enforced its payment by suit at law, for the reason
that he could not have sued himself as maker. A party cannot be both plaintiff and defend-
ant in an action at law, and the other nine makers of the note were not liable without
Davison." Kipp v. McChesney, 66 Ill. 460, 463 (1872).
382. See supra notes 274-318 & accompanying text.
383. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15006 (West 1977).
384. Id § 15007(4) (West 1977).
385. Id § 15006(1) (West 1977).
386. See supra notes 17-20 & accompanying text.
387. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15006(1) (West 1977).
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Case law also supports the conclusion that the parties to a SAM
are not partners. One element necessary to create a partnership is an
understanding between the two parties that both profits and losses of a
business will be shared.388 In a SAM, the lender has only a profit inter-
est in the property in the form of a share of the appreciation of the
property's value. If the secured property depreciates, the lender is not
obligated to compensate the borrower for any losses resulting from the
decline in value, and the payment obligation with respect to the princi-
pal and fixed interest is not affected.
Another necessary element of a partnership is the right of all part-
ners to participate in the management and control of the business. In
Bank of Caiffornia v. Connoly,389 a California appellate court stated
that receipt of profits alone from a venture does not make a participant
a partner. An "essential element" of a partnership is the right of joint
participation in the management and control of the business.390 "An
agreement by a landowner to share with another profits to be derived
from the sale of land does not, without more, create a partnership or
joint venture relationship." 391
The Connolly line of cases establishes that managerial activity is a
principal element of a partnership. In most SAMs, lenders will have
little, if any, participation in the management and control of the busi-
ness. Parties to a SAM should limit the lender's participation in order
388. Eg., Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947); Vogel v. Bankers
Bldg. Corp., 112 Cal. App. 2d 160, 245 P.2d 1069 (1952).
389. 36 Cal. App. 3d 350, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1973).
390. Id. at 364, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 478; see also In re Mission Farms Dairy, 56 F.2d 346
(9th Cir. 1932); Fritz v. Gilbert, 8 Cal. 2d 68, 70-71, 63 P.2d 291, 292-93 (1936); Coward v.
Clanton, 122 Cal. 451, 454, 55 P. 147, 148 (1898); Pearson v. Norton, 230 Cal. App. 2d 1, 40
Cal. Rptr. 634 (1964); Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (1956);
Mulligan v. Wilson, 94 Cal. App. 2d 286, 291-92, 210 P.2d 526, 529 (1949); Black v. Brun-
dige, 125 Cal. App. 641, 13 P.2d 999 (1932); Freeman v. Sullivan, 86 Cal. App. 200, 260 P.
807 (1927); People v. Hotz, 85 Cal. App. 450, 259 P. 506 (1927).
391. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 478;see also Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (1956), in which plaintiffs loaned defendant money for the pro-
duction of a radio show. As partial repayment, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 26-2/3% of
the profits from the first run of the show. Plaintiff claimed that a partnership was thereby
established and that he should receive 26-2/3% of all productions of the show. The court
held that no partnership was created because, although a partnership relation is to be pre-
sumed in a profit-sharing agreement, "such presumption evaporates when substantial evi-
dence is introduced, as here, showing the relationship to be one of borrower-lender with the
profit share's [sic] being paid for service rendered or money advanced." 145 Cal. App. 2d at
131, 302 P.2d at 402 (1956).
A limited partner's right to participate in the management and control of the partner-
ship is limited to certain specified items. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (West 1977 & Supp.
1982). However, a limited partnership cannot be formed on a de facto basis, but only by the
execution and recordation of an appropriate certificate. .Id. § 15502 (West 1977).
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to avoid any inference that the parties are partners. Nevertheless, oper-
ating covenants in the loan documents, similar activities, and participa-
tion by the lender in profits, should not result in a characterization as a
partnership where such activities are undertaken by the lender to pro-
tect its security.
Whereas the California SAM statute avoids the partnership prob-
lem by specifying that the parties' relationship is that of debtor and
creditor, 392 nonstatutory SAM borrowers and lenders can draft their
agreements to help ensure that the inference of a partnershp is not
made. The documents evidencing the loan should state that the rela-
tionship between the parties is one of lender and borrower with no
partnership relationship intended. The document should further ex-
plain the purpose and justification for the particular profit-sharing ar-
rangement. Such statements will successfully avoid any conclusion
that a partnership exists.
Clogging the Equity of Redemption
Beginning with fourteenth century English common law, borrow-
ers wishing to convey security to lenders did so by granting fee simple
title to the real property by means of a deed on condition subsequent.
The deed provided that, if the debt were paid on the day of maturity of
the obligation, the title to the realty would revert to the borrower.
393 If
the due date of the debt passed without repayment, then the condition
subsequent failed, and the lender's title became absolute.
394
This "clumsy" 395 security device has survived to the present time
in spite of basic imperfections making it an ill-fitting tool for its pur-
pose and in spite of complaints dating back more than six centuries.
396
392. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.160 (West Supp. 1982). "The relationship of the borrower
and the lender, as to a shared appreciation loan, is that of debtor and creditor and shall not
be... a . . .partnership ....
393. G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 8. A conditional grant (e.g., one which stated, "If I
[the borrower] fail to pay my debt when due, fee title to the real estate will vest in you at that
time.") was prohibited by the common law injunction against springing interests. F.
WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES 3-4 (1934).
394. S. LITTLETON, TENURES (C. 1481), as reprinted in translation in LITTLETON'S TEN-
URES IN ENGLISH § 332 (V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton ed. 1845). Littleton explains the
word "mortgage," which in French means "dead pledge," to have originated because the
pledge becomes dead (i.e., the debtor loses his land forever) if the debt is not paid on the due
date. Id.
395. G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 8.
396. Compare 3 D. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 130 n.5 (3d ed. 1923)
(quoting Anon. v. Anon., Eyre of Kent, Y.B. 6, 7 Ed. II (1314), as reprinted in 29 Seld. Soc.
Pub. 85 (1913)), with G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 8-9. See also id. at 12; 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 124 (2d ed. 1909).
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The imperfections in large part originally arose out of the fact that the
form of mortgage which was used was on its face a deed which no-
where referenced the fact that the sole purpose of the transfer was as
security. As Maitland said several centuries later, "That is the worst of
our mortgage deed. . . it is one long suppressio veri and suggestiofalsi.
It does not in the least explain the rights of the parties; it suggests that
they are other than really they are." 397 Early on, this imperfection was
compounded by various other problems, e.g., failure properly and ex-
pressly to provide for the reversionary right.398 Additionally, failure to
pay the debt precisely on the due date resulted in forfeiture of the land;
the law courts enforced the deeds strictly without flexibility.
399
English courts of equity, however, were unwilling to countenance
the easy forfeiture of the debtor's title and, contrary to the express
wording of the parties' agreement, began to give the borrower an equi-
table right to redeem the property upon payment of the debt.400 Origi-
nally the equity courts intervened only in cases where the mortgagor
had in fact performed, or where fraud or oppression existed, or where
other circumstances prevented timely repayment.401 As one commen-
tator explained, the intervention of equity was necessary "to prevent
the property being withheld in breach of good faith by the creditor.
And it was a breach of good faith because the purpose of the transac-
tion was security."4 2 During the sixteenth century, the Chancellor's
intervention was limited primarily to instances where the debt had in
fact been satisfied.403 In the decades before 1625, relief was granted in
cases where fraud, hardship, oppression, mistake or other typical
grounds for equitable jurisdiction existed, even though the date for
payment had passed and the mortgagee's title was absolute at law.4°
397. F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 269 (1929) (footnote omitted).
398. R. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 22 (1931) (citing inter alia Y.B. Trin. 9
Edw. 4, f. 25, pl. 34 (1469)). Turner's reference to plea 34 is an error, the intended reference
is to plea 33.
399. F. WALSH, LAW OF MORTGAGES 6 (1934).
400. See 5 D. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 396, at 293; G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 12-
13; R. TURNER, supra note 398, at 21-22.
401. Eg., Bodenham v. Halle (Ch. 1456), as reprinted in 10 Seld. Soc. Pub. 137 (1896).
In that case, the supplication to the Chancellor complained that the loan was usurious, the
borrower's manor had been deeded to the lender, and the borrower imprisoned for the debt
pursuant to a statute-merchant issued by him, all in spite of the fact that he was apparently
willing and able to pay the debt. (He did so at the hearing in the Chancery.) According to
the supplication, such a situation was against "ryght [right] and conscience, in fynall [final]
distruccion [destruction] of the saide [supplicant] Robert." Id. at 138.
402. G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 12.
403. R. TURNER, supra note 398, at 22, 24.
404. Id. at 25-27; F. WALSH, supra note 393, at 7, 9.
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The report of a case in 1625 shows that, as of that date, the need for a
showing of special circumstances was eliminated, and the courts began
allowing redemption as a matter of right after the due date for payment
had passed. Mentioning no special circumstances, the report says that,
though the mortgage was "void" (i.e., redeemed) in law if paid at the
due date, the mortgage "ought to be void in Equity" though paid after
that date.
405
Thereafter, a general rule arose allowing redemption in all cases,
provided only that the debt be paid within a reasonable time, and fur-
ther that the lender could seek a decree foreclosing the right of redemp-
tion if payment were not made.40 6 This equity of redemption was a
"right not given by the terms of an agreement between the parties to it,
but contrary to them .... -407 Thus, courts of equity freely altered the
parties' express agreement in order to prevent forfeiture. This was
done for the simple reason that the documentation did not reflect the
true relationship between the parties.
40 8
Soon, however, attempts were begun by lenders to hinder or pre-
vent the borrower from redeeming. One opinion refers to cases "where
the mortgagee [would] suddenly bestow unnecessary costs upon the
mortgaged lands, of purposes to clogg [sic] the lands, to prevent the
mortgagor's redemption. '40 9 The equity courts responded that at-
tempts to prevent the mortgagor from redeeming would not be toler-
ated,410 and the doctrine voiding any clogs on the equity of redemption
grew. Although many may suppose that the ancient rule prohibiting a
lender from imposing any clog on the debtor's equity of redemption
405. Emanuel College v. Evans, I Chan. Rep. 18, 20, 21 Eng. Rep. 494, 495 (1625-26).
The mortgage instrument took the form of a 500-year lease (with a reserved life estate after
the term), thus having the dubious significance of being one of the earliest unsuccessful
efforts to end-run restrictions on mortgages by using a hidden security device or equitable
mortgage. One third of a millenium later, some obligees unsuccessfully attempt the same
artifice. E.g., Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898
(1973).
406. E.g, Bromley v. Dorell, Tothill 134, 21 Eng. Rep. 146 (undated); How v. Vigures, 1
Chan. Rep. 32, 21 Eng. Rep. 499 (1628-29); R. TURNER, supra note 398, at 27.
407. Salt v. Marquess of Northampton, 1892 A.C. 3, 18 (1891).
408. The identical situation continues to occur today. E.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout,
61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
409. Bacon v. Bacon, Tothill 133, 133-34, 21 Eng. Rep. 146 (1639-40).
410. See also, for example, cases cited infra in notes 418-22. In one case, the report of
the opinion states that, if the instrument in question was truly serving the purpose of a
mortgage, then no words could bar the equity of redemption because, if that were to be
tolerated, "the scriveners would cozen all mortgagors out of their estates." Newcombe v.
Bonham, 2 Freeman 67, 68, 22 Eng. Rep. 1063 (1681), rev'don other grounds, 1 Veru. 232, 23
Eng. Rep. 435 (1684).
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died a deserved death a couple of centuries ago,411 the relatively recent
invocation of it by a New Jersey court412 precludes dismissing its po-
tential applicability to SAMs.
Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage
The rule falls into three parts, as set forth by Lord Davey:
The first doctrine to which I refer is expressed in the maxim, "Once a
mortgage always a mortgage." The second is that the mortgagee
shall not reserve to himself any collateral advantage outside the
mortgage contract; and the third is that a provision or stipulation
which will have the effect of clogging or fettering the equity of re-
demption is void.
413
In an early case, a borrower deeded the property with a covenant
that, should he fail to repay the debt, he would be barred "from all
equity of redemption. ' 414 The Lord Chancellor held that the bor-
rower's heir could redeem, "for being once redeemable and once a
mortgage, the negative words shall not make it otherwise."415 Further,
it is a "general rule, once a mortgage, and always a mortgage .... ,,416
This maxim is another way of saying that a mortgage cannot be made
irredeemable, and a provision to that effect is void.
4 17
Situations violating this maxim include: limiting or prohibiting re-
demption;4 18 allowing the mortgagee to keep some part of the mort-
gaged property, limiting redemption to the balance;4 19 increasing the
interest rate upon default;420 granting an option or right of first refusal
to the lender to purchase the mortgaged property;42 ' and providing for
411. As will be seen from the following discussion, all substantive content of this doc-
trine has been superseded by modem statutory and case law relating to, e.g., usury, uncon-
scionability, rights of redemption, foreclosure procedures, etc.
412. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (1973).
This case involved a relatively sophisticated party taking an option on property as a part of
the same transaction in which it obtained an equitable mortgage on the property. The op-
tion was found to be a clog on the equity of redemption of the debtor, and therefore void.
413. Noakes & Co. v. Rice, 1902 A.C. 24, 32 (1901).
414. Newcombe v. Bonham, 2 Freeman 67, 22 Eng. Rep. 1063 (1681), rev'd on other
grounds, I Vern. 232, 23 Eng. Rep. 435 (1684).
415. Id. at 68, 22 Eng. Rep. at 1063.
416. Newcomb v. Bonham, I Vern. 7, 8, 23 Eng. Rep. 266, 267 (1681), rev'd on other
grounds, 1 Vern. 214, 23 Eng. Rep. 422 (1684).
417. Noakes & Co. v. Rice, 1902 A.C. 24, 32 (1901).
418. See East India Co. v. Atkyns, I Comyns 346, 92 Eng. Rep. 1105 (1720).
419. Salt v. Marquess of Northampton, 1892 A.C. 1 (1891).
420. Strode v. Parker, 2 Vern. 316,23 Eng. Rep. 804 (1694); Holles v. Wyse, 2 Vera. 289,
23 Eng. Rep. 787 (1693).
421. Willett v. Winnell, I Vern. 488, 23 Eng. Rep. 611 (1687); Orby v. Trigg, 9 Mod. 2,
88 Eng. Rep. 276 (1722); Re Edward's Estate, I1 Ir. Ch. 367 (1861); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d 898 (1973).
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the preemption of the equity of redemption by the mortgagee.422 Thus,
any provision of a mortgage that operated to prevent or hinder re-
demption was void because it conflicted with an essential element of a
mortgage, its ability to be redeemed.
Several aspects of SAMs are sufficiently analogous to the situa-
tions cited above423 to raise a question whether SAMs violate the rule.
Arguably, allowing a lender to keep a portion of the profits on resale is
the economic equivalent of allowing the lender to keep a portion of the
property after redemption, and such a provision is therefore void.
424
Of course, the lender in a SAM is not keeping any part of the property,
and the owner has the full and unfettered right to control and sell the
entirety of the property. The SAM merely provides that a portion of
the interest payable by the borrower will be determined by the prop-
erty's appreciation.
The rule disallowing a borrower from forfeiting a portion of the
property in advance merely rephrases the rule forbidding the borrower
from divesting in advance its redemption rights.425 Nothing in the anti-
clogging rule, however, indicates that a borrower and lender cannot
share some of the economic risks and benefits of property ownership,
thereby allowing the borrower the benefits of a lower interest rate if the
property does not greatly appreciate. Conversely, nothing in a SAM
confers on the lender any power of strict foreclosure; if there is a de-
fault, the lender must foreclose by the appropriate procedures before
obtaining any interest.
Alternatively, it can be argued that contingent interest payments
are similar to the increase in interest rate upon default condemned in
some cases. 426 The distinction, however, is that the increase in interest
rate occurs after default as a result of default, whereas the contingent
interest accrues before maturity and is payable at maturity.
The "once a mortgage" rule grew out of a need to prevent a mort-
gage from containing any condition which was "repugnant" 427 to the
debtor's right to redeem. In view of the redemption protections con-
tained in modem statutory law, 428 the "once a mortgage" rule has be-
come superfluous.
422. Jennings v. Ward, 2 Vern. 520, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705).
423. See supra notes 418-22 & accompanying text.
424. See supra note 419 & accompanying text.
425. See supra note 419.
426. See supra note 420 & accompanying text.
427. Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., 1914 A.C. 25, 56 (1913).




Collateral Advantage and Fettering the Equity of Redemption
The second part of Lord Davey's maxim, the rule against collat-
eral advantage,429 had grown at one time in the English courts into a
"crystallized" and absolute rule forbidding any collateral advantage to
a lender whatsoever.430 In the relatively early leading case of Jennings
v. Ward,431 the mortgagee, at the time of making the loan, not only
took a mortgage securing principal and interest, but also extracted from
the borrower an agreement granting the lender on demand rents and
profits out of the property. The court held, "A man shall not have in-
terest for his money, and a collateral advantage besides for the loan of
it, or clog the redemption with any by-agreement. ' 432 This language
does not appear to be the rationale for the decision, but the conclusion
following from it. It is of substantial significance that, strictly speaking,
the case's rationale was not that all collateral advantage was voidable
but that the collateral agreement must be "set aside . . . as
unconscionable."
433
For more than two centuries following Jennings, courts appeared
to struggle with the "collateral advantage" rule, wavering between a
flexible rule voiding only unconscionable bargains, and a more rigid,
absolutist rule voiding any provision constituting a collateral advan-
tage.434 In 1898, much of the rigidity of the Jennings rule was over-
turned by Biggs v. Hoddinott.435 The Biggs court, in fact, noted that:
The proposition stated in Jennings v. Ward is too wide. If properly
guarded it is good law and good sense. A mortgage is regarded as a
security for money, and the mortgagor can always redeem on pay-
ment of principal, interest, and costs; and no bargain preventing such
redemption is valid, nor will unconscionable bargains be enforced.
There is no case where collateral advantages have been disallowed
which does not come under one of these two heads.43
6
The court upheld the right of the lender, a brewer, to require the bor-
rower, a hotel owner, to purchase beer from the lender during the term
of the mortgage. The court noted several times that the collateral
429. Though never clearly defined in the cases, "collateral advantage" means any bene-
fit, other than payment of interest, which a lender receives in return for the making of a loan.
See infra text accompanying notes 430-47.
430. Williams, Clogging the Equity of Redemption, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 31, 47-49 (1933).
431. 2 Vern. 520, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705).
432. Id. at 521, 23 Eng. Rep. at 935.
433. Id.
434. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 149-50; R. TURNER, supra note 398, at 175-83.
435. [1898] 2 Ch. 307.
436. Id. at 321 (footnote omitted).
November 1982]
agreement in no way hindered the borrowers from redeeming.
437
A schizophrenia developed in the case law on the collateral advan-
tage rule. On the one hand, Lord Davey made clear that the original
rule against collateral advantage was based solely on the courts' desire
to void transactions that "tended" to usury438 or were unconscionable.
With the repeal of many usury laws, he argued, the rule should be lim-
ited to collateral advantages of an unconscionable nature.439 On the
other hand, Lord Davey440 confirmed that the collateral advantage rule
had an independent off-spring; the rule against "fetters" on the equity
of redemption" 1 absolutely prohibited any collateral advantage ex-
tending beyond the term of the mortgage.
The leading case of Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Stor-
age Co. 442 overturned the absolutist aspects of the collateral advantage
rule even in cases where the advantage extended beyond the term of
the loan.44 3 According to Kreglinger, a mortgage provision violates the
437. Id. at 321, 323.
438. Noakes & Co. v. Rice, 1902 A.C. 24, 33 (1901). In a large number of cases involv-
ing this rule, what displeased the equity courts was not the fact of collateral advantage per
se, but that the lender's return from the benefits of the collateral agreement, plus the return
from the income actually denominated interest, constituted a total return (i.e., total interest)
in excess of the usury limits then in effect. Id. Modem courts do not resort to the difficult
doctrine of collateral advantage, but rather convert the collateral benefit to monetary terms,
ascertain the resulting interest rate, add that rate to the fixed rate, and determine whether the
sum total exceeds the applicable usury rate. See, e.g., Sandell, Inc. v. Bailey, 212 Cal. App.
2d 920, 28 Cal. Rptr. 413, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 831 (1963); Schiff v. Pruitt, 144 Cal. App. 2d
493, 301 P.2d 446 (1956); Goodwin v. Alston, 130 Cal. App. 2d 664, 280 P.2d 34 (1955);
Traders Credit Corp. v. Thyle, 116 Cal. App. 252, 2 P.2d 568 (1931); Calimpco, Inc. v.
Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950)3).
439. Noakes & Co. v. Rice, 1902 A.C. 24 (1901): "My Lords, the second doctrine to
which I refer, namely, that the mortgagee shall not reserve to himself any collateral advan-
tage outside the mortgage contract, was established long ago when the usury laws were in
force. The Court of Equity went beyond the usury laws, and set its face against every trans-
action which tended to usury. It therefore declared void every stipulation by a mortgagee
for a collateral advantage which made his total remuneration for the loan indirectly exceed
the legal interest. I think it will be found that every case under this head of equity was
decided either on this ground, or on the ground that the bargain was oppressive and uncon-
scionable. The abolition of the usury laws has made an alteration in the view the Court
should take on this subject, and I agree that a collateral advantage may now be stipulated
for by a mortgagee, provided that no unfair advantage be taken by the mortgagee which
would render it void or voidable, according to the general principles of equity, and provided
that it does not offend against the third doctrine [i.e., the doctrine forbidding the fettering of
the equity of redemption]. On these grounds I think the case of Biggs v. Hoddinott in the
Court of Appeal was rightly decided." Id at 32 (footnote omitted); see also Kreglinger v.
New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., 1914 A.C. 25 (1913).
440. Noakes v. Rice, 1902 A.C. 24 (1901).
441. See infra text accompanying note 445.
442. 1914 A.C. 25 (1913).
443. A quotation by Lord Davey in Noakes & Co. v. Rice, 1902 A.C. 24, 33-34 (1901), in
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rule against clogs on the equity of redemption only if it is "unconscion-
able," or if it is a "penal clause" or if it was in the nature of a "condi-
tion repugnant," i.e., a condition preventing or unduly hindering
redemption so as to violate the "once a mortgage" rule.
444
Conclusion
The common law prohibition against fettering the equity of re-
demption or otherwise clogging the equity of redemption beyond the
date of redemption is not applicable to SAMs. The collateral advan-
tage of a SAM, if one exists,445 expires upon redemption, preventing
any violation of the rule against fettering.
The common law rule prohibiting all other collateral advantages
grew out of concerns of usury and unconscionability. 446 These con-
cerns have been eliminated by modern statute and case law on the sub-
jects. The usury issues raised by SAMs have been discussed;447 the
following section examines the modern rules regarding
unconscionability.
Unconscionability
In 1979 the California legislature enacted a statute allowing courts
to void a contract or provision thereof on the basis of unconscionabil-
ity.448 However, neither the courts449 nor the legislature has been able
which he states that the fettering rule is a variation on the rule of "once a mortgage, always a
mortgage," suggests that the later cases speaking of "fettering" are all actually cases which
should be treated under either the collateral advantage rule or the "once a mortgage" rule.
The only common thread to the fettering cases is that some right or benefit extends beyond
the date of redemption. An example of the type of case to be treated under the collateral
advantage rule is Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., 1914 A.C. 25
(1913), in which the lender had a right under a contract to buy sheep skins from the bor-
rower for five years. The court upheld the contract, notwithstanding earlier redemption of
the mortgage, because it was not unconscionable. Furthermore, it should be noted that, as
with cases running afoul of the "once a mortgage" rule, this type of contract does not work
to prevent full and actual redemption of the mortgaged property. A case of the type falling
within the "once a mortgage" rule is one in which the mortgagor retained the right to profits
from operation of the mortgaged property for a period after the property's redemption. San-
tley v. Wilde, [1899] 2 Ch. 474 (1899). That case approved the agreement, but was overruled
by Bradley v. Carritt, 1903 A.C. 253; see also G. OSBORNE, supra note 158, at 149-50.
444. 1914 A.C. 25, 56 (1913). As one commentator put it, "Equity finally returned like
the prodigal to an original jurisdiction of rebuking forfeitures and relieving hardship, aban-
doning the vagaries of 'clogging."' Williams, supra note 430, at 49.
445. See infra text accompanying notes 446-47.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 442-44.
447. See supra notes 77-127 & accompanying text.
448. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
"(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
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to define unconscionability. The legislative history, however, is of
some help. It first states, in tautological fashion, that the basic test of
unconscionability "is whether, in the light of the general background
and the needs of the particular case, the clauses involved are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract. ' 450 The comment continues by stat-
ing that "[t]he principle is one of the prevention of oppression and un-
fair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power.
'451
Thus the test for this factual determination remains quite skeletal.
Certainly adequate and meaningful disclosures to the borrower appear
essential in order to prevent "unfair surprise." In the case of a SAM,
disclosures to the borrower of how the contingent deferred interest ac-
crues should occur before the loan is made, and, during the term of the
loan, the borrower should be kept informed of the amount of interest
he or she will be required to pay upon maturity.452
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
"(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the
determination."
449. In Swanson v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404 (1944), the court
stated: "An 'unconscionable contract,' the authorities are agreed, is one 'such as no man in
his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair
man would accept on the other.' Whether or not a contingent fee contract is unconsciona-
ble, even were that term to be given a less drastic meaning than the authorities ascribe to it,
must be determined upon the situation as it fairly appears to the parties at the time it is
entered into, not as subsequent events reveal it to be. Implicit in the nature of the contract is
speculation on the outcome." Id. at 688, 149 P.2d at 407-08 (citations omitted). The case is
significant, not only for its definition, but for its emphasis on the fact that unconscionability
must be adjudged on the basis of the facts at the time the contract is entered, not by hind-
sight. In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1981), the court found a contract to be unconscionable. Though the opinion is 21 pages
long, the conclusion is reached without any indication whatsoever of the reasoning or legal
test used by the court in reaching the decision. Nor is there any citation of authority, other
than a quote from a case involving a collective-bargaining contract, in which the United
States Supreme Court held that "minimum levels of integrity" would not be met where "the
employee's representation by the union has been dishonest, in bad faith, or discriminatory."
Id. at 825, 623 P.2d at 176, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976)). This test seems even harsher than that in Swanson P. Hempstead
450. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5, Legislative Committee Comment-Assembly (West 1979).
451. Id. (citation omitted).
452. It is not suggested that an appraisal be made periodically, only that a set or range of
hypothetical calculations be provided, letting the borrower determine how much the prop-
erty actually has appreciated.
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As to "oppression," an allocation of profits between borrower and
lender in the ratio prescribed by the California SAM statute would, by
virtual statutory definition, not be oppressive. The same would seem to
be true even if a substantially larger proportion were allocated to the
lender. However, the other extreme of allocating all profits in return
for a SAM equal to ten or twenty percent of the purchase price might




A SAM raises a variety of practical questions not presented by
traditional loans. Like the legal questions, these questions should be
addressed before a SAM is consummated.
Improvements
One question involves valuation of a borrower's capital investment
in improvements to the secured property, made during the term of the
SAM, when determining apportionment of the appreciated value of the
secured property.454 A SAM lender would discourage capital improve-
ment of the secured property unless a borrower was assured that the
cost or added value of any improvements would be considered in as-
sessing the amount of contingent deferred interest payable to the
lender.
Examining this issue, two subsidiary problems arise. First, a dis-
tinction must be made between expenditures for capital improvements
and those for repair, replacement, maintenance and normal upkeep.
Second, because a borrower's investment in certain improvements,
such as garages or new kitchens, may appreciate the value of a home
above the cost of the improvement, and because other improvements,
such as swimming pools, may appreciate the value of a home less than
the cost of the improvement,455 a formula based on value, rather than
cost, though more difficult to administer, may be desirable.
.Of the numerous comments made on this problem,4 56 the Califor-
453. In the illustration just given, if the SAM is a second mortgage substantially or to-
tally replacing the borrower's down payment, allocating most or all of the profits to the SAM
lender should not be oppressive.
454. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1917.150-.151 (West Supp. 1982).
455. McKenzie, 4 Comprehensive Look at Shared-Appreciation Mortgages, FHLBB J.,
Nov. 1980, at 11, 14; Letter from California Association of Realtors to the Secretary,
FHLBB at 3 (Nov. 25, 1980).
456. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce,Anaiysi of.B 2168 (Costa)
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nia SAM statute is again the most comprehensive. The statute requires
borrowers to submit to lenders proof of cost and an estimate of the
increase in the property's value by reason of any improvement costing
more than $2,500 during any twelve-month period.457 The lender has
thirty days to contest the claimed increase in value of the property.
458
If the claiied increase is contested, the borrower and lender may either
establish the value of appreciation by mutual agreement or by
appraisal.4
59
Two issues are not resolved by the statute. First, if a borrower
consistently makes minor improvements that appreciate the property's
value less than $2,500 per year,460 it is possible that the borrower will
make improvements substantially appreciating the value of the prop-
erty without receiving any compensation for them. To avoid this ineq-
uity, a borrower should be permitted to submit estimates
notwithstanding the value of the improvements. Then, upon maturity
of the loan, all estimates should be accumulated.
A second shortcoming is the failure to define the term "capital im-
provement," making it difficult to determine whether an expenditure is
a capital expenditure or a current expense. This problem is significant
when the cost of certain normal items of upkeep is examined. For in-
stance, it is not unusual to pay $4,000 for painting the exterior of a
home. If this is a capital improvement, the borrower could add the cost
to the expense of the property. Over the course of a twenty- or thirty-
year term, such costs could accumulate into a substantial figure.
Title Insurance
Lenders making traditional loans normally obtain title insurance
in an amount equal to the original principal of the loan. If a SAM
lender obtains title insurance in the amount of the original principal, it
might not be insured as to any contingent deferred interest. Assuming
the lender obtains a policy in the amount of the principal loaned, a
standard title insurance policy would insure a lender against loss of
interest only to the extent the principal had been repaid as of the time
of a claim under policy.
4 6 1
As Amended in the Senate on August 20, 1981, 1981-82 Reg. Sess. 5; McKenzie, supra note
455; Reichelt, supra note 7, at 41.
457. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1917.150(a) (West Supp. 1982).
458. Id § 1917.150(b).
459. Id.
460. See supra note 457.
461. ALTA Loan Policy-1970 (amended 10/17/70) § 6(a); CLTA Standard Coverage
Policy-1973 § 6(a). The CLTA policy form does not in any event cover "additional princi-
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There are two solutions to this problem. First, the initial title in-
surance policy can be written for an amount larger than the original
principal loan amount.462 This solution has been used to a limited ex-
tent in negative amortization loans,463 where title insurance companies
have by endorsement insured up to 150% of the value of the secured
property at the time of the loan. This form of endorsement is easily
adaptable to a SAM. Currently, however, it is extremely difficult to
convince title insurance companies to issue such an endorsement.
464
The title insurance policy could also provide that the title insurer
would supply the lender additional insurance at fixed rates subject to
certain agreed exceptions. 465 As the property increases in value, and
the lender's security interest in the property increases, additional insur-
ance could be purchased. This solution would create administrative
problems for the lender; in the residential context it would be difficult
to pass the additional title insurance premiums on to the borrower.
The increased use of AMIs, and the clarification of the statutory and
case law relating to these types of instruments, will force title insurance
companies to create special endorsements for these loans.
The Security Instrument
The standard forms of deeds of trust and mortgages used in tradi-
tional loan transactions do not adequately protect SAM lenders. Be-
cause SAM lenders are more concerned with the condition and use of
the secured property than are traditional lenders, SAMs must be more
restrictive than traditional deeds of trust or mortgages.
There are several provisions SAM lenders should include in SAM
pal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy," and the ALTA policy form covers
such only to the extent that the original principal has been repaid. CLTA Standard Cover-
age Policy-1973 § 6(a)(iii); ALTA Loan Policy-1970 (amended 10/17/70) §§ 6(a), 8(b).
However, a SAM's contingent deferred interest obligation being by definition interest, and
not principal, these policy exclusions are not applicable.
462. Traditionally, title insurance companies are reluctant to write policies in amounts
exceeding the initial investment of the lender or owner. In a situation involving a SAM or
other AMI, however, this reluctance would be ill founded.
463. THE GUARANTOR, July 1981.
464. Chicago Title Insurance Company currently has available a special endorsement
for SAMs. THE GUARANTOR, May-June 1981, at 9. Also, the board of directors of the
California Land Title Association is considering such measures. Currently, CLTA Endorse-
ments 111.5 and 111.6, developed for AMIs, could be used to satisfy some of the problems of
SAMs.
465. The allowable exceptions would be determined either as of the date of issuance of
the original policy, or as of the date(s) of issuance of the additional insurance. which date
would be applicable would depend upon the particular title company's analysis of the lien
priority question. See supra text accompanying notes 128-61.
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security instruments. The recorded security document must include
full disclosure of the SAM's contingent deferred interest provisions to
protect the priority of the lender's claim to the deferred interest ele-
ment.466 SAM security instruments should also require the borrower to
give notice to the lender of all improvements made to the premises.
Some lenders may wish to extend this provision to require that the bor-
rower seek written consent from the lender for any improvements ex-
ceeding a specific cost. SAM security instruments should also include
revised foreclosure provisions. The ability of a lender to foreclose
under a SAM deed of trust differs from that under a traditional mort-
gage, because the potential credit bid of the lender includes an amount
that will be indeterminate at the time of the foreclosure sale, unless the
deed of trust contains mandatory appraisal provisions relating to the
contingent deferred interest element.
467
Standard fire insurance provisions of the security instrument
should require the borrower to maintain fire insurance in an amount
equal to the value of the property. In addition, the security instrument
should permit beneficiaries to inspect the secured property from time to
time. Because the appreciation of the property depends on its condi-
tion, such a right could ensure that other provisions in the mortgage
relating to such matters as maintenance and waste have not been
violated.
Finally, SAM security instruments should permit lenders to ensure
that any sale of the property by the borrower is made for a fair value.
If a SAM borrower were to be permitted to establish the amount of the
property's appreciation by a sale of the property, it would be possible to
erode the lender's contingent deferred interest by selling the property
below market value.
Economic Questions
SAMs raise several economic questions for lenders. The first of
these is how nonstatutory SAM lenders should determine the term,
fixed interest rate, and share of appreciation of a particular SAM.
468
The commentators advise the lender to design their SAMs to ensure
that lenders will "break even. '469 The variables of SAMs, however,
466. See supra text accompanying notes 128-61.
467. See infra text accompanying notes 472-75.
468. Angell & Wardrep, supra note 231; Mylod, supra note 22; Reichelt, supra note 7;
Thygerson, supra note 45.
469. Thygerson, supra note 45, at 34. "After all, the source of the contingent interest is
estimated appreciation; the lender can't be expected to supply risk capital for less of a return
than he would get for supplying fixed-rate debt capital." Id.
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make this computation difficult.
SAM lenders cannot accurately predict the rate of appreciation of
a particular parcel of real property. At best, an extremely short-range
prediction of inflationary trends can be made. Thus, the greater the
differential between the prevailing rate and a SAM's fixed rate of inter-
est, or the longer the term of the SAM, or the larger the lender's interest
in the property's appreciation, the greater the risk that the property's
appreciation will not match the prevailing rate.
A second question is whether SAMs may be too volatile an invest-
ment for institutional lenders. Some critics have argued that SAMs
will subject the earnings of an institutional lender to radical varia-
tions.470 As a result, the long-term planning of institutional lenders will
be inhibited.
Although SAMs will introduce some uncertainty into the predic-
tive accounting procedures of institutional lenders, some estimations
will be similar to current accounting procedures. All lenders must esti-
mate the probability of increases or decreases in interest rates in assess-
ing the value of any of their current investments. Such computations
are no different than the mechanical accounting procedures necessary
to carry SAMs.
The critics objecting to the variability of a SAM lender's earnings
have also failed to note that any decrease in property appreciation will
probably be accompanied by decreasing inflation. A drop in the infla-
tion rate will trigger a lowering of mortgage interest rates. Thus, al-
though a lender's return on the contingent deferred interest portion of a
SAM may fall as a result of economic trends, there will likely be a
corresponding drop in the cost of funds to the lender, and a corre-
sponding drop in return on any fixed interest rate loans of that lender.
Also, as inflation slows, the return on the fixed interest portion of a
SAM becomes relatively more profitable. For this reason, a SAM
lender's earnings should not vary radically.
SAM lenders face a third practical problem in that such loans may
initially create a negative cash flow.471 This results from the possible
negative spread between the costs of funds to the lender and the fixed
interest portion of the SAM. For instance, if the fixed interest rate of a
SAM is nine percent and the cost of funds to the lender is eleven per-
cent, an annual loss of two percent must be carried on the lender's
470. Reichelt, supra note 7, at 39.
471. Id at 40.
November 19821 SHARED APPRECIATION MORTGAGES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
books until the contingent deferred interest is paid. The resolution of
this question is, essentially, a matter of the lender's business judgment.
Foreclosure
A fifth practical problem of SAMs involves foreclosure proceed-
ings. The contingent deferred interest element of a SAM may compli-
cate the ability of a SAM lender to determine the maximum amount of
its credit bid at a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
The California Civil Code permits beneficiaries under deeds of
trust to make so-called "credit bids" at the time of a nonjudicial fore-
closure sale.472 All other bidders at a foreclosure sale may be required
to show evidence of their ability to deposit with the trustee the full
amount of their final bid in cash or certified check.
473
A trust deed beneficiary has the right to credit bid "only to the
extent of the total amount due. . including the trustee's fees and ex-
penses. '474 In a SAM, the "total amount due" will not be a sum cer-
tain. The total amount of unpaid principal and accrued interest under
a SAM at any given point is equal to the sum of the unpaid principal
balance plus the lender's share of the appreciated value of the secured
property. Because the appreciated value of the secured property will
normally be determined by either the sales price or an appraisal of the
fair market value, the amount of a SAM beneficiary's credit bid will be
in doubt unless the parties agree to a binding procedure to establish
value.
To resolve this issue, the parties can provide in the loan documents
that, if a notice of default is filed, the trustee or beneficiary may order
an independent appraisal of the secured property in order to determine
the amount of contingent deferred interest owing. The cost of the ap-
praisal could be included as part of the trustee's fees and added to the
beneficiary's credit bid. The appraisal must be deemed binding on
trustor, beneficiary and junior lienors.
Conclusion
A SAM is a novel financing technique, presenting a variety of le-
gal and practical questions rarely encountered elsewhere. An under-
standing of these questions will enable the practitioner to avoid
potential pitfalls, and allow both lawyers and laymen alike to compre-
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hend the great flexibility as a financing tool inherent in SAMs and
other AMIs. Such comprehension is vital to understanding the poten-
tial benefits of SAMs and other AMIs, whether used for residential,
commercial or other property; for purchase financing, construction
financing or refinancing; and whether in times of high or low inflation
and interest rates.

